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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is a study of how racial prejudices
and stereotypes influenced Britain's utilization of Black
military personnel from 1660 to 1997, with an emphasis on
the twentieth century.

In addition to the economic,

strategic, and local causes of British imperialism, the idea
of European, or "White," racial supremacy and Black
inferiority helped to justify the empire to the government
that ruled it, the bureaucrats who administered it, and the
subjects, Black and White, who financed its exploration,
military conquest, and economic exploitation.

Throughout

the empire, British authorities utilized Black colonial
forces to augment the crown's military power and, logically,
the same stereotypes and prejudices against Black peoples in
general informed Britain's policies regarding Black military
personnel in particular.
I.

The Role of Black Colonial Troops
In India, Africa and the West Indies, British

authorities found that "native" troops proved cost effective
because they could better survive their own climate than

2

foreign-born and generally higher paid White troops.

In

1920, the War Office listed the three purposes for which
colonial forces existed:
(i) For the protection of the area administered
by local Government maintaining the Force, or
certain vital portions of it, from external
aggression.
(ii) For the support of the Civil Power in the
maintenance of law and order, including, in
many cases, the protection of the White
population from possible violence at the hands
of the natives.
(iii) Assistance in the defence of the Empire as
a whole in time of war by providing units,
either existing or produced by expansion.1
In addition to assisting Britain to control many lands
and peoples, Black colonial troops significantly augmented
British military strength in the major conflicts of the
twentieth century.

In the First World War, the empire

raised the following numbers of troops

1

(Table 1):

P.R.O. C.O. 537/621.
"Local Defence Forces:
Military Considerations regarding their Composition and
Organization," 6 November 1920.
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Table 1. Manpower Contributions to the Imperial War Effort.
Dead
White Empire
United Kingdom
Dominions
White Totals

5,704,416
1,306,512
7,010,928

662,083
137,639
759,722

Black Empire
India
1,440,437
47,746
Colonies
134,837
3,649
Black Totals
1,575,274
51,395
Imperial Totals 8,586,202
811,117
Source:
Figures from Statistics of the Military Effort of
the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920 (London:
His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1922), 756.
In the Second World War, the United Kingdom's armed
forces grew to 4.6 million soldiers, sailors, and airmen and
those of the Dominions 1.5 million.

Meanwhile, India raised

2.5 million soldiers, probably the largest volunteer army in
history. 2

The "Colonial Empire" proper, which included the

African and West Indian colonies, contributed another half
million soldiers (Table 2):

2

F.W. Perry, The Commonwealth armies: Manpower and
orginisation in two world wars (New York: Manchester
University Press, 1988), 117.

4

Table 2.

Colonial Forces in the Second World War.

Strengths as of :

1 September
1939

East Africa
West Africa
Mediterranean
Middle East
Far East
Fiji and Western Pacific
Caribbean and Bermuda
Mauritius and Seychelles
St. Helena
Falklands Islands

11,119
8,412
1,441
1,742
15,227
681
4,162
263
0

255

1 May
1945
227,864
145,862
17,732
27,052
26,228
11,912
9,921
4,943
266
194

- - - · · · · · - · - - - - · ............__________________ _

Colonial Empire Totals
43,302 471,974
Source: P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice] CAB. 21/1689. E.E.
Sabben-Clare, "The Colonial Military Forces in the Second
World War," 1947.

A glance at the preceding figures reveals the numerical
extent of Black involvement in Britain's military efforts,
but the nature of that service reflected prevailing British
attitudes concerning race.

To summarize, in the Great War,

Britain's Indian troops fought in Egypt and Mesopotamia
against the Turks, in Salonika against the Bulgarians, but
only briefly in France against the Germans.

African

colonial troops fought in the Cameroons and Tanganyika
against German colonial troops, but not in Europe.

In the

Second World War, several Indian infantry divisions, with
large British components, fought throughout the Middle East
and Mediterranean theaters as well as in Burma against the

5

Japanese.

Meanwhile, African combat troops fought in

Ethiopia against the Italians and in Burma against the
Japanese but were excluded from the European theater.

In

both world wars, a majority of the Indian, African and other
colonial soldiers deployed outside their home colonies
served as military laborers, or pioneers, behind the battle
lines in the Middle East and South East Asia.

In addition

to serving in separate colonial military forces, individual
Blacks have formed a small and usually unwelcome proportion
of the British Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force.

It is

contended here that the British Empire's non-European
manpower served in secondary or limited roles primarily as a
consequence of British sentiment concerning race.
II.

Terms
The term "race" has varied in its meaning, from a

single ethnic group, e.g., "the Irish race," to the peoples
inhabiting an entire continent, that is, "the African race."
The complex evolution of British scientific thought on race
will not be retraced in detail here; "race" will refer to
skin color and its cultural attributes within the context of
common British perceptions.

In British eyes, the many

peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean certainly
differed physically and culturally from each other, but they
shared one crucial link: they were not "White," and, thus,

6

lacked the primary qualification needed for political
autonomy.

The all-encompassing term "Black" will identify

non-White British citizens, subjects, and protected persons
of Asian, African and Afro-Caribbean descent.

This usage

follows a trend among scholars and British community groups
to denote a social category within the British historical
experience 3 ,

and largely supplants the negative and

cumbersome device,

"Non-European," as well as the tedious

and repetitive listing of the various ethnic groups
comprising the population of the British Empire.
"European" and "White" will be used interchangeably
because, in colonial settings, the recognition of variation
in European nationalities gave way to the dichotomy between
White and Black.

"European" and "White" were used more

often than "British" or "Briton" by British military and
civilian officials to identify a person from the United
Kingdom.

The term "colonial troops" will refer to those

military forces raised in Britain's overseas possessions and

3

See, for example, Laura Tabili "We Ask for British
Justice: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial
Britain (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) and David
Killingray, "All the King's men?" Blacks in the British Army
in the First World War, 1914-1918," in Ranier Lotz and Ian
Pegg, eds., Under the Imperial Carpet: Essays in Black
History (Crawley: Rabbit Press, 1986); See also,
Wellingborough District Racial Equality Council, "National
Curriculum History: Possible Black History Themes," a
recent pamphlet prepared for school teachers.

7

administered by local colonial authorities, including
India. 4

"Regular," "imperial," and "the forces" will denote

the permanent full-time armed forces

(the British army,

Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force) maintained by the United
Kingdom for service at home and in any part of the empire.
"Volunteer corps" or "the volunteers" will refer to a type
of colonial military force which was often unregulated and
consisted of amateur part-time soldiers.
III.

Historiography
Published works on the military experience of Black

British subjects are numerous, but the most useful tend to
fall within a few general categories, including memoirs,
regimental histories, monographs, and polemics.

The large

number of published personal accounts provides much useful
information on British attitudes toward Black troops and the
inner workings of regimental life. 5

Unit histories mainly

4

For the sake of this dissertation, the Indian army
will be considered one of Britain's Black colonial forces,
although technically, India constituted an administratively
separate entity within the imperial framework.
The India
Off ice ruled India while the Colonial Off ice ruled most of
the rest of Britain's colonial empire.
5

This sort of material is vast in the case of White
British officers.
For accounts by White officers in the
African colonial forces, see W.D. Downes, With the Nigerians
in East Africa, (London: John Murray, 1919) and Gerald
Hanley, Monsoon Victory (London: Transworld Publishers,
1958).
For an excellent account by an officer in the Indian
army, see John Master, Bugles and a Tiger (New York: Viking
Press, 1956. Unfortunately, published accounts by Black
service personnel are relatively few. Among these are E.M.

8

focus on administrative matters and narratives of glorified
events in the particular unit's past.

However, because

their authors are usually current or former members of the
regiment,

6

they often prove as useful as personal accounts.

There are numerous scholarly studies of the military
institutions and war-time experiences of various individual
colonial possessions. 7

Noble, Jamaica Airman: A Black Airman in Britain, 1943 and
After (London: New Beacon Books, 1984) and Elvey Watson, The
Carib regiment of World War II (New York: Vantage Press,
1964).
6

R.A.R. Bent, Ten Thousand Men of Africa:
The Story
of the Bechuanaland Pioneers and Gunners, 1941-1946 (London:
H.M.S.O., 1952); Brian Gray, Basuto Soldiers in Hitler's
War (Maseru: Basutoland Government, 1953); A. Haywood and
F.A.S. Clarke, The History of the Royal West AfricanFrontier
Force (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1964); H. Moyse Bartlett,
The King's African Rifles (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1956);
E.H. Rhodes-Wood, A War History of the Royal Pioneer Corps
1939-1945 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Ltd, 1960). For general
accounts of the Indian Army, see Byron Farwell, Armies of
the Raj, From the Great Indian Mutiny to Independence: 18581947 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989); Philip Mason, A Matter
OIIIonour (New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1974); S.L.
Menezes, Fidelity and Honour (New Delhi: Viking Press,
1993), and Charles Chenevix Trench, The Indian Army and the
King's Enemies 1900-1947 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1988).
For a scholarly study on administrative matters, see T.A.
Heathcote, The military in British India:
The development
of British land forces in South Asia, 1600-1947 (New York:
Manchester University Press, 1995. For an intriguing social
history, see David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj:
The
Indian Army, 1860-1940 (London:
The MacMillan Press, 1994).
7

Peter B. Clarke, West Africans at War, 1914-18,
1939-45: Colonial Propaganda and its Cultural Aftermath
(London: Ethnographicca, 1986); G.O. Olusanya, The Second
World War and Politics in Nigeria 1939-1953 (Lagos:
University of Lagos Press, 1973); O.J.E. Shiroya, Kenya and
World War II: African Soldiers in the European War (Nairobi:

9

IV.

Contribution to Field
The subject of Black people's participation in British

war efforts has received some attention.

In a chapter of

his 1979 dissertation on minority groups and military
service around the world, Warren Lee Young took a
comprehensive approach to the topic in his analysis of the
political consequences of Black service in the British armed
forces. 8

In the 1980s, David Killingray published two

groundbreaking survey articles on Blacks in the British
army. 9

Also, there are several provocative works on the

military participation and exploitation of Black people
which provide valuable information. 10

What has been lacking

Kenya Literature Bureau, 1985); N.J. Westcott, "The Impact
of the Second World War on Tanganyika, 1939-1949."
(Ph.D.
diss., University of Cambridge, 1982).
8

See chapter four of "Minority Groups and Military
Service: Case Studies in World Perspective," Ph.D. diss.,
(University of Cambridge, 1979).
9

Killingray, "All the King's Men," and "Race and
Rank in the British army in the twentieth century." Ethnic
and Racial Studies 10, 3 (July 1987): 276-90.
10

The Caribbean at War: British West Indians in
World War II. (London: The North Kensington Archive, 1992.);
Marika Sherwood, Many Struggles: West Indian Workers and
Service Personnel in Britain (1939-45) (London: Karia Press,
1984); and Ben Bousquet and Colin Douglas, West Indian Women
at War (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991); and J. Lee Ready,
Forgotten Allies:
The Military Contribution of the
Colonies, Exiled Governments, and Lesser Powers to the
Allied Victory in World War II. 2 Vols. (London: McFarland &
Company, Inc., 1985).

10

is a reverse approach to the politics of Black military
service, a study tracing the impact of British conceptions
of race on the utilization of Black service personnel.
In addition to practical, if not insurmountable,
impediments such as deficiencies in shipping and supplies,
the "racial mindset" of the British military and political
establishments limited the use of Black colonial troops.
Inculcated over many generations, racial stereotypes and
prejudices against Black people informed British military
policies but arguments in favor of utilizing Black colonial
manpower challenged entrenched military prejudices.

Hoping

to strengthen the bonds of empire, the politically sensitive
Colonial Office lobbied the services, especially the army,
to provide opportunities for subject peoples to be
"associated more closely" with British war efforts.

In

general, the military establishment's attitudes fluctuated
between indifference to colonial politics and outright
bigotry against Black people.

This study of race's

influence on military policy will complement an enormous
body of historical literature dealing with the military
experience of the British empire and commonwealth as well as
colonialism and race relations.
V.

Summary
In the balance of this chapter, I provide a background

11

sketch of the historical relationship of Britain and its
Black subjects and colonial troops.

Chapters two through

four concern Black colonial troops, i.e., the military
forces raised in the colonies and usually maintained by
colonial governments for local service, from about 1850
through the present.

The second chapter, "Racial Supremacy

and Military Policy," traces how concerns about "White
prestige" tempered British trust in Black colonial troops.
Valuable as Black colonial troops might have been, British
reliance upon them to maintain European rule actually
threatened that rule.

Chapter three, "The Perceived Utility

of Black Colonial Troops," examines the practical arguments
offered by contemporaries to limit the usefulness of Black
troops in the imperial order of battle, including a chronic
lack of White officers, low British estimates of the
fighting abilities of colonial troops and the fear that
Blacks could not withstand the European climate.

All of

these "pragmatic" factors directly related to British
perceptions of "race."

Chapter four focuses on the West

Indian contribution to the imperial orders of battle,
especially in the Second World War.

Black West Indians,

culturally and genetically among the most "British" of
Britain's non-European subjects, ironically endured the
widespread disdain of British military authorities precisely

12

because they were supposedly "too" White in manners and
blood.
Chapters five through seven address the service of
Black individuals in the United Kingdom-based armed forces
because, while the policies affecting the conditions of
service of colonial troops differed considerably from those
of the United Kingdom forces, the stereotypes affecting the
former have frequently impeded the service of the latter.
Chapter Five discusses the considerable role played by
Britain's Black soldiers and sailors during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.

The Georgian-era armed forces

highly prized the service of Blacks, but usually as ornately
attired musicians or laborers.

In contrast, the Victorian

era witnessed a general hardening of racial attitudes
throughout British society, which the army and navy
expressed via the imposition of color bars to Black
enlistment and commissioning.

In chapter six, the policies

of the British government during and after the First World
War are analyzed, in part to test how the intensification
and lessening of colonial political pressures could alter
the military policies of the metropolis.

Many Black Britons

and colonial subjects succeeded in enlisting in the forces
throughout the war and the War Off ice suspended the color
bar in 1918.

The inter-war years saw the forces reinstate

13

their color bars although they were challenged by
individuals, student organizations and politicians, but the
military establishment clung on to this.

In Chapter seven,

the color bar's second suspension in 1939 and its
consequences are traced.

In the Second World War, Britain

conscripted and accepted at least ten thousand Black British
and colonial volunteers.

Many Black personnel received

commissions and decorations for their efforts but others
suffered from discriminatory policies.

Chapter eight will

recount how service professionals, especially within the
army and navy, strove to return to pre-war restrictions.
Overruling the services, the Cabinet decided that, for the
good of imperial and commonwealth relations, the color bar
could not be renewed.

Nevertheless, the forces have never

been completely reconciled to being multi-racial in
composition.
VI.

Britain and Black People
While Britain's relationship with Black people dates

back many centuries, the historical experience of Black
people in Britain has received considerable scholarly
attention only recently. 11

11

Around A.D. 200, long before the

Peter Fryer, Staying Power (London: Pluto Press,
1984); Gretchen Gerzina, Black London:
Life before
Emancipation (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1995); Jagdish S. Gundara and Ian Duffield, eds., Essays on
the History of Blacks in Britain (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992);

14

British conquered vast tracts of African lands and peoples
in the nineteenth-century, the Romans had sent a unit of
African soldiers to Britain.

They received their discharges

and settled there, thereby contributing to the
"Romanization" of the country.

In the Middle Ages, Africans

captured by Vikings frequently participated in their
masters' raids on the British isles, particularly Ireland.
By the late fifteenth century, African entertainers became
common features of English and Scottish royal courts. 12
The Black presence in Britain has been continuous since
the mid-1500s when John Hawkins brought a group of three
hundred African slaves to Britain.

During England's

conflicts with Spain in the late sixteenth century, many
Africans were captured from the enemy and brought to
Britain.

Enough Africans lived in Britain by 1596 to alarm

the crown about the Black threat to the purity of English
blood.

In 1596, despite the fact that she herself had added

an African entertainer and page to her court, Queen

David Killingray, ed., Africans in Britain (London:
Frank
Cass, 1994); Folarin Shyllon, Black People in Britain, 15551833 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1977); Rozina
Visram, Ayahs, Lascars and Princes:
Indians in Britain,
1700-1947 (London:
Pluto Press, 1986); James Walvin, Black
Ivory: A History of British Slavery (Washington, D.C.:
Howard University Press, 1994) .
12

Paul Edwards, "The Early African Presence in the
British Isles," in Gundara and Duffield, 9-29.

15

Elizabeth I called for the expulsion of Africans from
England, thus issuing the first known racially
discriminatory law in British history.
Nevertheless, the ownership of African servants became
fashionable in England among the wealthy and powerful, and
within the monarchy itself.

Elizabeth's successor, James I,

had Black minstrels, and his wife, Black servants.

In the

1650s, the conquest of Spanish Jamaica facilitated the
acquisition of African slaves.

Britain's Black population

grew to such an extent that, in 1731, the City of London
banned Blacks from apprenticeships in trades. 13
Alarm at the Black presence aside, Georgian society
flirted with various clothing and decorating styles related
to Black people and their cultures. 14

For example, the

employment or ownership of Indian servants became widespread
largely because of "nabobs" who returned to Britain after
acquiring fortunes in the service of the East India Company.
Once home, they often attempted to recreate the
luxuriousness of their Indian existences by constructing
Indian-style houses and importing Indian servants to staff
them. 15

Other "Black"-inspired customs among Britons
13

Gerzina, 4; Shyllon, 93, 84-5.

14

V.G. Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 19-22.
15

Visram, 11-13.

16

included the imitation of Africans for social gatherings and
entertainment.

Also, African images became features in the

crests of prominent families, whether or not they had
actually been involved with slavery. 16
The institution of slavery continued in the British
Isles well after the abolition of the slave trade in 1807.
In the celebrated Somerset Case of 1772, a British chief
justice, Lord Mansfield, had ruled that an escaped slave
could not be forced to leave Britain by a master.

This

decision did not, in itself, end slavery in the British
isles, but a Scottish court in 1778 decreed that slavery was
illegal in Scotland.

In England itself, slavery remained

legal for a further six decades. 17
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Blacks continued to arrive in Britain, typically
as seamen or increasingly as students. 18

Numerically,

merchant sailors formed the largest group of Black

16

Gerzina, 5-6.

17

Shyllon, 24-8.

18

0n African students, see Ray Jenkins, "Gold
Coasters Overseas, 1880-1919," Immigrants and Minorities 4
(November 1985):
5-52; Hakim Adi, "West African Students
in Britain, 1900-60," and John D. Hargreaves, "African
Students in Britain: The Case of Aberdeen University," in
David Killingray, ed., Africans in Britain (Ilford, Essex:
Frank Cass, 1994), 129-44.

17

individuals who settled in Britain.

Indian sailors,

"lascars," crewed many of the vessels travelling between
India and Britain while Africans and West Indians joined the
crews of ships carrying transatlantic trade.

Between

voyages, Black seamen congregated in the major ports of
Britain, especially Liverpool and Cardiff and many married
local women.

Until the large-scale immigration of the post-

1945 period, the visible Black population numbered between
ten to twenty thousand.

As individual Blacks settled in

Britain, they and their usually mixed-descent progeny
intermarried with the general population and eventually
disappeared as a visibly distinct presence.

However, the

arrival of individual Blacks continually renewed Britain's
Black population.
VII.

Racial images
An important focus of the historical scholarship on

Black people in the British empire has been the issue of
"race" or "race relations." 19
19

In addition to encountering

For examples, see Christine Bolt, Victorian
Attitudes to Race (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971);
Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1964); Allen J. Greenberger, The British
Image of India (London: Oxford University Press, 1969);
Ronald Hyam, Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); Winthrop D.
Jordan, The White Man's Burden (London: Oxford University
Press, 1974); Douglas Lorimer, Colour, Class and the
Victorians (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978);
and J.A. Mangan, ed., The Imperial Curriculum: Racial images
and education in the British colonial experience (London:

18

Black individuals in Britain, British people observed
thousands of Africans in African and American settings via
trade, war and slavery.

The physical and cultural

differences between the themselves and Africans profoundly
affected the perspectives of many

Britons. 20

In historian

Winthrop D. Jordan's words,
From the first, Englishmen tended to set Africans
over against themselves, to stress what they
conceived to be radically contrasting qualities of
color, religion, and style of life, as well as
animality and a peculiarly potent sexuality. 21
By the eighteenth-century, British racial theorists accepted
that African physical attributes were connected to the
"African way of life." 22

Thus, in the English world view,

"White and Black connoted purity and filthiness, virginity
and sin, virtue and baseness, beauty and ugliness,
beneficence and evil, God and the Devil." 23
The association of racial characteristics with behavior
coincided with a demand for cheap labor in the New World.
Economic interests induced pro-slavery propagandists to
justify African slavery on the grounds that Africans were

Routledge, 1993) .
20

Gerzina, 5.

21

Jordan, 25.

22

Curtin, 30.

23

Jordan,

6.

19

inherently inferior to Whites and destined for servitude.
These sorts of writers propagated the view that Africans
were lazy, sexually aggressive, stupid, and incapable of
improvement.
Ironically, the racial prejudice developing among the
British in the Georgian era did not translate into
segregation or physical danger for Black people in Britain.
Historian Douglas Lorimer suggests that, in Georgian
Britain, Black peoples, including African slaves, suffered
little discrimination or bigotry when it came to interracial marriage or to social relations with Whites as a
whole.

Indeed, Lorimer claims that "no clear pattern of

institutionalized or socially sanctioned discrimination was
in evidence."

Instead, Britons of the period reserved their

violent xenophobia for Roman Catholics. 24
In the late nineteenth century, however, British racism
developed into a widely-held antipathy for Black people.
Metropolitan attitudes towards Blacks had changed during the
Victorian era because of transitions in British social
structures.

According to Lorimer, as the middle-class

expanded and became more highly class-conscious, Blacks,
including educated "gentlemen," in Britain became equated
with the inferior social status of the working class and
24

Lorimer, 28-31.

20

impoverished Whites.

Middle-class Victorians disdained

Blacks and lower class Whites in British cities "equally."
To summarize, according to Lorimer,

"mid-Victorian attitudes

to race rested upon assumptions about differences of class
rather than upon a perception of the unique physical
attributes of racial groups." 25
Late Victorian racial thought rejected previous
philanthropic sentimentality concerning Africans and Asians.
Informed by Social Darwinism and other new sciences, British
scholars argued forcefully for the biological inability of
non-Europeans to improve.

Concurrently, philanthropic

opinion had been disillusioned by the apparent failure of
Caribbean and Indian peoples to improve their societies
along English lines after extensive reforms.

Instead of

adopting English ways, the subject peoples retained their
previous norms and, on occasion, violently rejected colonial
control. 26

From the British perspective, this demonstrated

inherent flaws in Black peoples as well as any other group
that failed to adhere to British, particularly, southeastern
English standards.
In the Victorian worldview, physical attributes and
cultural achievements divided the races of the world into a
25

Ibid., 92-107.

26

Wa1 vi n,

3 3 o- 2 .

21

hierarchy with Anglo-Saxons and other Germanic peoples at
the top.

Although the British regarded all Black peoples as

"children," Asians were ranked higher than Africans in
cultural achievement.

In particular, the British placed in

the front rank of non-Europeans the "Aryan" peoples of
northern India because they most closely resembled the
British conception of physical beauty. 27

In comparison,

Britons commonly believed that Africans had physical but not
mental strength and tended toward a greater degree of
"savageness"[sic] . 28

African peoples, according to this

line of thought, possessed no history, sophisticated
political institutions, or ambition to exploit their
continent.

The contempt felt for Africans could often take

incredible forms as when, in 1873, the Times discussed a
suggestion to settle "industrious" Chinese in Africa in
order to displace the native Africans.

The organ claimed

that, though it acknowledged the African's inferiority to
the Chinaman "as a specimen of humanity," it was not certain
whether or not the world was "prepared for the substitution
of one race for the other after the fashion proposed." 29
Historian and journalist Peter Fryer has usefully
divided late Victorian racism into eight forms of
27

Bolt, 186-7.

28

Ibid., 208-10.
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expression.

As "phrenology," racism informed British rulers

that, because of physical characteristics, such as the shape
of their skulls, Black people lacked "force of character."
As "teleology," racism provided the British with the idea
that the destiny of Blacks was to labor for Whites.
Anthropological racism held that Black people had more in
common with apes than with Europeans.

Social Darwinism told

Britons that the inherent inferiority of Blacks condemned
them to eventual extinction.

In the form of Anglo-Saxon

nationalism, racism reflected a belief in a divinely
ordained mission for Britain to conquer and rule others.
Racism also took the form of trusteeship, or the view that
Britain had the moral obligation to educate and guide Black
peoples, usually for an indefinite period of time.

Finally,

popular racism, expressed through popular entertainment and
jingoistic newspapers, persuaded the British public that
British rule benefited colonial peoples.

All of these

variations of racism served a common political purpose in
that they justified British colonial rule over Black
peoples. 30

29

30

Times (London), 5 June 1873.

Peter Fryer, Black People in the British Empire
(London: Pluto, 1988), 66-67.
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VIII.

Racial Conflict in the Twentieth Century
Victorian racial paradigms remained firmly entrenched

in the British mindset well into the twentieth century.
Nevertheless, the Black population of Britain grew because
of the service of colonial Blacks in the armed forces and
merchant marine.

After the First World War, thousands

remained in British ports rather than return to their home
colonies.

However, the poor economic conditions and job

prospects for all returning veterans, Black and White,
created social stresses throughout Britain.

These tensions

exploded in 1919 with anti-Black riots in several cities
including Liverpool and Cardiff.

Often, the local civil

authorities proved unable or unwilling to prevent the
violence.

The 1919 riots marked the onset of a turbulent

phase in the experience of Black people in Britain.
Between 1920 and the Second World War, racism mainly
took the form of discrimination.

For example, in a pre-war

survey of individuals, families, and guest houses providing
housing for students, about 40 percent "expressed specific
unwillingness to take a coloured guest." 31

Since the Second

World War, hundreds of thousands of Black people have
settled in Britain to escape the poverty or violence of
31

K.L. Little, "A Note on Colour Prejudice amongst
the English 'Middle Class,'" Man (September-October 1943):
105.
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their previous homes.

Eventually, the Black presence grew

to approximately 5 percent of the British population and
concentrated mainly in the larger cities.

Paralleling

trends in the United States, racial strife became a
prominent feature of British national life.

CHAPTER II
RACIAL SUPREMACY AND MILITARY POLICY

Virtually wherever the British established a presence
in an area inhabited by Black peoples, especially tropical
regions, they raised Black troops.

The main regions

"requiring" the employment of Black colonial units included
India, Africa and the West Indies.

Inevitably, "racial"

considerations became limiting factors in Britain's
utilization of Black colonial soldiers.

First, British

reliance upon Black troops to police the empire raised
questions as to just which Black ethnic groups should be
tapped for military service.

Out of this dilemma arose one

of the central racial myths affecting the utilization of
colonial soldiers, the "martial races" theory, which held
that only certain ethnic groups in Africa and Asia provided
good soldiers.

Secondly, the British never completely

trusted the Black troops they did select for recruitment.
The authorities realized that Black troops could and did
occasionally mutiny and, within a given colonial possession,
White military forces of some kind were always deemed
necessary just in case the loyalty and discipline of Black
soldiers wavered.

Therefore, the extensive use of Black
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colonial troops actually reinforced the necessity of
maintaining White units throughout the empire.

Because

regular army regiments and sailors were scarce, the
participation of European colonial subjects in military
units, particularly amateur volunteer corps, became a
necessary support for colonial rule.

Logically, the British

could only extend the privilege of serving in volunteer
units to those peoples thought to be loyal and loyalty
became enmeshed in racial politics.

A third racial

consideration was that the employment of Black troops
potentially challenged the "great bluff" of colonial rule,
"White Supremacy."

After all, colonial troops might have

been called upon to kill European enemies or, worse still,
travel to Europe where they would have close contact with
White civilians, especially women, of all levels of society.
Colonial interests feared that Black familiarity with
Whites, in the form of mortal or amorous embrace, would
lessen European prestige in the eyes of Black servicemen.
Also, the diverse nature of the British Empire and
commonwealth caused troops of various nationalities to serve
alongside each other but the possibility of racial friction
between soldiers from different backgrounds threatened the
internal harmony of the empire and complicated Britain's war
efforts.

27

I. Colonial Forces, Race and "Martial Races," 1857-1947
A.

Asia
The first colonial military force to be considered in

this chapter, the Indian army, was by far the largest
maintained by Britain.

The body of literature, scholarly

and otherwise, relating to the Indian army is vast because
of the force's size and long length of service within the
imperial order of battle.

From 1600 to 1857, the East India

Company functioned as the main agent for Britain in India.
For the first century of its presence in India, the company
focused its energies on securing trade, and its military
forces remained small until the mid-eighteenth century, when
the struggles between Britain and France made India a hotly
contested prize.

The Battle of Plessey in 1757 decided the

rivalry in favor of the company, which received the right to
tax, or plunder, much of Bengal.

The company then possessed

its own economic resources with which to expand its
authority and assume a direct political role in India.

By

1857, the company had either eliminated or neutralized most
of its political opponents in the subcontinent.

Its

military forces were organized into armies based in Bombay,
Madras, and Bengal and consisted of native Indian and a
small portion of European mercenary units.

Regular British

army regiments supplemented company forces, but Indian
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troops always significantly outnumbered White soldiers by
several times.
In its imperial role, the Indian army functioned as a
reserve and "fire-brigade" for British interests in the
entire part of the globe considered by Britain to be the
"East."

For example, under company control, Indian troops

campaigned in the Dutch East Indies in the early 1800s.
Later, under direct crown control, the Indian army fought in
Abyssinia in 1867, garrisoned Malta in 1878, and, toward the
close of the century, provided contingents for service in
East Africa and China.
Just before the First World War, the Indian forces
fielded 241,934 soldiers. 1

The army of the "King-Emperor"

in 1914 looked much different from the East India Company's
forces in the years before the Indian Mutiny of 1857.

In

that year, much of the company's largest military force,
Bengal army, mutinied against its British officers.

the

The

soldiers, a high proportion of whom were high caste Hindus,
had been suborned by fears that Christianity would be forced
upon them.

After the mutiny's suppression, the British

government assumed direct rule of India.

Over the next half

century, the new administration transformed the composition
of the military by drastically reducing the recruitment of
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darker-skinned southerners, including high-caste Bengali
Hindus, while increasing that of "martial races," i.e.,
Moslems, Sikhs and Gurkhas of the north and northwest.

The

"martial races" theory held that some ethnic groups and
castes possessed characteristics such as simplicity,
fidelity, courage and a warrior tradition which others, such
as the previously favored Bengali Brahmins, apparently
lacked. 2
British military authorities attributed to each of the
"martial races" certain unique qualities.

For example,

according to a government handbook on Sikh soldiers, the
Sikh's "natural profession" was that of a soldier:

"offer

him but good pay, and there is no service, however difficult
or dangerous, for which he will not gladly come forward." 3
Freddie Guest, who served as an officer with a typical mixed
cavalry regiment, rated the main types of cavalry trooper
within his unit.

He ranked Hindu Rajputs as the "first and

highest type of fighting soldier amongst the Hindus" while
"the Punjabi is probably the best type of fighting
Mahommedan in India." 4

Following the dictum of "divide and

2

See Pradeep Barua, "Inventing race: The British and
India's martial races," Historian 58, 1, (Autumn 1995): 107117.
3

A.H. Bingley, Sikhs (Simla: Government Central
Printing Office, 1899), 93.
4

Freddie Guest, Indian Cavalryman (London: Jarrolds,
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rule," or, in this case, "counterpoise," most Indian army
battalions, excluding the trusted Gurkhas, contained "mixedclass" companies and platoons drawn from different ethnic or
religious groups. 5

In 1920, a high-ranking Indian army

officer optimistically noted that, "the different races have
their own characteristics; by mixing them you get a
combination of elan, stubbornness, and endurance." 6

More

realistically, by means of "counterpoise," the authorities
in India intended to forestall any united dissent among
members of any particular battalion.

Unfortunately, this

pitting of ethnic groups against one another resulted in
difficulties in the provision of supplies and replacements
during long periods of combat.
B.

Africa
In the early 1800s, Britain's military presence in

Africa remained limited, and usually consisted of small
penal formations or allied African levies.

For example,

Britain established the Royal African Corps in 1800 to
garrison Goree, just off the West Coast of Africa.

1959)

I

Soon,

88.

~ark Houston Jacobsen, "The Modernization of the
Indian Army, 1925-1939," (Ph.D. diss., University of
California at Irvine, 1979), 211.
6

James Willcocks, With the Indians in France
(London: Constable and Company, 1920), 58.

31

the regiment began to recruit Africans because European
soldiers, mostly military criminals, could not survive the
diseases associated with the climate; after 1817, it
recruited only Africans. 7

Until the late 1800s, White

British officers raised temporary levies of soldiers from
African allies to supplement their regular forces.

These

units received few, if any, modern arms and little western
military training but fought in most, if not all, campaigns
against the Ashanti in West Africa as well as in the
numerous campaigns in southern Africa against the so-called
"Kaffirs" and Zulus.
British expansion in western and eastern Africa
necessitated the establishment of numerous small regular
units including the Sierra Leone Frontier Force, the Royal
Niger Haussas, Gold Coast Haussas, and the Uganda Rifles.
Local colonial authorities controlled most of the African
colonial units but the War Office maintained a few of its
own for specifically "imperial" duties such as the
garrisoning of Mauritius and the naval base at Freetown.

By

the early 1900s, British authorities had replaced these
smaller formations with larger military units:

the West

African Frontier Force (W.A.F.F.; later "R[oyal]. W.A.F.F.")

7

J.J. Crooks, "The Royal African Corps, 1800-1821,"
United Services Magazine 15 (1917):
213-221.
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in West Africa and the King's African Rifles (K.A.R.) in
East Africa, each of which contained several regiments or
battalions.

Following the Indian example, the British

applied the martial races theory to their growing African
military forces.

To fill the ranks of the West African

battalions, for example, British recruiters preferred Muslim
and "pagan" northerners over coastal, more sophisticated
peoples such as the Ashanti and Sierra Leone creoles. 8
C.

Limitations of the "Martial Races" Theory
The "martial races" theory had no genuine scientific

merits, but it met British military requirements.

In India,

for instance, the British felt that high-caste Hindu
Bengalis, a favored group before the 1857 Mutiny, could no
longer be trusted.

British recruiters then looked to

Gurkhas and lighter-skinned Muslims and Sikhs of the north
and the northwest.

These peoples appeared to possess the

hardiness, fidelity, and "simplicity" found lacking in their
southern counterparts.

Thus, the "martial races" theory

reflected immediate political and military necessity.

In

the long-term, adherence to the paradigm actually created
problems for colonial authorities.
8

S.C. Ukpabi, "Recruiting for the British Colonial
Forces in West Africa in the Nineteenth Century," Odu 10
(July 1974): 79-96 and J. Bayo Adekson, "Ethnicity and army
recruitment in colonial plural societies," Ethnic and Racial
Studies 2 (April 1979):
153-8.
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By its nature, the "martial races" theory limited the
pool of potential Black colonial troops available to
Britain.

In particular, manpower availability became a

serious question during the world wars because the military
establishments in both Asia and Africa initially sought to
recruit exclusively from minority martial races and not from
the general populations.

In practice, the "martial races"

theory strained the traditional manpower sources of the
empire while others remained untouched. 9

In the case of

Malaya, adherence to the "martial races" theory contributed
to the British defeat at Singapore in 1942 because it had
prevented the British rulers from forming regular military
units from Malays.

Throughout the Victorian era, Malays had

been judged as "effeminate," inherently incapable to resist
conquest, and far from the physical model of White
manliness.

During the early twentieth century, influential

Malays pressed for a permanent military unit until the
British relented in 1933 and created the one-battalion Malay
Regiment. 10

Unfortunately, the regiment remained an

9

In addition to regimental histories, see Aubrey
O'Brien, "The Inexpansiveness of the Indian army," United
Service Magazine ns 54 (February 1917): 376-82; and Rita
Headrick, "African Soldiers in World War II," Armed Forces
and Society 4 (May 1978): 504-7.
10

See Nadzam Haran, "The Malay Regiment, 1933-1955:
Political and Social Study of a Colonial Military
Establishment in Malaya," Ph.D. diss. (University of Essex,
1987), 64-106; and M.C. Sheppard, "The Malay Soldier."
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"experiment" and the British formed a second battalion of
the regiment only in December 1941, too late to
significantly affect the outcome of the Malayan Campaign. 11
Another problem of the "martial races" paradigm was
that, in addition to shunning "effeminate" Black peoples, it
discounted the literate, mostly urban recruits required for
the efficient functioning of modern armies.

The rustic

"martial" peoples of the hinterlands of the empire provided
Britain with brave and capable soldiers for colonial
policing, but, for modern attritional warfare, colonial
infantry and cavalry required the support of massive numbers
of technologically sophisticated soldiers who would serve in
skilled occupations such as lorry drivers, mechanics,
electricians, wireless operators, and artillery gunners.
Unfortunately for British traditionalists, most educated
subjects could be found only among "non-martial" groups,
specifically those with a significant degree of
Westernization.

The British generally held low opinions of

western-educated Africans and Asians on the one hand and
mixed-descent Eurasians and Black West Indians on the other.
In the age of Social Darwinism, these types seemed to be

Straits Times Annual,
11

(1939): 31.

Donald H. Webber, Letter to Wife, 1945 (?), Webber
Collection, Imperial War Museum, London.
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"artificial" constructs and weak imitators of European
culture.

In British eyes, mixed-race and "mixed-culture"

individuals possessed too much of a non-European background,
even if that of a "martial race," to be redeemed by the
supposed superior attributes of White civilization. 12
The case of the Eurasian community in India epitomized
a persistent difficulty facing British colonial rule, the
conflict between existing racial paradigms and military
security.

India's Eurasians formed one the most prominent

groups of "westernized" Black peoples in the empire whom the
British denied a regular military role.

Eurasians,

descendants of inter-marriage and liaisons between
Europeans, often soldiers, and Indian women, usually
identified themselves with the local European community.

In

turn, Whites of Britain's middle and upper-classes in India
usually disdained the association.

Hoping to benefit

economically and socially, Eurasians desired greater
opportunities for service in the British military, but their
possession of "Asiatic" blood made their martial qualities
suspect. 13

Even White proponents of greater Eurasian

12

Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly
Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the late
nineteenth century (New York: Manchester University Press,
1995) and William Moore, "Recruiting the Anglo-Indian Army,"
Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review 2 (1891): 48.
13

F. Loraine Petre, "The Inefficiency of India's
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military participation acknowledged biologically-determined
weaknesses in Eurasians.

For example, the Anglo-Indian

Allen's Indian Mail, argued that Eurasians "may, as a rule,
be better at driving quills than wielding swords or rifles,"
but, "if hereditary instincts count for anything, some of
them must possess a martial spirit and a taste for active
pursuits. " 14

Throughout the history of the Indian empire,

Britain denied the Eurasian community a regular military
function, but they, and other "non-martial" peoples did find
a role in a peculiar sort of military unit, the amateur
part-time "volunteer corps."
II.

Trust and Local Colonial Forces
At times, Britain's dependency upon Black troops

jeopardized the internal security of the empire.

Around the

globe, few colonial governments expected that they could
rely exclusively on locally raised Black troops to maintain
internal security.

In the Caribbean area, several mutinies

by Black troops in the early 1800s had convinced British
authorities to maintain European troops there in order to
guard against insurrection.

Similarly, after the 1857

(May 1903): 385.
14

Quoted in the Times (London), 12 August 1873, p.
6.
See, also, Moore, 47-8.
See also, Arthur N. Gordon,
"Local regiments for India," Empire Review 27 (March 1914):
112-3.
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Indian Mutiny, thousands of British troops remained to
garrison India, even during world war emergencies.

In

addition to defending India from external assault, the
British garrison watched Indian soldiers.

Whenever

possible, the authorities maintained a proportion of one
White soldier for every two Indian soldiers.

They usually

assigned one British battalion with two or three Indian ones
to a brigade, a pattern strictly adhered to until late in
the Second World War.
Since regular army units were often unavailable in
sufficient numbers, White colonial subjects looked to
"volunteer corps" for their self-preservation.

Briefly, the

Victorian volunteer movement had originated in Britain with
the formation of self-supporting, normally unpaid, parttime, and loosely regulated military units in 1859.
Enrollment in a volunteer corps conferred military prestige
on members without the social stigma attached to service in
the regular army and militia. 15
15

In Britain, large numbers of volunteer units
formed during the invasion scares of the late eighteenthand early nineteenth centuries. After the Napoleonic wars,
the public's interest in military matters remained dormant
until the Crimean War, 1854-56. Then, the physical and
spiritual well-being of servicemen became objects of much
concern for reform, and elements of British society
expressed a desire for a closer association with the army
and navy.
They received their chance at military glory in
1859, during a war scare with France.
Tens of thousands of
eager middle class patriots spontaneously formed themselves
into amateur "volunteer" regiments. Thus, they avoided
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The growing enthusiasm for the military in Victorian
Britain paralleled similar trends throughout the empire.
However,

"race," rather than social class, tended to be the

main criterion for membership in a particular colonial
volunteer unit.

The three main purposes of a typical White

volunteer unit, such the Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps,
included 1) defending the colony from external threats 2)
assisting the civil authorities in maintaining law and
order, and 3) training potential officers for other military
forces. 16

Of course, other, if not all, British military

forces shared the same general responsibilities.

However,

the second reason cited is of particular interest here
because, in places where Black populations outnumbered
Europeans, "assisting the civil authorities in maintaining
law and order" meant safe-guarding European lives.

As the

Navy and Army Illustrated put it, a European man in India
"always has hanging over his head the possibility of
suddenly being called upon, not only to defend his own life,

serving in the regular army and militia under aristocratic
officers and alongside members of the lower socio-economic
orders.
See Hugh Cunningham, The Volunteer Force: A Social
and Political History, 1859-1908 (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1975);
and S.P. MacKenzie, The Home Guard (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995).
16
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39

but that also of all those dependent upon him."

17

The

Taranaki Rifle Corps in New Zealand claimed the distinction
of being the first "British" volunteer unit to see combat,
in 1859 against the Maoris. 18

The White settlers of

southern Africa could easily dispute that claim because they
had frequently formed themselves into volunteer units to
fight various African foes since the beginning of European
colonization. 19

Even in nominally independent China, the

British community formed the Shanghai Volunteer Corps in
1853 in order to protect itself from the "natives." 20
Volunteering may have seemed, from the European
perspective, necessary for the security of White civilians
and the maintenance of British influence, but it was not an
exclusively White phenomenon.

Non-European subjects

17
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18
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19
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misfortune.
20
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139; A. McK. Annand, "The Tientsin Volunteer Corps
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throughout the empire formed or enrolled in volunteer units
in order to share in the prestige of military service and
demonstrate loyalty, identity, and equality.

White

reactions to Black volunteering depended upon local
political and military conditions.

In Victoria, British

Columbia, the local Black population raised the Victoria
Pioneer Rifle Corps in 1860, but White hostility caused it
to be disbanded four years later. 21

In West Africa, where

the European population was sparse until the twentieth
century, volunteering began in 1863 when a small group of
African volunteers accompanied a British military expedition
against the Ashantis.

In 1872, African subjects established

the Gold Coast Rifles and the corps, which included African
officers, received permission to become permanent in 1892.
It had an initial authorized strength of one hundred,
although it grew to a strength of four hundred within two
years. 22

In the Far East, Europeans and Eurasians had
21

S.W. Jackson, "The Victoria Pioneer Rifle Corps,"
Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 39
(March 1961):
41-3.
22

Gold Coast Rifle Volunteers," The Volunteer
Service Magazine 31 (December 1894):
313-318. After 1900,
the sparse and scattered European population in the Gold
Coast formed small volunteer units of their own, including
the Railway Volunteers and Mines Volunteers, but the
government did not generally regard them as combat-worthy
because of their lack of training. Killingray, "The
Military in the Gold Coast," Ph.D. diss. (Cambridge
University, 1980), 63-64.
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formed the Singapore Volunteer Rifle Corps in 1854 in
response to riots among the Chinese population.
Indifference by Whites led to its dissolution in 1887, but,
in 1900, Europeans formed a new corps, followed soon by
separate Chinese, Eurasian and Malay units.

Until 1915,

Malayan volunteer corps remained exclusively European,
although local sultans and maharajahs financially supported
them.

Ironically, these Asian sponsors acted as honorary

colonels of units in which they could not ordinarily
enroll. 23
Though British authorities in India denied Eurasians an
opportunity for regular military service, the government
allowed them to enroll in volunteer corps.

The first

"Indian" volunteer units had been formed in the eighteenth
century by British merchants and bureaucrats.

The much more

extensive volunteer movement of the nineteenth century
received its impetus from the 1857 Mutiny during which
Europeans as well as Eurasians quickly established rifle and
cavalry units throughout India.

By 1900, the infantry

component of the Indian volunteers had become a largely
Eurasian body, with Europeans concentrating in the elite and

23
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expensive cavalry units. 24

Despite the practical usefulness

of Eurasian volunteers, many Whites criticized the high
proportion of them within the volunteers.

For example,

Major General Edwin Collen, Military Member of the ViceRoy's Council, asserted in 1903 that "the volunteer force is
intended, and rightly intended, to be a force composed of
men of our own racial characteristics and creed ... " 25

In

regard to volunteering, however, Britain's precarious
position in India negated anti-Eurasian sentiment.
By allowing Eurasian volunteers, the Indian government
encouraged these mixed-descent subjects to look to Britain
for identity and social position.

On the other hand, the

British denied Indian subjects, in particular, westernized
professionals, the right to establish or enroll in volunteer
corps out of fear of arming and training potential rebels.
Indian participation in volunteering became a charged
political issue in 1885 during a war scare with Russia.
Indians, especially members of the western-educated urban
classes, demanded that they be allowed to demonstrate their
loyalty to the empire by sharing equally in its defense.

24
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The opponents of Indian volunteers cited the "effeminacy"
and disloyalty of the western educated urban Indians (called
"Babus" by the British) who wished to enroll.

Ultimately,

the government decided against the inclusion of Indians in
the "Indian" volunteers. 26
In the First World War, White colonial volunteer units
mainly served as officer pools for regular colonial forces,
while Black volunteers assisted local civil authorities in
upholding British rule.

In Britain itself, enthusiasm for

military service had all but disappeared in the decade
following the Great War.

In contrast, the White populations

in the colonies continued to be "militarized," though out of
perceived necessity rather than glamour.

White colonial

subjects remained a key element of the effective external
defense and internal security of overseas possessions.

With

the possible exception of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence
Corps Artillery, which contained both European and nonEuropean members in the 1930s, 27 membership in local
colonial forces normally depended upon one's descent.

The

War Office advised colonial governments to maintain:

1937.

26
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(i) A small 'Active' Force, composed of one or
more of the following types of unit:
(a) Native units with White officers on a
regular basis.
(b) Non-regular native units.
(c) Non-regular White units.
(ii) A White 'Reserve' Force including all male
Europeans not serving in the 'Active' Force
and divided into two sections:
A.

B.

Composed of young men who with their
qualifications are registered, and
who, where possible, receive annual
training
Including the remaining men of
military age, and forming a
'National Guard' for use in
great emergencies. 28

Colonial responses varied but usually conformed generally to
these stipulations.

In the mid-1920s, the Gold Coast

replaced its autonomous African and European volunteer units
with a tightly regulated Local Defence Force (L.D.F.)

for

Europeans and an African Territorial Force with an
exclusively White officer corps. 29

Going a step further,

the government of Kenya required White settlers to enroll in
the part-time Kenya Defence Force. 30

28
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Not only did the racial nature of colonialism compel
Whites to serve in local forces,

racial politics also made

it imperative that they serve at the front during imperial
war efforts.

In 1943, Black Mauritians mutinied in

Madagascar, in part because no all-White Mauritian unit had
been sent overseas. 31

Similarly, after the decision to send

a West Indian contingent to fight Nazi Germany had been
made, the military and political leaders in Bermuda judged
it politically essential to send a separate detachment of
White Bermudians, otherwise, officials on the spot feared,
the whole White population will lose prestige with the
coloured people after the war." 32
The experience of colonial local defense forces
reflected the political and racial complexities of defending
the British empire.

Because of "race," certain ethnic

groups were regarded and treated very differently from
others in regard to imperial defense.

The British felt that

some Black peoples could not be relied upon to provide
effective soldiers.

In contrast, all male White subjects in

the colonies incurred a duty to serve, largely in order to

31
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Bermuda to Lt. Col. C.P. Dawnay, n.d.
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keep the Black populations about them subjugated.
III.
A.

Questions of White Prestige
Black Soldiers in European Conflicts
At the height of the British empire, political, meaning

"racial," considerations inhibited Britain's willingness to
rely on Black troops in conflicts between White powers and
as guardians of British colonial rule.
always been the case.

But this had not

During the American Revolution, the

Napoleonic Wars, and the War of 1812, Britain frequently
employed Black troops against the White troops of France,
Spain, and the United States in the Americas.

From 1817 to

1819, Black West Indian troops garrisoned Gibraltar. 33
Consistent with a deepening British antipathy toward
Black peoples in the late nineteenth century, concern grew
as to whether or not non-Europeans should be used to fight
European foes at all.

In 1878, British prime minister

Benjamin Disraeli brought Indian troops to Malta as a
demonstration of British strength and resolve in the face of
a Russian threat.

Many found this a dangerous precedent,

such as the Spectator, which bluntly stated the risks for

33
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"White prestige" if Indian troops were successfully employed
against European enemies: "they would have learned the only
lesson we do not want to impart,--that Sepoys can defeat
White troops in the open field." 34

Doubts about utilizing

non-European soldiers to kill White enemies with nonEuropean soldiers increased in the years leading up to the
Boer War.
British subjects around the globe viewed the conflict
in South Africa as a crusade for the empire and British
ideals.

The White communities in India, Ceylon, Australia,

New Zealand, and Canada sent thousands of soldiers to South
Africa.

Likewise, Black subjects wished to serve, but

imperial, colonial and Boer authorities considered the open
military employment of Africans and Asians against Whites in
South Africa to be an atrocity and a direct threat to White
rule.

To no avail,

"every officer and man" of the Jamaica

Militia reportedly stepped forward for active service in
South Africa. 35

The New Zealand government declined

hundreds of Maori offers of service,

36

and even the Queen's

own desire for the deployment of her beloved Indian cavalry

34

Quoted in they Madras Mail, 29 March 1878.

35

"The Jamaica Militia," The Navy and Army
Illustrated 4 (28 October 1899): 146.
36

James Cowan, The Maoris in the Great War
(Auckland: Whitcombe & Tombs Limited, 1926), 7.
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to the war zone could not be fulfilled because the British
government formally relegated non-Europeans in this "White
Man's war" to support roles such as wagon drivers and
stretcher bearers. 37
In reality, the prohibition against Black involvement
broke down immediately because of military necessity.

For

example, when besieged by Boers during the first months of
the war, British-held towns called upon Africans and mixedrace "coloureds" to help in their defense.

Both sides

attached African scouts to their forces and on the British
side, many of the sweeps of Boer civilians off the land were
conducted with the assistance of African personnel.

Also,

in the course of the conflict, Boers frequently raided into
the territories of their traditional African enemies,
including the Zulus.

Rather than intensifying the conflict

by openly acknowledging or endorsing Black participation,
each side in the conflict adhered to the charade that it
waged a "White Man's war.n

Occasionally, however, one side

would publicly accuse the other of engaging in the
uncivilized practice of utilizing Blacks as soldiers against
the other. 38
37

See Cabinet discussions for February 1900, in
P.R.O. CAB. 41/25/30-2.
38
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The war in South Africa highlighted Britain's military
weaknesses around the globe, but most British government
opinion still held that wars between European peoples should
be as "civilized" as possible, meaning that Black
participation ought to be limited to secondary roles.

In

1901, Lieutenant-Colonel Altham prepared a paper for the War

Off ice on the organization of colonial troops for imperial
service.

He noted that the war in South Africa had been "a

valuable illustration of the necessity for organizing the
defence of the Empire against far graver contingencies."
However, Altham continued, the burden of fighting a European
enemy would still "be borne by the White subjects of the
King."

The value of Black colonial troops was recognized,

but only in regard to their local defense roles. 39

Along

with Altham, most Britons would probably have agreed with
the Spectator's explanation that, "our coloured auxiliaries
are invaluable, but our sovereignty is built, like that of
the Roman, on the White legionary." 40
The prevailing wisdom that the use of Black troops in

Peter Warwick, Black People and the South African War 18991902 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
39

P.R.O. W.O. 32/8303. "The Organization of Colonial
Troops for Imperial Service," December 1901.
40
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"0ur Black Troops," The Spectator, 23 March 1901,
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"White Men's" wars constituted a violation of civilized
warfare was illustrated in 1909, when the War Office
rejected the idea of using ad hoc "native levies" in its
African territories until an enemy did so. 41

Curiously, the

prohibition was extended to some of Britain's welldisciplined Black colonial troops.

According to the army's

1914 regulations governing the conduct of war,

"troops

formed of coloured individuals belonging to savage tribes
and barbarous races should not be employed in a war between
civilized States."

The War Office specifically exempted the

Indian army, France's African colonial forces, and the
United States' Negro regiments,

42

but not Britain's own West

Indian and African colonial units.

France and the U.S. were

potential allies and Britain probably did not wish to
antagonize them with any unilateral declarations about the
utilization of their own Black soldiers.

In the case of

Britain's own Indian empire, the War Office had recently
begun considering Indian army divisions, with their high
proportion of regular British soldiers, as potential
reinforcements in the event of a European war.

Out of

41

P.R.O. C.O. 537/394. Extract from the Minutes of
the 102nd Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 29
June 1909.
42
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necessity, British policy shifted enough to include certain
Black soldiers in its strategic planning.
B.

Black Soldiers and White Settings
"Vinculum," an Edwardian proponent of the use of Black

troops, asserted that the martial instincts and loyalty of
war-like peoples such as the North American Indians, Zulus,
and Maori, could be nourished in a multi-racial imperial
army. 43

Vinculum's hopes might have had a chance to have

been realized in the course of the First World War, in which
Britain welcomed the participation of hundreds of thousands
of White troops from throughout the empire. 44

As in the

case of the Boer War, Black colonial subjects offered
themselves for military service. 45

Most British and

colonial officials feared the consequences of removing
colonial troops from their normal duties in order to serve
alongside White troops in Europe.

However, the huge

43

"Vinculum," "Imperial Recruiting-Grounds,"
MacMillan's Magazine, ns. 1, (1906):
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Ceylon sent a contingent of several hundred, many
of whom subsequently received commissions in British
regiments. British Malaya contributed one thousand and
Fiji, 680.
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manpower demands of the Great War moved the British
government to reconsider its stance in two ways.

First, the

British called upon their only immediately available
reserve, the Indian army, to provide an expeditionary force
for France within months of the war's outbreak.

Secondly,

as the war continued into 1915 and 1916, Britain needed to
bring Black military laborers by the tens of thousands to
France.
Britain's Black troops received heartfelt welcomes in
France and Britain, 46 but their presence raised serious
concerns for colonial and military officials.

In colonial

possessions, British civil and military personnel expected
that "natives" should be treated as and behave as clear
subordinates.

Except at points of exploitative or

administrative contact, Europeans in the colonies had
attempted to maintain distance from Black subjects.

If,

however, "non-colonial" Whites of various classes in Europe
would be willing to associate with Black soldiers, then
European prestige would be undermined.

Black soldiers would

see Whites performing menial tasks or engaging in scandalous

46
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activities, a far different reality from the pristine and
aloof image of Whites that colonial authorities wished to
display as part of the "theater" of colonial rule.
Inter-racial sexual contact particularly worried
British colonial authorities. 47

Politically, the British

felt that inter-racial sex lessened the respect or awe for
themselves that they had hoped to instill in Black subjects.
Thus, inter-racial sex had become a profound demonstration
of equality and colonial authorities wished to avoid it.
The British made some attempts to keep Black soldiers away
from White women during the First World War, by imposing
curfews and segregating medical care, but the effectiveness
of such measures is difficult to gauge.

Historian Jeffrey

Greenhut argues that the attempts at sexual segregation
undermined the morale and, ultimately, the military
effectiveness of the Indian Corps which fought in France for
the first year of the war. 48

Another historian, Laura

47
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Tabili, suggests that, in the course of the war, British
authorities actually relaxed colonial sexual taboos
concerning Black soldiers' access to European women,
especially prostitutes, as an implicit reward for loyal
service. 49

An alternate explanation for the occurrence of

inter-racial romance may be that the strict enforcement of a
sexual color bar in Europe was impractical.
In either case, British racial prejudices and sexual
anxieties unequivocally reasserted themselves in the decades
following the end of the First World War.

From 1919, the

French government stationed several thousand African troops
in the Rhineland and E.D. Morel, an outspoken English
radical, referred to France's policy as a "horror" and
campaigned extensively for the Black troops' withdrawal.

He

sensationalized tales of mass rape and other violent crimes
supposedly committed by African troops against German
civilians.

Morel's crusade persuaded the Women's

International League for Peace (W.I.L.P.) to adopt the
following resolution:
That in the interest of good feeling between all
the races of the world and the security of all
women, this meeting calls upon the League of
Nations to prohibit the importation into Europe
for warlike purposes, of troops belonging to
primitive peoples, and their use anywhere, except
for purposes of police and defence in the country
49

Tabili, 24.
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of their origin. 50
Despite Morel's efforts, the British government refrained
from interfering in what it considered to be a French
matter, but when it came to the possibility of Britain's own
African soldiers having sexual relations with White women in
Britain, government policy closely resembled the W.I.L.P.'s
position.

For example, when authorities made arrangements

to send West African soldiers to London for the coronation
in 1937, their commanding general advised the Colonial
Office that they be kept away from White prostitutes because
"the accounts of the deterioration in behaviour on the
return here of those Africans who have done so are
deplorable ... " 51

On another occasion, at the beginning of

the Second World War, British officials in Nigeria briefly
entertained the idea of attaching African women to any
African contingent sent to Europe.

Otherwise, they feared,

the soldiers "would obviously consort with White prostitutes
with the most undesirable effects upon them ... " 52

5

°Keith L. Nelson, "The 'Black Horror on the Rhine':
Race as a Factor Post-World War I Diplomacy," Journal of
Modern History 42, 4 (1970): 606-627.
51
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While anxieties over inter-racial sex still existed
throughout the Second World War, British authorities did
little directly, if anything, to prevent it.

Many Black

colonial servicemen in Britain dated and married Whites with
no official prohibitions of any kind. 53

A military censor

reported that Black West Indian soldiers in Italy
"boastfully and luridly" described their sexual relations
with local women in letters home. 54

Unfortunately, in the

course of fostering Anglo-Italian relations, many of them
lost rank and pay because they had contracted venereal
diseases.

According to a Black member of the unit, had the

regiment remained where it was, it "would have been wiped
out without a shot being fired." 55

Though they punished the

contraction of sexually-transmitted diseases because it
inhibited military efficiency, the authorities tolerated
inter-racial sexual relationships

(i.e., prostitutes) to the unit.
The Governor of Nigeria
himself rejected Orde-Browne's suggestion for recruiting
"cooks" because it would create "serious resentment
locally," especially among Christian missionaries. Governor
of Nigeria to Colonial Secretary, 18 January 1940.
53
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C.

Black and White Soldiers
The world wars brought military personnel from various

regions of the empire into contact with one another and
British authorities worried about the political
repercussions of this contact.

White troops had

demonstrated a great deal of contempt, even violence, toward
Black peoples in colonial settings.

As feared, when Black

and White soldiers served alongside each other, friction and
violence frequently resulted.

According to a White soldier

in East Africa during the First World War, fights broke out
between White, Indian and African soldiers when members of
one group transgressed into the camp facilities of
another. 56

In a particularly brutal incident, several

hundred White patients assaulted fifty maimed Black West
Indians in a Liverpool military hospital in 1918. 57
Colonial officials feared that such bad treatment at the
hands of White soldiers would cause dissatisfaction among
Black colonial troops, which would, in turn, be transferred
to the colonies as resentment against White colonial
society.
Apart from outright White bigotry, the most significant

56
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source of tension revolved around differences in pay and
family allowances.

On the eve of the Second World War, each

colonial force had a pay scale based upon local conditions
and types of currency.

Normally, authorities paid colonial

troops at approximately one-half to three-fourths of British
rates.

Only forces from the West Indies (including Bermuda)

received pay comparable to British troops.

In addition to

differences in normal pay, colonial soldiers' families
received allowances at two-thirds of British rates. 58
In order to prevent inter-racial antagonism caused by
hatred or jealousy, military authorities segregated soldiers
of different races as much as possible.

For instance,

during the preparation for the coronation of King George VI,
initial plans to quarter Black colonial troops with White
dominion troops had to be changed for fear of inciting
racial violence between contingents. 59

When contact became

unavoidable, British authorities urged their soldiers to
exhibit a combination of formality and respect toward
colonial servicemen.

A 1940 booklet urged White soldiers

headed to India to avoid being "altogether too free" with
Indian servants, otherwise, they would become insolent.

58
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Conversely, it advised British soldiers not to label all
Indian soldiers together as potential mutineers; instead,
"Tommies" were encouraged to maintain good relations with
their Indian comrades. 60

An anonymous but apparently semi-

official pamphlet, Service Overseas, encouraged White troops
bound for Africa to adopt a "colonial" attitude:

"In all

contact with the natives, let your first thought be the
preservation of your dignity" and the maintenance of
distance from Africans. 61
The British government's aim of preventing racial
conflict conflicted with its enthusiasm for the military
involvement of the Union of South Africa.

Especially during

the Second World War, overseas South African participation
raised concerns about possible violence between Union
personnel on the one side and Black troops and civilians on
the other.

For example, before the Ethiopian Campaign of

1941, the British hesitated about bringing White South
African troops to East Africa.

Strategic necessity

prevailed and, ironically, General Sir Alan Cunningham,

60

0ur Indian Empire: A Short Review and some hints
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military commander in East Africa, reported that he was
"intensely surprised to find [South Africans] even playing
football with the K.A.R. and R.W.A.F.F. battalions." 62

It

would appear that shared hardship and distance from the
Union facilitated White and Black camaraderie in the
Ethiopian campaign.
The Union itself remained a delicate political problem
because it served as a transit base for troops en route
around the Cape, and the guest troops included West Africans
and Indians.

Early in the war, after some Royal Indian Air

Force officers were asked to leave a Cape Town restaurant,
the British decided that no further Indian personnel would
be sent to the Union. 64

In case this stipulation proved

impossible to enforce, Indian servicemen waiting in the
Union would be subject, for matters of discipline, to the
local British representatives and not to South African
military authority. 65

Meanwhile, tens of thousands of West

62
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61

Africans passed through the Union on their way to Ethiopia
and Burma.

The country's prosperity may have impressed

them, but the strict segregation proved somewhat
disillusioning.

Barred from certain areas of South African

towns, R.W.A.F.F. soldiers were also prohibited from
carrying arms and had to be accompanied by officers or
British N.C.O.s when sightseeing. 66

The South African

government obviously did not want its Black population
thinking that Africans anywhere could carry arms like White
soldiers or confidently walk about without close White
supervision.

Issues of race influenced the military roles given
Black colonial troops in an empire justified by and
structured according to a racial hierarchy.
determined who served:

First, "race"

martial races provided Britain with

generally reliable imperial guardians, but for major wars,
the adherence to the paradigm restricted the numbers and
qualities of military recruits.

Westernized and mixed

descent "non-martial" peoples, though enthusiastic to serve,
usually found their opportunities for military service
66
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limited to secondary roles.

Secondly, where Black colonial

servicemen served was affected by the fears of colonial
authorities that "native" troops would be negatively
influenced by contact with White troops and civilians in
Europe.

Britain preferred to keep Black soldiers as

"unfamiliar" with European society as possible, but military
necessity often over-rode these concerns.

Thirdly, the

ethnic diversity of the empire complicated Black military
participation because the fear always existed that Black and
White soldiers would come into conflict.

CHAPTER III
THE PERCEIVED UTILITY OF BLACK COLONIAL TROOPS

Several ostensibly "practical" factors, including a
lack of officers, a relatively low level of military
effectiveness and the fear of the possible effects of a cold
climate on Black soldiers, limited the usefulness of Black
colonial troops as part of the British Empire's order of
battle.

All of these seemingly pragmatic considerations

directly related to British perceptions of race.

First,

until decolonization, the government required that colonial
troops be officered exclusively by Whites.

It was generally

believed that the effectiveness of Black colonial soldiers
depended mostly on their White officers.

The lack of

officers possessing what British authorities held to be the
necessary racial background, education, and character
prevented a greater utilization of colonial troops during
world war efforts. 1

1

Secondly, no matter how well officered
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and effective Black troops might have been, they, with the
possible exception of the Gurkha regiments of the Indian
army, were not considered to be the equal of European
soldiers in fighting abilities.

British sources cited

racial and cultural attributes for these differences and
such beliefs often proved to be self-fulfilling prophesies.
A third frequently cited restriction on the use of Black
troops, either as combatants or military laborers, was the
"Myth of the Black Man's Grave."

In a reverse of the "White

man's grave," which was the fear, based on long experience,
that European troops suffered appalling rates of sickness
and mortality in tropical regions, British authorities
assumed that Black troops were naturally and extremely
vulnerable to colder climates.

The fact that the British

accepted these "practical" considerations limited the manner
in which they could utilize colonial troops.
I.

LACK OF OFFICERS
A.

White over Black
For British observers, the 1857 mutiny of Indian troops

of the Bengal army drove home the lesson that the loyalty of
Black troops to the British crown depended upon how well
their White officers knew their soldiers.

In trying to

establish the actual spark or first step of the revolt,
British military sources almost universally cited the

65

breakdown in the relationship between White officers and the
sepoys, who had been disaffected by rumors that they were
going to be forced to accept Christianity.

In the decades

leading up to the Indian Mutiny, European officers of the
East India Company's army (who themselves were despised by
the class-conscious royal army establishment) tended to be
disdainful of their soldiers.

Although a pre-Mutiny guide

for Indian army officers praised the native soldier for his
fidelity, courage and lack of criminality, 2 indifferent
company officers commonly referred to their soldiers
disparagingly as "natives" and "those horrible Black nigger
sepoys," terms which had certainly gone out of fashion
decades later when, under crown rule, the Indian army became
an extremely desirable posting for British officers. 3
Immediately preceding 1857, military voices warned of
the deteriorating relationship between European officers and
their Indian troops.

Albert Hervey, an officer with the

40th Madras infantry, condemned the racial prejudice which
he often encountered among colleagues and warned against
officers being ignorant of their soldiers' feelings:

"the

2
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poor soldier will be maltreated until his meek and humble
spirit becomes roused, his pride hurt, and the consequences
are attended with fearful results." 4
The "fearful" events of 1857 demonstrated to most
British observers that thoroughly dedicated officers were
needed for the Indian army.

Direct crown rule in India

dramatically raised the prestige of a Indian military career
and by the end of the century, the Indian army drew its
British officers from among the top graduates of the Royal
Military Academy at Sandhurst.

Normally remaining with

their Indian regiments for their entire military careers,
these "Indian" officers considered themselves indispensable
to the efficiency of their Indian troops, whom they referred
to as "jawans" ("youngsters" or "young warriors"), no matter
what their actual age. 5

In 1878, a British officer

expressed the typical opinion that, "the native fighting

4
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material is inferior to the British.

All men require

leading, but the Indian needs it more than the AngloSaxon ... " 6

The official historians of the Indian Corps in

France during the First World War noted that Indians
demonstrated a degree of dependence on European officers
"greater than ... in any army in the world."

Consequently,

they concluded that British officers, no matter their age,
developed the "habit and frame of mind of a father, and
sometimes ... even more the habit and frame of mind of a
mother." 7
The purportedly "unique" relationship between British
officers and Indian other ranks has been a central theme in
discussions about the effectiveness of the Indian army.

For

example, Charles Chenevix Trench, historian and former
Indian army officer, wrote that,
What made the Indian Army tick was the sepoy's
pride in his profession and in his regiment, and
complete, unquestioning trust between officer and
man. But there was a reverse to this coin: it was
a personal relationship between the sepoy and the
officers whom he knew.
If too many of these
officers were killed, and replaced by strangers
who might not speak his language or know his name,
then the Indian soldier might be utterly lost. 8
6
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Philip Mason, another historian and former Indian army
officer, emphasized the Indian soldier's cultural background
in his explanation of the bond between officers and men:
[The Indian soldier] took it for granted that in
any society there were great differences in social
level; some men were leaders by birth, others were
destined to be led. He felt neither envy nor
discontent when he saw the mess dining-room ... On
the contrary, he was proud that his sahibs should
be rich and should have expensive rifles and polo.
ponies
... 9
After having studied the performance of the Indian Corps in
France during the First World War, historian Jeffrey
Greenhut concluded that traditional British views of the
dependence of Indian troops on European officers were
essentially true.

He stated that the soldier-officer

relationship was far more personal than in the British army,
and Indian soldiers expected British officers to be many
things besides simply a manager. 1 °

Conversely, David Omissi

questions the idea of Indian dependence on and devotion to
British officers by citing numerous censored letters written
by Indian soldiers who served in France during the First
World War.

Omissi argues that the letter-writers rarely

mentioned their officers and, thus, were indifferent to

9

Mason, 390-1.

10

Jeffrey Greenhut, "Sahib and Sepoy," Military
Affairs 48 (January 1984):
15-18.
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them.

11

It is doubtful whether this line of reasoning does

more than suggest indifference among the literate minority
of Indian soldiers, and, unfortunately, Omissi does not
differentiate between the "peace-time" Indian army and its
expanded war-time incarnation which suffered from heavy
casualties.

Whether or not Omissi correctly interprets the

mail of the Indian Corps in France, his theory would
probably not apply to the "peacetime" Indian army, in which
officers and men developed relationships over years rather
than days or hours.
European officers themselves expected to function
differently in their Indian postings than they would in a
British regiment.

Sir William Slim, famed Indian army

general of the Second World War, found that, in contrast to
British troops,

Indian troops responded immediately and

intensely to emotional and spiritual appeals. 12

To be

effective leaders, and thereby prevent another Mutiny,
British officers believed that they had to take an active
paternal interest in their soldiers' cultural and religious
practices, especially the complex concept of "izzat" or
honor.

On leave, they traveled in their soldiers' home

11
12

0missi, 103-106.

William Slim, Defeat into Victory (Dehra Dun:
Natraj Publishers, 1981), 188.
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districts and visited pensioners of their regiment.

In

return for this personal concern, soldiers often initiated
deserving officers into their particular ethnic group or
caste. 13
In Africa, officers for colonial troops volunteered for
the duty and, after serving for a term of several years,
normally returned to their British regiments.

Service in

Africa offered junior officers better opportunities for
higher pay, adventure, and active command responsibilities
than they could receive at home.

A World War II brochure,

intended as an introduction to Nigerian soldiers for
European personnel, summarized the unique difficulties
ahead:
You may like the African or you may not, but if
you feel that he really is an impossible
individual remember these things: (i) He probably
cannot understand what you say and nobody is at
their best under these circumstances.
(ii) He may
never have left his village until he joined the
army and he probably finds everything very strange
and frightening.
(iii) If he is 'educated', his
father almost certainly was not, and what you have
acquired in many generations is being forced on
him in one . 14
Newly posted British officers and N.C.O.s found themselves
in a foreign place among peoples who presumably viewed the

13

Masters, 119; Guest, 90.

14

Tribes in the Nigerian Military Forces:
Their
Customs and Markings (Lagos: Government Printing Office,
1943)' 5.
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world very differently from western Europeans.
British sources expected that, in order to transcend
the wide cultural gulf, African troops required better
officers than British soldiers.

According to Francis

Lugard, African troops needed the sort of European leaders
who would empathize with and be proud of their soldiers. 15
A 1942 booklet implored new officers to remember that,

"by

European standards [African soldiers] are children, and that
you are their 'father and mother' for the moment. " 16
Similar to the usage of "jawan" in the Indian army, British
officers in the African colonial forces often referred to
their soldiers with such terms as "my Africans," "our
Africans," and "the Africans." 17

Officers found that

African troops responded positively to a familiar approach
without the "stern reserve" supposedly characteristic of

15

Francis Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical
Africa, (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922), 577-8.
For other examples, see P.R.O. C.O. 96/379. "Report of
Mutiny of the West African Regiment." 5 May 1901; J.F.
Whitacre Allen, "An African Army:
Some Possibilities,"
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 63 (1918):
658; Haywood and Clarke, 451; and Moyse-Bartlett, 572.
16

"The African Soldier in the Nigeria Regt.," 1942.
See also, J.A. Kent, "Funga Safari" I, n.d., TMs, Imperial
War Museum, London, 6-9.
17

Hanley, 253; Charles Carfrae, "Nigerians at War,"
Blackwood's Magazine, (September 1946): 184; and Israel,
159.
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British units. 18

Army psychiatrist Captain N. Dembovitz

reported that Africans responded positively to "flattery of
the most naive sort," but warned that they resented verbal
abuse, never forgiving Europeans who denigrated their skincolor or the legitimacy of their births. 19

The apparent

"dependency" of African soldiers on White officers revealed
itself especially in combat situations.

In European eyes,

Africans needed to know and trust their officers personally
and tended to panic in battle when led by officers with whom
they had not time to develop a personal rapport. 20

British

officers commonly felt that African troops developed a
mystical attachment to them.

For example, P.B. Poore

discovered during the Burma campaign, 1944-45, that his
soldiers considered him lucky because he had a "good and
powerful 'Ju Ju.'"

Even if he blundered, his soldiers

expected that his "ju ju" would retrieve a dangerous

18

W. Lloyd-Jones, K.A.R.

(London: Arrowsmith, 1926),

142-3.
19

N. Dembovi tz, "Psychiatry amongst West African
troops," Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 84 (1945)
72.
20

Allen, 658;
Patrick Leslie Edwards, Interview,
Transcript, n.d., Department of Sound Recordings, Imperial
War Museum, 7; R. C. Glanville, Interview, Transcript,
n.d., Department of Sound Recordings, Imperial War Museum,
London, 74; Haywood and Clarke, 451; and Moyse-Bartlett,
572.
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situation. 21
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries White officers depended upon the assistance of
several types of "native officer"

(N.O.) who did not hold

commissions equal to that of European officers.

Their

powers of command were limited to non-European troops and
the most senior of them was subordinated to the lowliest
young British officer fresh out of Sandhurst.

Indian N.O.s,

termed "Viceroy Commissioned Officers (V.C.O.s)" rose from
the ranks according to seniority and, thus, had much
experience, if little formal education.

In addition to

their command responsibilities as platoon commanders, they
helped European officers learn Indian customs and languages.
In the massive world war expansions of the Indian army,
V.C.O.s became more crucial as intermediaries because fresh
officers from Britain did not attain fluency in Urdu, the
main language of the Indian army, before being posted to
Indian units. 22

Despite the proven value of V.C.O.s,

British military authorities doubted the ability of Indians
to function effectively as regular, or King's Commissioned
Officers (K.C.O.s).

General Willcocks, the commander of the

21

P.B. Poore, "The First Kaladan Campaign," n.d.,
TMs, Imperial War Museum, 69-70.
22

J. B. Harrison, "A Temporary Officer in a Temporary
Battalion," Indo-British Review 16 (1989): 103-4.
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Indian Corps in France in the Great War, considered Indians
"well fitted" to replace fallen European officers
temporarily but he did not believe that they could
permanently do so as commissioned officers, their obstacles
being training and temperment. 23
In Africa by the 1890s, there existed potential
conflicts between N.O.s and the British non-commissioned
officers (N.C.O.s) who appeared in increasing numbers to
help administer African battalions.

If N.O.s attempted to

assert authority over White sergeants, it was feared,

all

concerned, including political leaders, would be
embarrassed.

By 1900, British authorities in West Africa

had decided to end N.O.s. altogether. 24

In East Africa, the

K.A.R. finally terminated its N.O. ranks in 1931. 25

W.

Lloyd-Jones, a pro-African K.A.R. officer, acidly remarked
that nothing had irritated European settlers "so much as to
see a 'jumped-up nigger,' so it may easily be imagined that
the uniform of an African officer of the K.A.R. is to them
anathema." 26

Still needing collaborators, the British

23

Willcocks, 6.

24

Killingray,

25

Moyse-Bartlett, 465.

26

Lloyd-Jones, 104.
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relied upon African N.C.O.s who, by regulation, always fell
under the authority of White N.C.O.s.

A.N.C.O.s became

essential for the effectiveness of newly assigned British
officers who required at least two months to develop into
efficient leaders of colonial troops. 27
In the Victorian era, Britain excluded non-Europeans
from officer commissions in its colonial forces, but this
may not have always been the case.

Immediately after the

American Revolution, the British appointed Stephen Bluche, a
prominent Black Loyalist residing in Nova Scotia, as a
Lieutenant Colonel
title)

(probably an honorary or provincial

in command of the Loyalist "Black Guides and

Pioneers." 28

British commanders in the West Indies during

the Napoleonic Wars had occasionally incorporated captured
enemy Black troops, including a few of their Black officers,
into their own service. 29

Early in its existence, the

Lt. Col. w. P. B. Arkwright, "With the Nigerians in
the East African Campaign," Journal of the Royal Scots
Fusiliers 18, 1 (January 1951): 37.
27

28

Graham Russell Hodges, ed., The Black Loyalist
Directory (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996), xxiii;
In a
letter to the author dated March 13, 1996, Hodges stated
that Bluche, "like other Black military figures fighting for
the English in the Revolution, received informal titles out
of respect rather than actual rank."
29

Peter M. Voelz, Slave and Soldier: The Military
Impact of Blacks in the Colonial Americas, (New York:
Garland Publishing, 1993), 153.

76

Sierra Leone militia contained Black officers who commanded
White as well as Black personnel. 30

Until the 1860s,

Canadian militia regiments, including predominately White
units, often appointed or elected Black officers. 31
Individual Blacks thus served as officers in part-time
colonial forces, being accepted more or less as "equals" by
Whites with whom they served, but they could not yet obtain
regular commissions.
In the 1820s, suggestions circulated that Black
officers be commissioned for African colonial service in
order to spare the lives of European officers. 32

Sir Neill

Campbell, Governor-in-Chief of the Cape Coast, proposed that
such officers could be found "among the sons of the European
merchants who have been educated in England and for whom
there is no employment after the death of their fathers.
They would not require much pay, no half-pay, no
pension ... " 33

Other colonial officials questioned the

wisdom of appointing Black officers.

30

York:

For example, from

James St. G. Walker, The Black Loyalists,
Africana Publishing Co., 1976), 192.
31

Winks, 150-153.
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Voelz, 44, 154-5, 250.
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Campbell to Bathhurst, 12 November 1826, in G.E.
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History, 1807-1957 (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1964),
105-107.

77

Barbados, Governor Warde related the "strong jealousy" of
his colony's White population toward such advancement of
"free coloured people." 34

Racial anxiety notwithstanding,

William Smellie, a Black West Indian, received a commission
in the Royal African Colonial Corps in 1827. 35

Meanwhile, a

debate followed in the War Office as to the value of Black
officers.

The Duke of Wellington, professional head of the

British army, disliked the idea of utilizing groups of Black
officers but he conceded that there might be Black
individuals who were fit to be commissioned. 36

In any

event, the brief flirtation with appointing Blacks to
colonial military commands apparently ended with Smellie,
who left the service after embezzling funds.

37

Any willingness on the part of the British government
to experiment with Black officers dissipated by the late
nineteenth century.

By then, War Office policy prohibited

the normal commissioning of Black officers in the colonial

34

P.R.O. C.O. 28/100. Warde to Horton, 20 January
1827, quoted in Eric Williams, ed., Documents on British
West Indian History (Port-of-Spain: Trinidad Publishing,
1952) I 219.
35

Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone
(London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 178.
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forces because the empire was justified and structured along
racial lines.

The commissioning of Asian or African

officers on an equal basis with Britons threatened the
underlying assumption of the Victorian empire, inherent
White moral and intellectual superiority.

In 1902, Captain

Owen Wheeler plainly argued in the Navy and Army Illustrated
against commissions for Indian princes because, "this might
conceivably mean the subordination of a British combatant
officer to one who, although of princely lineage, was still
not of the blood and colour that mean almost everything in
India where mastery and leadership, especially in the field
against alarming odds, are concerned." 38

In other words,

Black subjects could not be given the opportunity of
command, as that would demonstrate racial equality in
leadership roles.
In addition to the question of White prestige, the
British rationalized that Asians and Africans did not
possess nor learn the abilities necessary for command.

The

overwhelming majority of officers in the British crown's
various colonial forces would have agreed with A.A.S.
Barnes, an officer with the short-lived Chinese Regiment,
when he credited the White British officer with possessing
a way of identifying himself with those under him,
38

Captain Owen Wheeler, "Soldier Princes of India,"
Navy and Army Illustrated (13 December 1902):
333.
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of familiarising himself with their interests,
their likes and dislikes, that distinguishes him
from the officers of other races, and gives him
his unique power of making soldiers out of any
material that comes to his hand. 39
Thus, it was generally accepted that White British officers
had the natural ability to command soldiers of any ethnic or
racial background.
Not only did the necessity of having White officers
over Black soldiers usually appear self-evident, any White
officers sufficed during world war expansions of colonial
military forces.

Frequently, colonial forces received

inexperienced and incompetent "war-time" British officers
and, in the case of the R.W.A.F.F. in 1941-43, exiled Polish
army officers possessing little or no knowledge of Africa,
colonial race relations or the English language. 40
British authorities often asserted that Blacks could
not overcome "inherent" character flaws.

They assumed that

Indians lacked the confidence, self-reliance, organizational
ability, and initiative necessary for command. 41

In 1927, a

39

A.A. S. Barnes, "The Passing of the Chinese
Regiment," United Service Magazine 25 (1902):
634-6.
40
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British officer commenting about "Indianization" under the
pseudonym, "Jewan Singh," wrote that Indian officers, coming
from diverse backgrounds, would not work well together, but
British officers would "keep the peace--at least outwardly."
He warned that weak points in the Indian character such as
"slackness and indolence" prevented Indians from being
efficient officers. 42

Leonard Handley, another White

officer, argued that caste-ridden Indian officers would be
susceptible to nepotism, bribery and corruption. 43

British

reactions to the idea of African officers were at least as
negative as those expressed about Indian officers.

For

example, Kenneth Gandar Dower, an adventurer and journalist
who celebrated the accomplishments of East African troops
during the Second World War, chided those calling for
African officers:

"No one who has not been to Africa can

realise how dependent the African is on the initiative of
the White man in times of crisis." 44

In other words,

children had no business being placed in positions of
parental authority.

42

"Jewan Singh," "Some Aspects of the Indian army
and its Indianization," Army Quarterly 22 (June 1931):
361,
363.
43

Leonard Handley, Time's Delinquency
Hutchinson & Co., 1935), 53-74.
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Even had Britain abruptly changed policies in 1900 to
allow Black subjects to compete for commissions, other,
longer-term aspects of British racialism probably would have
severely limited the number of potential candidates.

India

possessed a large number of western educated middle class
gentlemen, but they came from southern Indian cities and
tended toward political consciousness.

Neither of these

characteristics endeared them to the military authorities
who derided such westernized Indians, "Babus," as
"effeminate" and untrustworthy. 45

In contrast, education

policy in Africa actually limited the number of western
educated Africans.

For the first half of the twentieth-

century, for example, British East African education policy,
whether missionary or government sponsored, focused on
providing Africans with basic literacy and vocational
training, but avoided a literary, or liberal, education.
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, European officials complained about the
supposedly damaging effects even limited liberal education
could have on the African character.

Educators prepared

African students to function as laborers and mechanics in
45

See Suresh Chandra Ghosh, "'English in taste, in
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African students to function as laborers and mechanics in
the settler-dominated economy, and not for a life of
intellectual reflection and decision-making. 46

Therefore,

in all likelihood, most "educated" Africans, particularly in
Kenya, lacked the educational qualifications for
commissioning, even if African officers had been allowed.
At the height of the Victorian empire and its related
racialism, two notable exceptions to the color bar existed
which did not necessarily challenge White supremacy.

No

"colour bar" to Black officers existed in that portion of
India normally referred to as the "princely states."

These

territories, which comprised about one-third of India, had
surrendered their foreign policy to Britain in exchange for
internal autonomy under their traditional rulers.

After

1885, the British reformed the military forces of the Indian
princes in order to make them more effective and able to
assist the imperial forces.

Officered by Indians and often

commanded by the "princes" themselves, these forces became
known as Imperial Service Troops (I.S.T.), and proved to be
a welcome addition to the regular forces of the Indian army.
I.S.T.s served alongside European-officered regiments in
46

G.D. Killan, The 'Educated African' Theme in
English Fiction About Africa, 1884-1939," Phylon 27 (1966),
155-64 and Anthula Natsoulas and Theodore Natsoulas,
"Racism, the school and African education in colonial
Kenya," in Mangan, 109-134.
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numerous campaigns within India and overseas.

47

I.S.T.

officers were a common sight in Europe during the First
World War; the rulers of fifteen princely states served in
France and their presence was publicly lauded. 48

One of the

more prominent Indian princes, Lieutenant-General His
Highness Sir Pertab Singh of Jodhpore, commanded his
Jodhpore Lancers in France at age seventy, but survived the
war despite ardent hopes to die while leading a cavalry
charge. 49

Britain allowed I.S.T. officers to exist because,

as soldiers of nominally autonomous states, they did not
represent threats to White prestige in the parts of India
directly under the rule of the crown.
In a second recognized exception to the color bar,
Britain appointed Blacks to serve as military physicians
within the colonial forces.

The India Act of 1853 opened

47

Farwell, Armies of the Raj, 220-235. Major Bir
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"Two
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July 1902), 476.
48

St. Nihal Singh, "Indian Rajas at the front," The
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the Indian Medical Service to Indian subjects and by 1909,
109 Indians received I.M.S. appointments. 50

In the Great

War, the British commissioned almost seven hundred to serve
as medical officers with the Indian forces.

51

Several West

Africans received similar appointments, the best known of
whom, James Africanus Horton of Sierra Leone, entered the
army's service in 1860 after being educated in Edinburgh.
He experienced some resentment at the hands of White
officers in West Africa, but became a prominent scientist in
the region. 52

Thus, in limited circumstances, "coloured"

subjects could aspire to be military physicians but this did
not signify racial equality, since they never possessed
powers of command or discipline over White military
personnel.

Instead, the policy shows that White doctors

willing to risk their lives in tropical regions were
difficult to recruit.
The commissioning of Black line officers in colonial
military units formed a crucial part of the process of
transferring power from imperial to local control during the
period of decolonization.

In their policies of

50
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"Indianization" and "Africanization" of colonial officer
corps, British military authorities behaved as if they
accepted racial equality even when, in reality, they often
did not.
In the decade before the First World War, British
policy makers had already begun to discuss when and how
Indians would be granted commissions in the Indian army.
Hoping to appease its traditional allies, the British
granted Indian aristocrats the right to attend Imperial
Cadet Colleges and obtain commissions in a hollow military
organization called the "Indian Native Land Forces."

These

commissions, first awarded in 1905, qualified their holders
to serve in the Indian States Forces and on the staffs of
British generals. 53
Debates about commissioning Indians continued and, in
1917, the Indian government introduced an interim policy of
sending ten Indian candidates per year to Sandhurst from
prominent families among the martial races.

At Sandhurst,

Indian cadets often suffered from racism such as paying
higher tips to servants, sitting separately at the cinema,
and, under pressure, absenting themselves from situations
where they might have contact with White women.
53

Also, in

DeWitt C. Ellinwood, "A Rajput aristocrat in
imperial service," Inda-British Review 15 (December 1988):
93.
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general, the British did not promote Indian cadets to posts
of authority. 54

Most revealing of all, on one occasion, an

Indian army officer attempted to recruit future officers
from among an assembly of cadets by assuring them, including
the Indian cadets in attendance, that "there will be no
chance of you having to serve under Indians." 55
Successful Indian Sandhurst graduates became King's
Commissioned Indian Officers (K.C.I.O.s).

In 1932, in order

to increase the pace of Indianization, the Indian government
established an Indian military academy at Dehra Duhn to
train Indian Commissioned Officers (I.C.O.s), whose
authority would not extend to British personnel.

Thus, the

newer and more numerous local Indian commission lacked the
power and prestige of the sovereign's commission. 56
Integration of the officer corps proceeded slowly and, in
1939, the Indian army included 4,424 officers, of whom only
396 were Indians. 57
54

Muchu Chaudhuri, "Sandhurst Revisited,"
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Indianization brought new tensions to the regiments of
the Indian army.

Initially, Indian other ranks appeared to

be apprehensive about Indian officers. 58

One Indian officer

attributed this to British officers who, he claimed, had
"conveyed an impression" to Indian troops that Indian
officers would be "partial to them in promotion, welfare and
in other respects ... " 59

Moreover, White officers sometimes

reacted ambivalently toward Indian colleagues as political
and racial tensions entered the officers' messes. Mohammand
Ayub Khan recalled that,
there was trouble in the Mess because the British
officers would not let us have the food we
wanted ... Then there was dissension over the
question of music, when we wanted Indian records
as well as western ones in the Mess. 60
Except for the required social and training activities,
Britons and Indians usually did not mingle.

When off-duty,

British officers normally frequented local European-only
clubs although, in Iraq before the Second World War, "Timmy"
Thimayya's commanding officer forced the Basra European club
to admit Indians. 61
58
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By the late 1930s, Indian applications for army
commissions declined and Indianization faced serious
difficulties.

The discriminatory restrictions on their

authority had tempered the enthusiasm of potential officers
while the Indian police and civil service actually offered
better chances for advancement. 62

According to historian

Chandar Sundarum, these forms of racial discrimination
towards Indian officers (and other ranks) played a major
role in the creation of the Indian National Army, an antiBritish military formation raised by the Japanese after the
fall of Singapore during the Second World War. 63
The wartime expansion of the Indian forces provided
more opportunities for commissioning and advancement.

By

1945, the Indian army contained 32,752 British and 13,947
Indian officers. 64

The discrepancies in authority between

king's and Indian commissions did not survive the war.

In

1942, the War Office considered an Indian government
proposal to grant I.C.O.s the power to punish White
personnel, in order to make their authority fully effective
and equal to White officers.

62

The War Office conceded this

Sharpe, 51-2.

63

Chandar S. Sundaram, "Soldier Disaffection and the
Creation of the Indian National Army," Indo-British Review
18 (1990):
155-162.
64

Perry, 115.

89

measure as a logical consequence of "Indianization," but
hesitated to implement on the grounds that it would
undermine White prestige in India at a time of internal and
external danger.

The War Office informed the India Office

that the change in regulations should be delayed, but if
this was unacceptable, then the matter should be referred to
higher authority. 65

Subsequently, the War Cabinet decided

in favor of the Indian government. 66

Inevitably, some White

personnel refused to accept this decision.

For example, a

South African officer serving in Burma balked at serving
under an Indian, and successfully requested to be
transferred to another unit. 67
In the decade following the First World War, West
African colonial authorities occasionally considered
granting commissions in the R.W.A.F.F. to Africans, but
policy-makers could not agree on conditions or timetable. 68

65
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Such was the extent of anxiety over White prestige, that, on
the occasion of the 1937 coronation, authorities prohibited
White stewards from waiting on the African N.C.O.s who had
been invited to attend.

Also, the guests traveled by

steamer to Britain in strictly segregated quarters. 69

In

that same year, however, both the Colonial Office and Sir
George Giffard, the military commander in West Africa,
strongly supported a proposal to open the officer corps of
the part-time Territorial Battalion of the Gold Coast
Regiment to Africans.

By 1939, the authorities decided that

an African, who served for two years in the ranks and had
the educational qualifications, could apply for a commission
in the part-time Territorial Battalion.

The War Office

agreed to the scheme after it received assurances that
Europeans would not serve under African officers.

The

Territorial Battalion would be "Africanized" from the bottom
up, with slots being gradually closed to Europeans. 70
Only two Africans, Seth K. Anthony and Tom Impraim,
received commissions in the R.W.A.F.F. before the end of the
Second World War.

Fearful of being accused of racial

discrimination, the Colonial Off ice overcame deep War Off ice

69
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reluctance to grant King's emergency commissions to African
officers.

Consequently, Anthony,

Impraim and those who

followed held full power of command and punishment over
White personnel.

In 1948, at the end of the wartime

emergency, the War Office debated whether these King's
commissions should be replaced by local governor's
commissions which precluded any authority over White
personnel.

It was decided that this change would be seen as

racial discrimination, because White British officers
seconded to the West African forces from regiments of the
British army would continue to hold King's commissions.
Also, it would be inconsistent because African residents of
Britain could already earn King's commissions in British
regiments (see Chapters Seven and Eight) . 71

In January

1955, Britain finally granted Africans the privilege to gain
Queen's commissions in the East African Land Forces. 72
II.

Military Effectiveness: Black v. White troops
Until the inter-war period, military authorities

usually cited biology as the reason for the inferiority of
Black to White troops.

However, reflecting the intellectual
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abandonment of Victorian racialism taking place in Britain,
British military leaders, by the Second World War, tended to
attribute differences in military efficiency to cultural
factors, especially education.
Historically, the British did not think that the
"native" troops of the Indian army, with the probable
exception of Gurkhas, could equal White troops in military
effectiveness.

In 1867, a Parliamentary Select Committee

investigated the possibility of substituting Indian for
British troops in overseas garrisons.

Several of the

witnesses who testified before the Committee held that
British soldiers were twice as effective as Indian troops.
The Committee accepted that, for merely showing the flag,
Indian troops were adequate.

If, on the other hand,

colonial garrisons had a genuine military role against
serious attack, then their effectiveness should not be
reduced by substituting Indian for British troops.

In

contrast, supporters of a greater Indian role in def ending
the empire stated that service in the colonies would instill
loyalty in Indian troops, and prepare them for imperial
conflicts outside of Asia.

Critics feared the possible

lessening of White prestige by interaction with and friction
between Indian troops and European colonists.

Ultimately,

the Select Committee recommended that Indian troops should

93

be used in colonial garrisons close to India, but never
exclusively. 73
In addition to enforcing fidelity, the policy of
employing British and Indian units alongside each other was
intended to provide Indian troops with examples of good
discipline and behavior.

General Willcocks, commander of

the Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914-15, observed
that, there was "no one who is more susceptible to good
example than the Indian soldier." 74

In turn, racial pride

supposedly forced British troops to exert themselves
further, lest they be bested by Blacks. 75
If, in British opinion, Indian troops could not equal
British troops in military ability, they still compared
favorably with other European soldiers, especially Russians.
During the war scare of 1878, when Disraeli brought Indian
troops to the Mediterranean, the condition of the Indian
Army became a popular topic of discussion in the Times.
Several officials with Indian experience favored Indian
involvement.

For example, an Indian army officer, Lt.-Gen.

Mark Kerr, boasted that the "Native Army in India ... is a
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match for any Continental Army in Europe. "

76

Another Indian

army general, Patrick Maxwell, cited several examples of
pitched battles in which Indians defeated British troops. 77
In India, the Times correspondent in Calcutta highlighted
the examples of many Indian soldiers who eagerly volunteered
for overseas service. 78

Meanwhile, the Madras Mail praised

the British government for treating India "as an integral
part of the great British Empire, ready to contribute her
resources, to add to the strength of her friends, to share
in the combat ... " 79

Because the crisis of 1878 subsided

peacefully, Indian troops never came to blows with their
Russian counterparts.

The War Office did not again

seriously consider involving Indian troops in White Men's
Wars until July 1913, when a general European war appeared
likely. 80
Two Indian infantry divisions, each one-quarter
British, arrived at the front in October 1914.

Writing in

1915, Saint Nihal Singh praised his countrymen for
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introducing unforeseen qualities into the trenches, "that
uncanny sense of sight and hearing, that panther-like,
stealthy movement ... the strange weapons which the Indians
bore ... inspired the Kaiser's hordes with awe." 81

Despite

such propaganda, the shock of trench warfare, with its
constant shelling and high casualty rates in a cold, wet
climate, undermined the troops' morale.

Indian soldiers'

rates of self-inflicted wounds greatly surpassed those of
British troops.

Back in pre-war India, Indian soldiers had

normally campaigned on the frontiers against various tribes
and acted as police in aid of civil authorities.

Neither

activity, however arduous, resulted in casualties and
personal terror on the scale of the western front.

A

frustrated Sikh soldier wrote home and complained about the
lack of "honorable" combat in France:
What you say in letter about not being disloyal to
the Emperor, and it being the religion of the
Sikhs to die facing the foe--all that you say is
true. But if you yourself could be here and see
for yourself ... There is no fighting face to face.
Guns massacre regiments sitting 10 miles off.
Put
pikes and staves in our hands and the enemy over
us with like arms, then indeed we should you how
to fight face to face! 82
Because of an increasing number of failures in military
performance on the part of individuals, as well as units,
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British commanders decided to relegate Indian troops to
quiet sectors of the front.

Most British military opinions

cited the high casualty rate among European officers as the
primary cause of the Indian troops' poor showing.

According

to this argument, the bonds of trust and loyalty between
soldiers and officers, forged during years of relative peace
in India, could not be established quickly with replacement
officers under the stress of modern war. 83

Others

subsequently attributed the high failure rate to the
structure of the Indian army, on the grounds that it had
neither the training, organization or reserves of officers
and other ranks to fight a modern attritional war against
the German army. 84

R.W.W. Grimshaw, an "Indian" cavalry

officer, actually blamed the failures of the Indian Corps on
poor performance by some of its British battalions.
Curiously, Grimshaw also cited Indian soldiers' supposedly
deeper devotion to family for a lack of aggressiveness in
the trenches. 85

In late 1915, the British withdrew the
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majority of Indian units from France.

For the rest of the

war, most Indian combatants served in the Middle East, where
they were deemed suitable for fighting Turks.

The Indian

presence in France remained limited to laborers and cavalry
regiments usually not employed in the trenches.
Britain's African colonies contributed thousands of
soldiers to the imperial war effort in the First World War.
In 1914, the W.A.F.F.
7500 men:

(later R[oyal] .W.A.F.F.) consisted of

five battalions of the Nigeria Regiment, one

battalion of the Gold Coast Regiment, one Sierra Leone
battalion, and the Gambia Company, along with engineers and
light artillery.

It fought in the Cameroons and East Africa

but expanded only moderately.

Meanwhile, the K.A.R.

numbered 2,400 in 1914 but grew to 35,500 by the end of the
war. 86
Many British authorities sensed that African soldiers
possessed an aptitude for army life.

In 1883, Sir Garnet

Wolseley, one of Victorian Britain's leading generals,
acknowledged that Basutos and Zulus learned military drill
quicker than Europeans, and cited "some hereditary bias in
their brain, in their very blood, which fits them for the
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easy acquisition of a soldier's duties."B 7

In addition to a

talent and motivation for drill, British Captain J.F.
Whitacre Allen wrote in 1918 that African soldiers possessed
dash, cunning, and endurance.BB

Nevertheless, in contrast

to France, which brought many thousands of Black troops from
Africa and Asia to the Western Front,B 9 the British
government never intended to bring African soldiers to fight
in France.

In 1915, Arthur Bonar Law, the Colonial

Secretary, referred to the idea as "the height of folly." 90
Likewise, the War Office objected to the wider use of
African soldiers in combatant roles because of perceived
limitations regarding African intelligence and ability to

B7 Garnet Wolseley, "The Negro as a Soldier."
Fortnightly Review (London) 264 (December 1888):
689-703.
BBAllen, 657-9.
B9 0n France's use of African troops during the First
World War, see Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The
Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960.
(Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1991), 25-46. Commandant
Blanchet, a French colonial infantry officer provided the
British with his evaluation of African troops. He judged
that Africans did not possess aptitudes for operating
automatic weapons or constructing complex field works.
Further, they were unable "to understand and sum up a
tactical situation quickly, or take a timely and adequate
initiative." P.R.O. C.O. 445/45 War Office to Colonial
Office, 11 September 1918.
"Notes on French-African troops
by Commandant Blanchet, Infanterie Coloniale, 19 August
1918."
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withstand the European climate.

Also, African units

required large numbers of European personnel and lengthy
periods of training in order to make them effective. 91
Throughout the war, a number of voices in the British
press and Parliament called for a greater use of the
empire's African man-power, on both practical and idealistic
reasons.

Early in the conflict, one M.P. offered to finance

the recruitment of African soldiers himself.

Later, in mid-

1915, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty,
"pleaded" for the House of Commons "to take steps to deal
with the question of coloured soldiers, and to get them from
South Africa."

In July 1916, Josiah

c.

Wedgewood, M.P.,

perhaps the leading advocate of African military
participation, praised the military abilities of Black
troops and urged that greater use be made of them, even if
shared combat undermined White prestige. 92

In the English

Review of October 1916, Major Darnley-Stuart-Stephens, who
commanded African pioneers, urged that 500,000 soldiers be
91

P.R.O. C.O. 445/45. War Office to Foreign Office,
10 February 1918 and accompanying comments.
92

Killingray, "The Idea of a British Imperial
African Army," Journal of African History 20, 3 (1979):
423-7; Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Ser., vol. 84
(1916), cols. 1530-1536; and vol. 93 (1917), cols. 11071108. Also, see Wedgewood's articles in the Daily Chronicle
of 27, 30 October, and 7 November; and that of Sir Godfrey
Lagden, 31 October; Sir Alfred Sharpe, 1 November; Sir Harry
Johnston, 2 November 1916.

100

raised from African territories and "thrown into the scale"
against the Germans in France. 93

However, even an advocate

for a greater utilization of African troops, J.F. Whitacre
Allen, summed up the limitations of using them in Europe:
they panicked easier than European soldiers and did not
possess "the same capacity for withstanding hardships of a
novel kind, whether mental or physical, as is possessed by
the latter." 94

Perhaps the last but most interesting plea

for the use of Black troops in Europe came in September
1918, when the British commander in France, Field-Marshal
Sir Douglas Haig, asked the War Office to provide Black
combatant troops for his depleted divisions for the upcoming
1919 campaign.

The War Office took no action on this "wild"

suggestion and the war ended within a few months. 95
Warfare changed significantly between 1914 and 1939 as
new techniques to kill infantrymen developed including
mobile armored combat and air-power.

By the Second World

War, combatant soldiers constituted only a small proportion
of military strength, the balance being technicians or
laborers.

In order to function effectively under these new
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circumstances, military personnel had to master increasingly
sophisticated weapons systems and tactics.

However, the

colonial forces never could recruit enough literate
individuals to handle the more complex tasks of
"blitzkrieg."

For example, military authorities in West

Africa found it impossible to fill a recruiting quota of
sixty-three literate recruits per month.

In fact,

for the

first three and one-half months of 1944, only twenty-eight
had been obtained. 96
In the Second World War, British military officials
acknowledged that the superiority of White soldiers over
Black colonial troops was caused by cultural background
rather than any genetic inheritance.

For instance, in 1945,

Col. E. Collins, adjudant-general of colonial troops in the
Middle East, explained the significant difference between
British and African motivation,
The U.K. soldier has a background of generations
of political experience, education and recurrent
major wars, the [African] men under consideration
have a very different background.
The standard of
education of the modern U.K. soldier has for
example largely abolished the need for footdrill
as an essential part of training but footdrill
because of its psychological effect will remain
necessary for most colonial troops for many years
to come. 97
96
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In other words, British soldiers required less discipline
instilled by repetitive drill because their cultural
background already provided preparation and motivation for
their military duties.

Black soldiers apparently needed a

more thorough re-conditioning for western military life.
Because of their ignorance of western political values,
simple basic military discipline had to suffice to motivate
illiterate soldiers to carry out their duties.
At first, the Great War attitude that the Indian army
could not cope with a European foe would appear to have
largely subsided during the Second World War.

From the

start of the war, Indian troops played important roles. In
particular, Indian divisions distinguished themselves
against mechanized enemies in North Africa from 1941 to
1943.

After that hard fought campaign, the British brought

Indian troops to Sicily and Italy for two years of mountain
warfare against the German army.

However, Indian brigades

serving in the Mediterranean contained British battalions,
reflecting the post-1857 fears of another Mutiny.

In

contrast, the Indian army divisions in the Far East adopted
a different but more practical organization after 1943.

also, Sir George Giffard's comments are found in William
Platt, "The East African Forces in the war and their
Future," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 93
(1948): 412.
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William Slim, the commander of the British Fourteenth Army
in Burma, decided to withdraw British units from his Indian
infantry divisions and cited several benefits including a
simplification of supply arrangements and enhanced fighting
abilities. 98
Shortly after the Second World War began, the Colonial
Office resolved to press for the acceptance of colonial
military units, including Africans, for active service
overseas.

Initially, it appeared that the War Office

concurred.

For example, General Sir Robert Gordon-

Finlayson, the Adjudant General to the Forces, agreed that
colonial troops could be usefully employed to relieve
British garrisons in Egypt and elsewhere, and possibly be
deployed on "quiet parts of the front" in France. 99
Whether sincere or not, Gordon-Finlayson's conciliatory
opinion did not reflect government intentions regarding the
R.W.A.F.F. and K.A.R.

None of Britain's political or

military leadership seriously considered employing African
troops in battle against the German army.

Early in 1941,

Winston Churchill, now Britain's prime minister, protested
that African infantry divisions should not be termed

98
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"divisions" at all within the imperial order of battle and
that "no one contemplates standing them in the line against
a European army." 100

At about the same time, British West

and East African troops had begun the liberation of Ethiopia
against Italian and Italian colonial troops.

They earned

high praise in the largely infantry-style campaign but, in
July, the British commander in East Africa, General Sir Alan
Cunningham, predicted that it would be "unwise" to send them
against the German army.

They would be "staunch," he wrote,

but only as long as their White officers survived. 101
As modern soldiers, illiterate Indian and African
troops, still largely recruited from so-called "martial
races," generally did not reach the technical effectiveness
of British troops.

This goal would have required a much

longer period of training and education than available
during the war.

Had vigorous educational and economic

development policies been instituted throughout the empire
in the decades before the war, then the empire could have
been transformed into a far more massive recruiting ground.
Since the 1850s, however, Britain's policies toward the

100
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"improvement" of subject peoples had reflected an assumption
that Black people could not be "improved" and that such
education as was provided might actually prove to be
injurious, either to the individual concerned or to the
political unity of the empire.
British military leaders generally thought that Black
troops could not take the field successfully against modern
European armies, but they did discover a less glamorous,
though absolutely necessary, role for Black soldiers behind
the firing lines.

In both world wars, British armies in the

field required the supporting services of many thousands of
military laborers.

Pioneers, as military laborers were

usually called, unloaded and transported supplies, built and
maintained roads, railways, and other means of
communications.

Since physical and intelligence standards

were lower for pioneers than frontline soldiers, a larger
pool of potential recruits could be called upon.

Training

requirements were minimal, being usually limited to basic
drill and less vigorous older White officers could be
assigned to command them.

The utilization of Black laborers

freed White personnel, who were considered better suited for
modern war, for service in combatant roles.

For example, in

May 1942, Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander in Chief, Middle
East Forces, asked the War Office for Black troops to

106

replace Whites in secondary static roles such as garrison
and anti-aircraft duties.

He argued that, "the White

manpower resources of the Empire must be conserved and used
to the best advantage by the maximum employment of nonEuropean troops. " 102
Between 1914 and 1918, the War Office recruited several
hundred thousand Black laborers from throughout the empire
and nominally independent China to work behind the battle
lines in France. 103

In 1939, British leaders planned to wage

the Second World War in much the same way as they had the
First in that a British Expeditionary Force, consisting of
British and dominion combatant formations, would again
defend the Franco-German Border.

Meanwhile, thousands of

Black military laborers would be imported to unload and haul
supplies behind the front in France.

The War Office

estimated that there would be fifty thousand military
laborers serving in France with the B.E.F. by June 1940 and
150,000 by mid-1941. 104

In early 1940, the War Cabinet
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decided to postpone the employment of colonial pioneers with
the B.E.F. in France because Britain itself still had over
one million unemployed workers.

It would have been

"politically dangerous" to employ "coloured" colonial labor
instead of Britons. 105
III.

The "Black Man's Grave"
Whenever discussing the use of Black troops in Europe,

as combatants or pioneers, British officials considered the
potential impact of the European climate on the health of
Black troops.

In British eyes, lung afflictions, especially

pneumonia, presented the greatest threat to the health of
Black troops in colder regions.

It is unclear just how far

back this view was held, but the New Orleans campaign of
1814-1815, in which the 1st and 5th West India Regiments
took part, apparently confirmed it.

G.R. Gleig, an officer

with a White regiment, blamed the susceptibility of the
W.I.R.s to the Louisiana climate for the British failure.

106

Benson Earle Hill, a Royal Artillery officer, recalled that
the Black soldiers "suffered most dreadfully from the change
of climate and alteration of fare; they were positively not
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only useless, but absolutely in the way."

Hill witnessed

many W.I.R. soldiers who simply resigned themselves to
dying. 107

In fact,

according to an officer and historian of

a W.I.R. regiment, the primary cause of the suffering of the
"Black Corps" in the unexpectedly cold Louisiana climate was
that the British had not provided the Black soldiers, who
normally campaigned among the Caribbean islands, with
a de qua te clothing. 108
The "Black Man's Grave" mirrored the "White Man's
Grave," the belief, based on long experience, that White
soldiers suffered extremely high mortality rates in tropical
regions. 109

Whether the concurrent belief in the "Black

Man's Grave" reflected racial arrogance or a reasonable
scientific supposition, it persisted for quite a long time.
In 1885, Alfred B. Ellis, an officer in the 1st W.I.R.
strongly advocated a greater use of West Indian troops, but
warned that they could never be used in cold climates
because, in his words, "the negro suffers from cold in a
manner which is incomprehensive even to Europeans who have
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passed the best part of their lives in the tropics." 110

In

1878, as Indian troops prepared for possible action against
the Russians in the Mediterranean, the European Madras Mail
lamented that the vulnerability of Indian troops, especially
those from southern India, to cold weather, restricted their
deployment to warm regions.

It duly recommended that the

best suited Indian soldiers to send to Europe included
northerners such as Gurkhas, Sikhs, and "Musalmans." 111
Climate remained a crucial factor in military decisionmaking in the First World War.

For example, in 1915, when

pondering a greater use of colonial manpower for the war
effort against Germany, Arthur Bonar Law, the Colonial
Secretary, reported to the Cabinet that,

"West Indian troops

could not face a European winter campaign." 112

Africans had

a similar reputation for susceptibility to dampness and
cold. 113

Despite government fears, medical statistics from

the First World War did not support the "Myth of the Black

110
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Man's Grave."

In 1917, White (British and dominion) troops

in France suffered pneumonia at an annual rate of 1.14
hospital admissions per thousand ration strength; Indian
troops (mostly cavalry), 1.22; and the multi-ethnic Native
Labour Corps (N.L.C.),

.94.

In the following year, White

troops in France suffered pneumonia at a rate of 1.03
admissions per thousand; Indian troops, 2.34; and the
N.L.C., a relatively low .61. 114

Tentatively, these

statistics suggest that Black colonial soldiers did not
suffer from the cold significantly more than White troops
and, in some instances, they suffered less.
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence concerning Black
susceptibility to the cold, combined with racial
stereotypes, survived the war and significantly affected
British military policies in the Second World War.

Again,

in 1939, when the Colonial Office studied the problems of
again recruiting a contingent of "coloured" pioneers for
service in France, climate figured prominently.

Gold Coast

Governor Hodson opposed sending Africans to France because
their exposure to the French climate would be "a form of
cruelty." 115
114
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115
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"the incidence of sickness would be so high that in a very
short time it would become completely ineffective ... such a
disaster would have serious political repercussions after
the war." 116

Cautiously, medical officials in Nigeria

predicted that, if provided with sufficient clothing,
accommodations, and food, and time for acclimatization to
the French climate, the health of Nigerian pioneers would
"remain reasonably good." 117
The European climate became an issue again in 1943,
when British commanders in the Mediterranean hoped to bring
Black pioneers to Italy with the Eighth Army.

Colonial

medical officials in Nigeria advised that West African
pioneers would be unable to withstand the rigors of
campaigning in Italy's winter climate, but they could
function adequately at stationary hospitals and base camps
if allowed time to acclimatize. 118

Experience bore out the

wisdom of this prediction because the British brought
soldiers from many tropical regions to Italy and found that
they could withstand the climate as well as White troops,
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providing that they had time to acclimatize and were given
sufficient food, clothing, and shelter. 119

Nevertheless, at

Colonial Office insistence, the commanders in Italy withdrew
West African units to the Middle East in late 1944. 120
Neither the military's own figures or scientific
opinion supported the notion of a "Black Man's Grave."

As

with the First World War, medical statistics for the Second
World War indicated that Indian and African troops (from all
regions) serving in North Africa (excluding Egypt) and Italy
actually suffered pneumonia at lower rates than White
British troops. 121

In early 1945, a War Office scientist

informed his superiors that, according to established
scientific knowledge, racial differences in climatic
tolerance were slight:
Each group is on the whole more in harmony with
the physical conditions of its own habitat than is
any other group but a short period of
acclimatization on the part of the foreigner is
sufficient to bring him into a harmony with the
conditions of the strange habitat.
The coloured
119

See reports in P.R.O. W.O. 106/2190.
"Brief
History of R.W.A.F.F. in MidEast, by Lt. Col. H.A. Lilley;"
and P.R.O. D.O. 35/1183/Y1069/1/1/Pt.1.
"Report by Lt. Col.
R. Charnock, 9 January 1944.
120

P.R.O. C.O. 968/97/1. Colonial Office to War
Office, 20 October 1944 and War Office to Allied Forces
Headquarters, 10 November 1944.
121

Medical History of the Second World War:
Casualties and Medical Statistics (London: H.M.S.O., 1972),
247, 256, 259. Unfortunately, the statistics are not broken
down between West, East or South Africans.
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man can thrive biologically wherever the White can
flourish and vice versa. 122
Although "established," this scientific knowledge was
consistently displaced within the military and political
establishment by long-held stereotypes.

The British fear of

killing Blacks by means of pneumonia lacked empirical
support, but the "Myth of the Black Man's Grave" buttressed
British reservations about the utility of Black troops.

For Britain's major defense needs, Black colonial
troops served as crucial supplements to the White forces of
the empire.

Ordinarily, however, British and colonial

authorities did not rely on Black soldiers exclusively.
Racial prejudice, whether in the form of a small and
exclusive officer corps, a hesitancy to send Black troops to
kill Whites, or a fear of the "Black Man's Grave," limited
the usefulness of Black colonial troops.

Given that racial

considerations were intrinsic to existence of the British
colonial empire in the twentieth century, Britain had, in a
military sense, acquired an empire it could not exploit to
the fullest.
122

P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692. D[irector]. of
B[iological]. R[esearch]. to D[irector]. of O[rganisation] .,
7 February 1945.

CHAPTER IV
THE CARIBBEAN REGIMENT DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR:
A CASE STUDY OF RACISM AND BRITISH MILITARY POLICY.

Most of the British military establishment's racial
attitudes discussed previously with regard to Asian and
African colonial troops affected the military participation
of Black West Indians.

However, the case of the West Indies

is especially instructive because, compared with the Black
inhabitants of the Indian Empire and the African colonies,
West Indians were the most "English" in culture and race.
Because of the degree of West Indian "Anglicization," Black
West Indians were not considered to be a "martial race."
Consequently, the War Office strenuously opposed any close
association of Black West Indian subjects with its war
efforts during the twentieth century.

The experience of the

Caribbean Regiment, the West Indies' only overseas combatant
contingent during the Second World War, is discussed in some
detail here because it shows vividly how colonial politics
and backward-looking military perspectives clashed.
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I.

Black Military Experience in the British West Indies.
Black soldiers played important roles in military

operations in the Western Hemisphere from Europe's Age of
Discovery onward.

In emergency situations throughout the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, all of the European
colonial powers in the Americas came to rely upon the
usually enthusiastic response of African subjects, free as
well as slave, to serve against other European powers.
Often, such service earned freedom and land for slaves and
special privileges for free men of color. 1

In the Georgian

period, West Indian militias, with exclusively White officer
corps, consisted of a majority of White personnel, but Free
Blacks formed a significant minority.

For example, the

Jamaica Militia, originally formed in 1661, numbered 8,827
in 1825, of whom about three thousand were free Blacks.
During the Napoleonic conflicts, the Trinidad militia
possessed two infantry regiments of Blacks.

Meanwhile,

Trinidadian Whites comprised three cavalry regiments and one
infantry regiment. 2

As the century unfolded, limited

contact with people of color in militias increasingly
appalled Whites.

1

2

By mid-century, many colonial governments

Voelz, 14-19.

"The Jamaica Militia," 146; R. Chartrand, British
Forces in the West Indies (London: Osprey, 1996), 39.
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had disbanded or simply left their militias moribund.

An

1853 Colonial Office report noted that, in Jamaica's case,
such indifference to militia service was due to "the
repugnance on the part of the White population against a
general association with the coloured races." 3
Public attitudes toward military service changed and,
concurrent with Britain's volunteer movement, colonial local
forces experienced a rejuvenation by the late nineteenth
century.

The new West Indian local forces,

like the old,

included racially segregated units,

(all of which, of

course, were officered by Whites).

For example, in the

1890s, Trinidad's "Little Army" of volunteers included the
527-strong Light Infantry and 142-member Field Artillery
Volunteers, both of which consisted of Black other ranks and
White officers.

A ninety-nine member Light Horse (cavalry)

remained the preserve of wealthier Whites. 4

Bermuda formed

its own segregated local units in 1892: the White Bermuda
Volunteer Rifle Corps and the predominately Black, but
White-officered Bermuda Militia Artillery. 5

3

P.R.O. C.O. 537/155. Memorandum, "Militia in the
Colonies," 14 January 1853, 6.
4

"The Little Army of Trinidad," Navy and Army
Illustrated 2, (13 November 1896): 256-7.
5

A.L. Kipling, "The Bermuda Regiment," Bulletin (The
Military Historical Society) 16 (May 1966):
92-3.
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Apart from direct combatant roles in part-time or
emergency military forces, British commanders in the
Caribbean during the Georgian period assigned slaves to
White units in order to relieve European military personnel
of exhausting, and therefore deadly, fatigue duty.

European

troops suffered high mortality rates and military
authorities hoped that Black labor could help preserve White
lives. 6

After employing Blacks in strictly controlled

militias and pioneers, the next logical step for British
military leaders seemed to be the formation of regular
regiments of Blacks to permanently replace or augment
European garrisons in the West Indies.

The War Office did

not adopt this policy until 1795, during the war with
Revolutionary France.

Colonial Whites had opposed any Black

regiments besides those already existing in the militia.
For example, in 1782, when the Jamaican government, fearful
of Spanish and French attack, formed three provisional
battalions of free Black volunteers (in addition to existing
Black militiamen), it was delayed by the protests of local
merchants and planters. 7

The prospect of having more armed

Blacks on the island brought no feeling of security to the

6

7

Voelz, 59-71.

Albert W. Haarmann, "Jamaica Provincial Corps,
1780-1783," Journal of the Society for Army Historical
Research 48 (Spring 1970):
11-13.
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ruling elite.
During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars,
few British regiments could be spared for Caribbean
garrisons, but various British West Indian colonial
assemblies strenuously resisted the creation of regular
Black regiments.

Historian Roger N. Buckley writes that the

British government "demonstrated uncommon toughness in the
face of determined colonial opposition," 8 and by 1799 twelve
West India Regiments (W.I.R.s) had been raised.

The number

of West Indian battalions fluctuated between a dozen and one
before the disbandment of the last in 1927.

In contrast to

locally supported and regulated units such as the Indian
army and African colonial forces, the W.I.R.s remained
"imperial" regiments under the direct control of the War
Office, but separate from White British regiments.
Originally, the British government had planned to
purchase slaves in the West Indies for the W.I.R.s but this
source yielded few soldiers because of the reluctance of
slave-owners to sell physically fit males to the army.
W.I.R. recruiters then relied on slaves purchased direct
from Africa until the end of the British slave trade in
1807.

After this date, escaped and "liberated" African
8

Roger Norman Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats: The
British West India Regiments, 1795-1815 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1979), 144.
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slaves provided most recruits.

These "Black Corps" earned

high praise for their services in the Caribbean during the
Napoleonic period.

From 1818, it became customary for at

least one of the W.I.R.s to be stationed on the coast of
West Africa,

9

where they campaigned largely unheralded.

Imperial and colonial views of the W.I.R.s remained
ambiguous throughout their existence.

As an example of the

British army's ignorance of the W.I.R.s, the Broad Arrow, a
military periodical, cited the story of a general who
received the distinction of being named honorary "Colonel"
of a W.I.R. and met with one of its officers.

The White

officer's appearance surprised the general who exclaimed,
"God bless my soul, sir! why, you don't mean to say you're a
captain in the [W.I.]--Regiment?

I thought they were all

Black. " 10
White West Indian society, well aware of the "Black
Corps," did not like or trust Black West Indian soldiers.
As discussed previously, colonial governments felt that
London did not understand the racial situation in the
Caribbean.

However, in the face of Britain's determination

9

G. Tylden, The West India Regiments, 1795-1927, and
from 1958," Journal of the Society for Army Historical
Research 40 (March 1962):
43-5.
10

"A Plea for West India Regiments,"
Arrow 2 (13 March 1869):
316.

The Broad
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to form and maintain the W.I.R.s as imperial troops, West
Indian governments gradually became accustomed to their
presence.

The degree of comfort lessened by mid-century

when the sources of African recruits disappeared, and the
British then sought out West Indian-born Blacks for the
W.I.R.s.

For West Indian Whites, the recruitment of Afro-

Caribbean soldiers seemed threatening to the structure of
their colonial society.

In 1853, Antigua businessmen

protested to the Colonial Off ice that they preferred African
recruits because these foreigners did not sympathize with
the creole population, "whom [the Africans] regard with no
friendly feelings and by whom they are consequently much
dreaded, more even than the White troops ... " 11
II.

The Martial Races Theory and the West Indies
As with Eurasians, Black West Indians did not merit the

term "martial race" in military opinion because they,

"an

inappropriate hybridism," possessed White blood and were
exposed to European culture.

They were supposedly incapable

of incorporating the "best" of European characteristics,
including hard work, thrift, and duty.

For example, a

W.I.R. officer who witnessed the transition from African to
11

Daniel & Co. to Duke of Newcastle 18 June 1853, in
House Paper 1852-53 (938) 65. 115. Correspondence between
West Indian Merchants to the Colonial Office, respecting the
Recruiting for the Black Regiments from the Creole
population of Antigua.
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West Indian recruitment in his unit, judged that, "the pure
African makes a better soldier than a Creole.

He is

generally more subordinate, and is cleanlier than his
domesticated brother [sic]. " 12

Another observer contrasted

the African with the creole and found the first "loyal,
brave, honest, and,

... as faithful as a mastiff," while the

creoles were "treacherous, dishonest, and ... most brutally
cruel to one another, to children, and to such animals as
they can get into their power." 13

Sir Garnet Wolseley, one

of Britain's most important Victorian generals, summarized
the racial basis of Black West Indian defects as soldiers:
The infusion of White blood into the West Indian
negro has certainly not improved his physical
strength, whilst the education we have given him
has as certainly injured his fighting qualities.
He has lost the best qualities his forefathers
possessed as savages, and he has failed to acquire
those which belong to that civilisation [with]
which he is now more or less associated. 14
Another reservation about the W.I.R.s was that, by being
treated and fed like British troops, they were "excessively
pampered."

Being too "civilized," it was believed that they

could not fight as well in the bush as African troops. 15

12

"P," "Blacks," St. James Magazine 7 (1863):

13

46.

"Sketches in the West Indies," Dublin University
Magazine 56 (November 1860):
612.
14

15

Wolseley, 691.

S.C. Ukpabi, "The Origins of the West African
Frontier Force," Journal of the Historical Society of
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Not all late Victorian officers expressed such fondness
for the "noble savage" and dislike for West Indians.

Alfred

B. Ellis, an officer with the First W.I.R., advocated a
greater use of Black West Indians in colonial garrisons to
replace British units, which then could be concentrated at
home. 16

Ellis differed with the views such as Wolseley's

that West Indian units were "no longer of the same use to us
as formerly, when they were composed of liberated
Africans." 17

Indeed, Ellis thought that creoles made

excellent soldiers precisely because of their degree of
Anglicization.

While he considered West Africans "dull and

stupidn and Indians "hostile to us by tradition," Ellis
found the West Indian soldier to be "docile, patient, brave,
and faithful." 18

More applause came in 1894 from a former

head of the West Indian command, Major General Sir Charles
Pearson, who wrote that the Black West Indian soldier was
"quite as easily managed as the European."

The West Indian

possessed his "peculiarities ... but, when once his officer
and he understand each other no one could be more amenable
to discipline, and his loyalty is unimpeachable."

Nigeria 3, 3,

(December 1966):

16
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also argued that the W.I.R.s deserved more recognition. 19
As if in response, albeit belatedly, the Navy and Army
Illustrated, in 1898, praised "the cheery and powerful
Blacks" of the W.I.R.s for extending British authority in
West Africa. 20

However, within the British military

establishment, pro-West Indian Black sympathy remained a
minority opinion.

More typical was the view expressed in a

1901 War Office report that,

"the W[est] .I[ndian]. soldier

in peace time only does well where he can have his Black
women without interference--otherwise he may become very
troublesome and insubordinate." 21
III.

White Officers and the W.I.R.s
In contrast to the sought-after postings in the Indian

army and African colonial forces, the W.I.R.s usually
received reluctant British officers who simply had no where
else to go for a military career.

In 1894, General Pearson

observed that, "of the unpopularity of the [West Indian]
service among candidates for commissions in the Army there
can be no doubt." 22

Frequently, W.I.R. officers had

19

Charles Pearson, "The West Indies and its
Command," United Service Magazine (June 1894):
156-7.
20

"The West India Regiment," The Navy and Army
Illustrated 7
(8 December 1898):
278.
21
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22

Pearson, 157.
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graduated low from Sandhurst and spent a considerable amount
of time and effort attempting to "exchange" to better
postings.

The Army and Navy Gazette stated that,

the fact these regiments are officered at all is
indeed a striking proof of the anxiety of our
middle class young men for military service. As a
profession their calling may be pronounced
miserable.
They command blacks, and their service
alternates between ... [the West Indies] and the
pestilential West Coast of Africa ...
Another military journal, the Broad Arrow, suggested that
officers disdained serving with the W.I.R.s because, while
they received the same low pay as their fellows in U.K.based units, they were subject to higher costs of living and
continuous foreign service in far more hazardous climates. 23
Some officers strongly detested their West Indian
postings.

For example, in the 1890s, Scottish-born Ernst

Craig-Brown had joined the W.I.R. after Sandhurst but sought
to transfer to an elite Highland regiment.

Sounding much

like a dissatisfied East India Company officer before 1857,
he bitterly referred to his Black West Indian N.C.O.s and
soldiers as "little removed from the Ape" 24 and "the
rottenest lot of sulky, lazy brutes I ever came across." 25
23

Army and Navy Gazette Quoted in The Times, 10
December 1867. See Pearson, 158; and "A Plea for West India
Regiments," 316.
24

Craig-Brown, Letter to Father, 22 January 1897,
Craig-Brown Collection, Imperial War Museum, London.
25

Craig-Brown, Letter to Mother, 15/17 December
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Craig-Brown also disparaged his soldiers' marching skills:
"the nigger can't walk, he only shambles along."

Upon

viewing a newly arrived British battalion, he found it "a
treat ... to see a European regiment at drill after seeing
nothing but negroes for 6 months." 26
A significant proportion of W.I.R. officers came from
"non-traditional" sources, which included former N.C.O.s and
temporary war-time officers who had been offered permanent,
or regular, commissions in the army as rewards for
distinguished service.

Such officers invariably lacked the

independent income required to participate in the social
life of a more fashionable U.K. regiment.

Perhaps the most

famous such example was William Slim, a temporary officer
during the First World War, who received a regular
commission in the British army.

Contemplating the

considerable expense of regimental life, he chose the
"cheaper" W.I.R. as his "home" regiment.

Slim never

actually served with the regiment but exchanged into the
Indian army before the end of the war. 27

1895.
26

27

Craig-Brown, Letter to Mother, 2 February 1896.

David Anderson, "Slim," in John Keegan, ed.,
Churchill's Generals (New York: William Morrow, 1991), 302.
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IV.

Reliability and White Man's Wars
The most notable disciplinary failures on the part of

the W.I.R.s occurred before the change in recruiting
patterns from Africans to creoles. 28

From the mid-

nineteenth century until their final disbandment in 1927,
the W.I.R.s remained loyal, despite the fears earlier
expressed concerning the fidelity of creole soldiers and the
disdain of their officers.

The one significant revolt of

creole soldiers between 1850 and 1914 involved not the
W.I.R.s, but a volunteer corps in Trinidad.

In 1896, the

racial tensions existing in Trinidadian society violently
erupted during a day-long series of athletic competitions
which marked the end of annual training periods.

A fight

broke out between Bombardier Alleyne, a Black member of the
artillery and a Light Horse sergeant, Thomas Gibson.

The

bombardier, who had been drinking, had asked Gibson if he
could borrow his horse for a race.

Gibson refused and,

after being verbally harassed by Alleyne, struck the
bombardier.

Several of the bombardier's comrades then

proceeded to batter Gibson.

Other members of both units

joined the fray, their officers having lost control.

A few

artillerymen who had maintained their composure arrested
28

For examples, see Michael Craton, Testing the
Chains (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1982), 228-9,
236.

127

Alleyne on an officer's orders and took him to the barracks,
where he fell asleep.

However, most of the artillerymen

refused to obey orders to disband, made loud threats and,
because Gibson had not been arrested, demanded that Alleyne
be released.

After Alleyne had been awakened and released

by fearful officers, the mutineers carried him through the
streets in triumph.

Within days, the governor formally

dissolved the Artillery Volunteers and those mutineers who
held positions with the government or private firms
immediately lost their jobs, including the unfortunate
Alleyne, who had been employed by the Port-of-Spain Gazette.
Subsequently, a court-martial reduced Gibson to the rank of
private for assaulting Alleyne. 29

In addition to

illustrating the stresses inherent to colonial society, the
"Artillery Riot" demonstrated that Black West Indian
soldiers could react with violence to racial slights.
In the First World War, the West India Regiment (the
several W.I.R.s had been by now consolidated into one
regiment, consisting of two battalions) fought against the
Germans in the Cameroons and East Africa.

The War Office

refused early offers of a separate West Indian contingent,
consisting of citizen-soldiers and modeled along the lines
29

For the saga of this mutiny, see the Times
(London) 15 September 1899; Port of Spain Gazette, 27, 29,
and 31 August and 2 September 1899.
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of Kitchener's "new armies" then being raised in Britain.
"Respectable" West Indian patriots did not wish to simply
enlist in the regular W.I.R.s because of the contempt then
widely held for professional soldiers, who usually came from
the poorest and most desperate sections of society. 30

In

1915, after being subjected to lobbying by influential
organizations and persons, including the Colonial Office and
King George V himself, the War Office authorized the
formation of the British West Indies Regiment (B.W.I.R.)
war-time service.

for

Only two of the regiment's eleven

battalions actually served as frontline combat soldiers, and
that was against the Turks in the Middle East. 31

In 1917,

the War Office decided to permit West Indian colonial
governors to nominate "slightly coloured gentlemen" for
"governor's" commissions, which were limited in authority to
the B.W.I.R.

It is not clear how many were eventually

appointed before the regiment's post-war disbandment. 32

30

In early 1918, a scheme to amalgamate reluctant
members of the wartime British West Indies Regiment with the
regular 2/W.I.R. in East Africa had to be dropped because it
would have caused "serious trouble," including murder.
P.R.O. C.O. 318/347. General Officer Commanding, East
Africa, to War Office, 9 April 1918.
31
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Against Germany's African colonies, the W.I.R. fought
well, but usually without fanfare.

In contrast, the

activities of the B.W.I.R., a publicly proclaimed embodiment
of West Indian patriotism, remained a subject of acute
interest for colonial officials throughout the war.

In

general, high ranking British commanders commended the
battalions of the B.W.I.R. personnel serving under their
command.

In 1916, the British commander in Egypt, W.J.

Murray, did not initially consider the recently arrived
battalions of the B.W.I.R. to be fit enough even for pioneer
duties in the Middle Eastern heat, but he recognized that
the West Indian soldiers wanted a chance to fight.

33

A year

of training improved the unit's condition so much that
Murray reported that "the discipline of the regiment has
been consistently good, and the fine physique and smart
turnout of the men has often been noted."

In 1918, two

B.W.I.R. battalions earned praise for an attack they made in
Trans-Jordan. 34

Meanwhile, in France, Sir Douglas Haig

found that the B.W.I.R. personnel he used as pioneers were
cheerful under fire, well-disciplined and possessed high

33

P.R.O. C.O. 318/339. General Officer Commandingin-Chief, Egypt, to Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 29
June 1916.
34

P.R.O. C.O. 318/344.
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morale. 35

In 1947, E.E. Sabben-Clare, a Colonial Office

official, concluded that if the War Office had any grounds
for complaint about the morale and performance of West
Indian troops in the First World War, army authorities
themselves were largely responsible because of negligence in
providing adequate clothing and dividing the regiment in
question among several fronts.

36

Meanwhile, individual opinions of lower ranking British
personnel toward West Indian soldiers ranged from admiration
to stereotype to ignorance.
in France remembered that,

W.E. Young, a stretcher-bearer
"they could give points to

British [soldiers] in manners, speech and behavior."

In

Africa, West Indian soldiers staged a concert, an event
which A.F. Bowden described as a "real" minstrel show.
Roland Mountfort, a corporal with the 25/Royal Fusiliers in
East Africa, received the impression that West Indians
"thought no small beer of themselves, always speaking

35
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36
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English if there was a White man anywhere around. " 37
White resentment of Blacks who felt equal to Europeans
was returned in kind.

Soon after the end of the First World

War, soldiers of the B.W.I.R. staged mutinies in Taranto,
Italy.

The soldiers had become violent in response to

racist slurs against them, their lower pay, inferior
accommodations, and segregated medical facilities.

38

With

this incident, the War Office learned an irritating and farreaching lesson, i.e., that Black West Indian servicemen
would not willingly accept racial subordination or
discrimination.

The West Indian expectation of equality

would pose sensitive problems in any future multi-racial,
imperial war effort.
In the 1920s, fiscal pressure and prejudice convinced
the War Office to disband the last regular West Indian
battalions.

The army had judged that a West Indian

formation would not be as economical as a European one
because the War Office would never bring it to Europe.

In

37
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the 1930s, during a period of economic distress, West Indian
governments as well as leading White colonial citizens
unsuccessfully championed schemes to reconstitute the W.I.R.
as a means of reducing unemployment. 39
V.

Another World War
A.

Demands on the colonial empire
In early 1940, Malcolm Macdonald, the Secretary of

State for the Colonies, presented his department's opinions
on the exploitation of colonial man-power to the War
Cabinet.

Macdonald ranked the manpower of the empire

according to military ability and equipment shortages.

He

acknowledged that, "all the available supplies of equipment
will be required for units considered to be of superior
fighting capacity, raised in this country or the Dominions,"
that is, White units.

The Colonial Secretary predicted

that, if and when the problem of the equipment shortage was
overcome, "it is probable that the fighting races of India
would be drawn upon rather than any of the races inhabiting
the colonial dependencies."

Other factors discussed

included the political dangers of deploying colonial troops
to places where they were not welcome, and the destructive
impact that France's climate was thought to have on troops

39
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from tropical regions. 40
B.

Calls for a West Indian Contingent
The concern about Black military participation seemed

especially acute in regard to the West Indies, which had
experienced numerous labor disturbances in the late 1930s.
At the outbreak of war, however, the Caribbean colonies had
been swept by a remarkable wave of patriotism.

Virtually

all segments of West Indian society, including the most
militant labor leaders, promised to cooperate fully with
Britain. 41
Many disparate voices lobbied for the greater inclusion
of Black West Indian subjects in the war effort, although
they often disagreed as to the exact role to be given West
Indian troops.

Early on, a White West Indian subject wrote

to the Colonial Secretary that many West Indians feared that
their islands were to be transferred to U.S. sovereignty.
He admitted that he himself could enlist freely,

"but what

of the many West Indians of like means & views who are of
mixed or negro[sic] descent ... Surely there is a place for

40
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us all in this battle for civilization." 42

In May 1940,

Jamaica's Legislative Council expressed "unshaken loyalty"
and "undiminished desire" to form a contingent for the
war. 43

In July, a public meeting in Trinidad resolved to

offer 25,000 men to the imperial government. 44

Two months

later, the Rev. E. Elliot Durant, rector of the heavily
British West Indian St. Ambrose Episcopal Church in New York
City, assured the prime minister that, "it would be a
splendid thing" to reconstitute the W.I.R. and "give these
loyal subjects of His Majesty an opportunity to help in
defending Democracy. " 45

In April 1941, Durant appealed

directly to the King on the grounds that, "Britain does not
possess more faithful subjects than her colored people.
They are willing to give their lives for the Empire. " 46
The Colonial Office wanted to maintain these patriotic
feelings and inquired of the West Indian governors their

42
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opinions on whether, in light of the experiences with exservicemen of the First World War, military units should be
discouraged.

Most of the respondents discounted the problem

of ex-servicemen but the governor of British Honduras
strongly differed:
1. I do not know whether they were any good in the
field, but I have heard from some of their
officers that they gave a great deal of trouble
behind the lines. When they returned here they
rioted, and they have always been the cause of a
great deal of trouble locally. Most of them think
that, having served their King and country as
soldiers, their King and country should support
them for the rest of their lives.
2. I do not know whether any troops will be asked
for from the West Indies during the present War,
but for the sake of my successors in off ice I hope
not.
There would, however, be no objection to
recruiting men for a Labour Corps, and, in fact I
should welcome this. 47
Jamaica Governor Richards favored raising local forces, but
he advised against sending any West Indian unit to a cold
climate, and doubted whether a combatant unit would be
successful.

Richards reported that, a "certain amount of

interested local agitation" had called for the revival of
the W.I.R., but he observed that the scheme was a form of
unemployment relief and did not support it. 48
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In mid-October 1939, the War Office gave tentative
permission for raising a symbolic West Indian "field
company" if the gesture would facilitate the raising of
labor units. 49

The War Office did not act on this

concession and, in February 1940, formally postponed the
establishment of West Indian pioneer units on the grounds of
climate.

It decided that,

"the most effective coloured

labour from overseas for service in France is that from
Mediterranean territories such as Palestine and Cyprus." 50
In June 1940, Winston Churchill, the new British prime
minister, suggested that the W.I.R. be reconstituted:
It might have three battalions strongly officered
by British officers, and be representative of most
of the islands; to be available for Imperial
Service; to give an outlet for the loyalty of the
natives, and bring money into these poor
islands. 51
At the time, however, "the general feeling" of the rest of
the government toward West Indian soldiers remained so low
that, in one colonial official's words, "it was not worth
proceeding with this proposal." 52
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C.

Colonial Office v. War Office
At the beginning of 1941, the Colonial Office re-opened

the question of West Indian military participation, this
time as pioneers.

David Margesson, Secretary of State for

War, wrote to Lord Moyne, the new Colonial Secretary, that
West Indians were not an "industrious race," the British
climate would be against them, and that he did not "much
like the idea of billeting them in" Britain.

He assured

Moyne that "if the need should arise for tapping this source
of man-power [he would], of course, consult [him] at
once." 53

Moyne replied that, despite the past poor opinions

of West Indian soldiers, "the growing shortage of manpower
in the United Kingdom and elsewhere may well compel us to be
content with a lower standard than we should have been ready
to accept hitherto. " 54

In April 1941, the Colonial Office

again stressed the availability of manpower in the West
Indies because of unemployment and the "very real desire" of
West Indian subjects to serve.

In response, Margesson told

Moyne that the creation of West Indian military units might
have propaganda value but, in the First World War, the War

June 1940.
53
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Office had experienced "considerable difficulties in
employing West Indians in labour units in this country owing
to climatic reasons, difficulties of billeting and
accommodation, and the difficulty of providing units with
British staff. " 55
West Indian governments continued to pursue military
units.

In May 1941, The General Legislative Council of the

Leeward Islands publicly expressed "the fervent wish of the
people of this colony that consideration be given to the
formation of a West Indian unit for any service which H.M.'s
military advisers may recommend."

In response to such

requests, the Colonial Secretary advised West Indian
governors to make the following announcement:
It is with great regret that this decision has
been taken and I share the disappointment which it
must cause, but I am sure that West Indians will
appreciate that in modern warfare, with all its
complexities, it is not given to all individuals
or communities even in Great Britain itself to
serve out common cause in the way in which their
most generous instincts dictate ... 56
In July 1941, after being informed that the War Office had
no plans for raising West Indian units, Churchill urged that
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the scheme "be pressed forward" and suggested that they
could garrison Singapore. 57

However, West Indian political

sensitivity precluded the suggested use of Polish officers
for training the proposed force, a policy Churchill had
adopted for the R.W.A.F.F. 58
Armed with Churchill's endorsement, Mayne assured
Margesson that if enough suitable higher quality recruits
could not be found to form a brigade, then a single highquality battalion of picked men would be preferable. 59

In

August, Margesson cited the practical difficulties of
shipping and the lack of officers and that,

"on racial

grounds," it was "undesirable" to mix Black West Indians
with African or Asian soldiers.

"The cold fact of the

matter," the War Secretary related, was that, "it would be
an inconvenience" to raise West Indian units, and a waste of
resources.

As a compromise, Margesson offered Mayne officer

commissions in the African colonial forces for a few wellqualified individual Black West Indians. 60
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The Colonial Office countered with a suggestion that
Britain could meet West Indian aspirations to participate in
the war by increasing individual recruitment of both Whites
and Blacks for service in Britain or, alternatively, perhaps
yet raise pioneer units. 61

In November, Moyne again

advocated increased individual recruitment in the British
forces and pioneer units as alternatives to combatant units.
He cited an August request from Sir Claude Auchinleck,
British Commander in Chief, Middle East, for West Indian
stevedores, a plea which had been rejected by the War Office
on account of practical difficulties. 62

Margesson decided

to leave it to Auchinleck to reject Moyne's appeals.

In

December, the War Secretary asked Auchinleck whether Black
West Indian soldiers, who were paid as White British troops,
"could satisfactorily work side by side with Indian troops
and West African labour units on substantially lower rates,
and without risk or repercussions," and whether he was
willing to allot some of his shipping space to the West
Indians.

Auchinleck replied negatively to both matters and,

in turn, Margesson informed Moyne that the War Office had to

61
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reject Moyne's proposals. 63
The debate between ministries over West Indian pioneer
units continued into 1942.

The need for military laborers

in the Middle East increased substantially as the British
built up an enormous base there from which to wage war
against the Axis powers.

At an April meeting, both

ministries agreed that shipping, accommodation, and climate
did not immediately present insurmountable obstacles to West
Indian units.

At least in principle then, the War Office

accepted the notion of pioneer units in the future.

64

Regardless of its theoretical acceptance of West Indian
pioneers, the War Office preferred to tap African sources of
manpower for military labor, a tendency which caused Harold
MacMillan, Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Colonial
Office, to ask,

"how can I press Africa still further when

the voluntary offers of West Indians are rejected?" 65
Six weeks after the April meeting, the War Office
stated that the lack of shipping still prevented the

63
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utilization of West Indian pioneer units. 66

MacMillan then

appealed to Philip H. Noel-Baker, Minister of War Transport,
who expressed "utmost sympathy" for the "highest political
importance" of raising pioneer units in the West Indies.
However, Noel-Baker agreed with the War Office's analysis of
the shipping difficulties.

American troops would have to be

delayed in favor of West Indian units and, because the Uboats were finding the Caribbean a good hunting ground, an
unusually strong naval escort would have to be provided for
the West Indian troop convoy. 67
In April 1943, the Colonial Office again proposed a
West Indian combatant contingent.

The War Office argued

against such a plan by citing shipping, difficulties of
maintaining reinforcements, and the effect the relatively
high pay expected by West Indian personnel might have on
other Black colonial troops.

As an alternative, it

suggested garrison duty in Ceylon or Madagascar for the
proposed force.

68

Again citing the prime minister's

previous support and possible resentment on the part of
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Black West Indians, the Colonial Office urged an active role
for a combatant unit in the Mediterranean. 69
The War Office commenced its rear-guard action against
a West Indian overseas contingent in August 1943.

Sir James

Grigg, the newest War Secretary, argued against the scheme
on several familiar grounds, including the "Black Man's
Grave" and West Indian expectations of being treated
equally:
In the first place West Indians are not a very
robust race, which would detract from their value
as combatant troops [and] might easily make them
something of a commitment from the health point of
view.
Secondly, their advent would mean setting
up a special administrative staff, and
complications over their rates of pay if they were
employed, for example, as labour units outside
Great Britain. They would presumably have to be
paid at British rates, whereas other coloured
labour abroad is not.
Thirdly, under existing
arrangements, they would not provide any accession
of strength to the British Army, since they would
count against Army manpower ceiling ...
With the last point, Grigg implied that, if only a limited
number of personnel could be supported by Britain, then they
should be White.

Moreover, Grigg cautioned that the

deployment of a West Indian contingent to the United Kingdom
would aggravate the tense racial situation already existing
there because of the arrival of large numbers of segregated
American forces.
69

The introduction of Black British subjects
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would, the War Secretary warned, be "asking for trouble and,
therefore, politically open to question."

Grigg left it

ultimately to the Colonial Office to decide if the political
advantages to an overseas contingent outweighed the military
drawbacks enough to submit the decision to higher authority,
i.e, the War Cabinet. 70
Before referring the matter to the War Cabinet, Oliver
Stanley, the then Colonial Secretary, persuaded the War
Secretary by arguing that West Indians were just as "robust"
as other Black colonial troops; pay differentials already
existed in the Allied effort, in particular the pay of
American servicemen versus British; and the proposed unit
would be sent direct to the Mediterranean instead of the
United Kingdom. 71

Apparently, the last condition clinched

the deal, for Grigg finally acceded to Stanley's plan and
recommended that the West Indian contingent 1) be used for
garrison duties without calling it a garrison unit, 2) be
sent to North Africa with summer duty in Italy, and 3) be
deployed overseas in the summer of 1944. 72
70
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acceptance secured, Stanley informed the War Cabinet that he
and his predecessors had "since the early days of the war,"
pursued the idea of a West Indian contingent and that,

"the

announcement of a decision to send a West Indian contingent
to a theatre of war would be most warmly received ... " 73

The

War Cabinet concurred and decided to ship the contingent to
the Mediterranean area as soon as possible after April 1944,
the earliest time when shipping would be available. 74

Soon

afterward, an absent Churchill minuted his approval: "I
favour this. " 75
In addition to a combatant contingent, the War Office,
in 1944, discussed the idea of sending specially raised West
Indian garrison battalions to British islands in the Pacific
in order to replace "island hopping" American troops. 76

The

military and political authorities in the West Indies
favored the suggestion and began planning for it but, from
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the Pacific, the New Zealand prime minister deprecated the
"introduction of another native race as most undesirable on
ethnological grounds." 77

In the event, the War Office never

implemented this scheme.
VI.

The Caribbean Regiment
The War Office informed its commanders in the

Mediterranean of the War Cabinet's decision to form a West
Indian overseas contingent and asked for their opinions as
to the unit's (to be called the 1st Battalion of the
Caribbean Regiment or 1/C.R.) eventual role.

The War Office

acknowledged to its commanders that it rated Black West
Indians' value as soldiers as "dubious," but requested that
they consider the political implications of relegating the
unit to a "static role. " 78

Sir Henry "Jumbo" Wilson, Allied

commander in the Mediterranean, agreed to train the regiment
in Italy as a commando, a small self-contained unit with
training appropriate to special tasks such as raiding.

Back

in London, the Colonial Office itself doubted whether the
soldiers would be "mentally alert enough" for the duty. 79
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Not all British commanders in the Mediterranean
appeared as accommodating to the l/C.R as Wilson.

For

example, Major General E.A. Sutton, Director of Medical
Services in Italy, claimed that on the basis of
"considerable personal experience,"

(presumably during the

Great War) he held an "extremely low" opinion of the Black
West Indian soldier.

He found them "very prone to reporting

sick for the most trivial reasons," they questioned
diagnosis, and, "they are in the main 'bone idle.'" 80

Sir

Harold Alexander, the Allied land commander in Italy,
opposed the idea of a symbolic West Indian contingent being
attached to his command for military reasons.

On a copy of

the War Office's proposal, he protested that,
I cannot accept the West Indian troops here--my
battle front is already far too rigid because of
the number of nationalities I have.
Those
responsible must be warned now that we shall be
heading for trouble if the Italian theatre is made
the dumping ground of all sorts of people who want
to be in on the show for political reasons. 81
Ironically, the War Office ignored dissenting opinions and
dutifully pressed forward with a scheme it had never
favored.
The battalion consisted of about 1,200 volunteers

80
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(including replacements) selected from the existing local
military forces of the various Caribbean area colonies and
Bermuda (Table 3).

Table 3. Geographic Distribution of the officers and
other ranks of the Caribbean Regiment.
COLONY
OFFICERS
OTHER
RANKS
Bermuda
3
97
Bahamas
1
53
Br. Honduras
1
60
Jamaica
6
240
Antigua
2
75
St. Lucia
1
93
Barbados
2
196
Trinidad
12
194
Br. Guiana
4
151
TOTALS
32
1,159
Source: P.R.O. W.O. 176/41. War Diary of l/C.R.,
Orders for Embarkation, 17 December 1945.
The War Off ice met colonial concerns about racial
discrimination by agreeing that Blacks could compete for
officer commissions on an equal basis with Whites. 82
However, this concession worried the military authorities in
Italy because it might have caused resentment in Black units
which could not have Black officers. 83

Most of the

regiment's senior officers were White, either West Indians
or Britons but most of the junior officers were

82
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"coloured." 84

Later, Black Londoner Major Joe Moody joined

the l/C.R. in the Middle East after several years service
with British anti-aircraft batteries.

He became the

highest-ranking Black officer and one of the senior officers
in the unit. 85
In view of the War Office's intransigence over bringing
the l/C.R. to Britain because of the growing American
presence, it was ironic that the authorities gathered and
trained the new battalion near Newport News, Virginia, for
six weeks before transporting it to Italy.

Before

disembarking in segregated America, Lt. Col. Wilkin, the
regiment's commanding officer ordered his soldiers to be
"particularly careful" when patronizing public
transportation, public houses, amusement centers, and places
of businesses in order to avoid "those places or vehicles
that are obviously reserved for Whites."

Wilkin further

prohibited his soldiers from communicating with or
befriending White women, but assured them that recreational
facilities would be provided.

"Above all," Wilkin implored,

"remember that the honour of your Regiment and your island
rests on your shoulders and that if you conduct yourselves

84
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properly and only go where you are told, you should have no
cause to regret the time spent in the U.S.A." 86

H.St.C.

Whitehorne, a White junior officer, recalled that the
relationship between the battalion and American civilians
was generally "amicable," but also remembered that the color
bar had "affected mildly one of our young officers who was
coloured and was not welcomed in a club or restaurant, but
this raised no real issue." 87
For entertainment, authorities organized dances and
sightseeing tours.

Barbadian Elvey Watson remembered that,

"if we had stuck to the stringent rules, we would never have
had a desire to mix with the Americans."

Because they wore

British uniforms, the soldiers of the l/C.R. often managed
to visit areas of towns which were off-limits to AfricanAmericans. 88

On 8 June 1944, the l/C.R. had the unique

distinction of being the first British regiment to celebrate
the king's birthday on American territory since the American
Revolution. 89

Fortunately for colonial relations, the
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battalion emerged largely unscathed from its American stay.
In Italy, British inspectors found that the training
which the battalion had received in the West Indies and the
U.S. was inadequate.

They judged that both officers and

O.R.s of the 1/C.R. required six months of intensive
training before participating in battle against the Germans.
The officers, from the relatively old Wilkin down, were
judged "all unfit to look after their men and command in
battle." 90

Dismayed, the War Office momentarily considered

transferring the regiment to the Pacific but, instead, asked
Wilson to try, within a few months, to make the l/C.R. as
effective as possible, even if only for use in a quiet
sector of the front.
approached.

Speed mattered because winter

In the course of their late summer training,

the 1/C.R. earned congratulations for saving a key
ammunition dump from fire and, on another occasion, for
loading bridging equipment in record time, an effort which
contributed to a rapid allied advance across a river. 91
Inexplicably, the intensive effort to prepare the battalion
well enough for a quiet sector failed.
90
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worsening weather, the battalion's commander reported that,
Records of the last war show that West Indian
personnel cannot be suitably trained much less
fight under damp cold weather conditions without
incurring a very high sick rate, due to the West
Indian susceptibility to all pulmonary disease.
Wilkin recommended that his battalion be moved to Egypt or
India to complete training. 93

Sutton, the chief British

medical officer in Italy, agreed and warned that,

"the

presence of these troops in Italy during the winter months
will be a liability, not an asset, and most of their
training will have to be done in hospital." 94

In November,

the War Office informed Wilson that administrative
difficulties prevented the l/C.R. 's transfer to Southeast
Asia and asked that Wilson employ it in a warm coastal area
of Italy in the spring of 1945. 95
Meanwhile, military authorities replaced many of the
battalion's original officers and N.C.O.s with experienced
men, including Major Moody.

A White South African officer

posted to the unit presented a delicate disciplinary problem
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for the 1/C.R. and was transferred to a South African
unit.

96

To further complicate matters, the Colonial Office

strongly opposed sending the unit to Palestine because it
might be called upon to quell local disturbances, and "such
employment of West Indian troops would be objected to by
both Jews and Arabs on racial grounds." 97

Eventually, the

British assigned the unit to Gaza, but undertook to move it
away if violence occurred there. 98
British commanders worried about the effect of the
presence of the 1/C.R. on other troops in the imperial
forces.

Soon after its arrival in Italy, the British

attributed to West Indians the inability to "mix at all well
with Africans or other Coloured troops." 99

In Egypt, in

common with White soldiers, members of the 1/C.R.
contemptuously referred to Egyptians as "wogs" and
"gippos. " 100
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experienced by the regiment, however, involved White
servicemen.

A violent altercation started while several

hundred members of the regiment enjoyed leave in Cairo on
Christmas Eve, 1944.

In Egypt, military authorities

normally provided separate recreational facilities for White
and "Coloured" personnel.

However, members of the 1/C.R.

technically counted as "White" because their paybooks were
stamped "B.O.R." (British Other Ranks) rather than
"A[frican] .O.R." or "I[ndian] .O.R."

At the "Sweet Melody

Cafe," a dance hall frequented by White servicemen, a
dispute erupted between a White soldier and a Black 1/C.R.
sergeant over a woman.

A brawl lasting several hours ensued

and involved many more soldiers, including White military
police.

The outnumbered West Indians boarded themselves up

in their hotel and refused to surrender to the provost
marshal.

They threw mattresses down upon the military

police and other White soldiers who attempted to storm the
hotel.

According to Elvey Watson, American military police

achieved a truce and transported the 1/C.R. back to camp.
On Christmas Day, Lt. Col. Nicolson, the recently appointed
O.C., cancelled leaves and lectured the regiment on the
brawl's impact on its reputation and chances to fight in
battle.

Watson recalled that Nicolson "advised us to count

ten before striking, and, if possible, to count ten more,
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but after that,

'Strike, and strike hard!'"

Subsequently,

the unit received a new home in the desert near the Red Sea
and remained barred from leave in Egyptian cities for
several months, measures which successfully prevented
further racial confrontations.

Soldiers of the l/C.R. later

claimed that the fight demonstrated their superiority over
both other "coloured" soldiers as well as Whites. 101
The Christmas Eve incident confirmed the fears of
British generals in the Middle East.

The West Indians

presented a difficult administrative problem for the
generals because of their expectation of being treated
equally to White troops. 102

According to the Commander-in-

Chief, Middle East, the battalion's morale and behavior
remained good only when "actively employed and isolated from
other t[roo]ps and from women." 103

Even training policy

reflected racial concerns as officials refused to assign the
battalion to an Indian division for crucial large formation
training "owing to difficulties of colour." 104

101

Moody; Whitehorne; and P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854.
Extract from Middle East Military Censorship Summary No.
106, period 27 December 1944 to 9 January 1945; Watson, 93-

4.
102
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103

P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Commander-in-Chief, Middle
East, to War Office, 12 July 1945.
104

P.R.O.

c.o.
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Paget to War Office, 26
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Nevertheless, according to Major Moody, the battalion
received the best training and equipment available to any
British battalion, including mountain training in
preparation for possible operations against German-held Kos
and Leros islands in the Aegean. 105

The l/C.R. had plenty of

time to train since British authorities found it difficult
to find a suitable role for it.

In London, officials within

the War and Colonial Off ices continued to discuss the
possibility of sending the unit to Burma, but neither
strongly favored the idea.

On a military level, the War

Office still doubted the regiment's effectiveness, while, on
a political level, the Colonial Office did not wish the West
Indians to come into contact with the lower paid African
troops who already served there in large numbers. 106
Meanwhile, when not engaged in training exercises,
personnel of the l/C.R. won four sporting competitions open
to all units in Egypt, 107 but the lack of action threatened
the morale and discipline of the battalion.

In London,

March 1945.
10

5Moody.

106

P.R.O. W.O. 193/124.
7 February 1945.
107

Minute by Lt.-Col. Garrett,

P.R.O. C.O. 537/1266. Summary of Overseas Career
of the l/C.R., Trinidad (Acting Governor) to Colonial
Secretary, 28 June 1945.
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Harold Moody of the League of Colored Peoples in Britain
(and father of Major Moody) urged an active role for the
unit and alluded to the possibility of another Taranto
Mutiny:
We believe that our men are all keen to pull their
weight to the full and that they will not let down
their flag. We do hope that you will be able to
do something to satisfy the yearnings of these men
and not wait until their sense of frustration
should result in some act of insubordination for
which they cannot be wholly regarded as
responsible. 108
The Colonial Office assured Moody that the War Off ice
realized the "general desirability of allotting an active
role to this unit if possible," but the Colonial Secretary
could not intervene in the army's field operations. 109

The

announced reluctance to interfere notwithstanding, the War
Office, within days, formally "offered" its commanders in
the Far East the battalion for any operational role they
could find for it.

The War Office informed Claude

Auchinleck, now the Commander-in-Chief, India, of the unit's
political significance, but warned that the men were paid at
British rates and were "extremely colour conscious," and
expected to be treated equally. 110

108

P.R.O.
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the grounds that the imperial forces in the Far East
included enough infantry and that no combatant role could be
found for the battalion. 111
Rebuffed, the War Office again turned to its
Mediterranean commanders in order to get the 1/C.R. into
combat.

On 2 May 1945, with the European war's end just a

few days off, Alexander agreed to "call forward" the
l/C.R. 112

On 6 May, the War Office advised him that, "honour

would be satisfied if this Reg[imen]t was used in any minor
op[eration] in the Aegean or to take part in receiving the
capitulation of Crete." 113

On 9 May, Alexander reported that

time would not allow either scheme and suggested that the
l/C.R. be sent to the Far East or remain in Middle East to
guard prisoners of war. 114

The Air Ministry presented

another option in July, when it requested that men of the
l/C.R. be allowed to volunteer for the R.A.F. 115
10 March 1945.
111

P.R.O.
30 March 1945.

w.o.

106/2854.

Auchinleck to War Office,

112

Allied Forces Headquarters

113

War Office to Allied Forces

114
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115
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P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854.
to War Office, 2 May 1945.
P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854.
Headquarters, 6 May 1945.
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The British authorities did not adopt these schemes,
and once it became clear that the l/C.R. had no real or
potential military function, British commanders urged that
it be returned home as soon as possible to forestall
disciplinary problems. 116

The Colonial Office feared the

political consequences of sending the 1/C.R. home without
having been blooded.

Following a Colonial Office

suggestion, the War Off ice asked the commanders in the
Middle East to "make clear to all ranks that they are
returning to their own country with honour," and that it was
regretted that they had not gotten an opportunity to
fight. 117

Consequently, Sir Charles Allfrey shared the

following words with the regiment: "you may feel badly for
not getting a fight, but the fault was not yours ... On your
return to the West Indies, you must not feel ashamed." 118

The case of the Caribbean Regiment underscored the
tensions affecting the British empire during the 1930s and
1940s.

Colonial political and racial relations were

changing faster than ingrained military prejudices.

The

116

P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Commander-in-Chief, Middle
East, to War Office, 12 July 1945.
117
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118
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formation of the l/C.R. resulted from the persistence of the
Colonial Off ice in the face of deeply held War Off ice
prejudices.

The Colonial Office hoped to strengthen the

bonds of empire by gaining for Black colonial subjects an
active part in the British war effort.

It was wary of

allowing any suggestion that Black West Indians were valued
less than Whites.

Conversely, the War Office clung to old

racial prejudices with little regard for the possible
political ramifications of relegating Black West Indians to
a distant, secondary role.

CHAPTER V
BLACKS IN THE BRITISH FORCES, 1689 TO 1914
British policy toward the service of Blacks in the
armed forces of Britain to 1914 fluctuated considerably but,
in general, the same attitudes dictating the utilization of
Black colonial troops often influenced policies toward
individual Black personnel in the Royal Navy, British Army,
and Royal Air Force.

Black servicemen frequently and

successfully served in the Georgian military, although not
on a basis equal with Whites.

In the Victorian era, the

authorities determined that formal distance had to be
maintained between White and Black, otherwise, close contact
would undermine White prestige.

As a result, the services

imposed color bars to keep their ranks racially pure.
I.

Black Sailors and Soldiers, 1689 to ca. 1850
Black seamen often served in the Royal Navy throughout

the Georgian era.

In 1801, the H.M.S. Ganges had two

Indians and three Africans in a crew of just under 700.

At

Trafalgar, the crew of Admiral Nelson's flagship, H.M.S.
Victory, included two Indians, one African and nine West
Indians. 1

1

Until the late-nineteenth century, the manpower-

Dudley Pope, Life in Nelson's Navy (Annapolis:
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starved "senior service" did not overly concern itself with
the color or ethnicity of its crews.

By 1900, however, the

Admiralty relegated Blacks sailors to limited local roles,
such as stokers on the West African station.
Black servicemen probably made their most pronounced,
or perhaps, visible, impact in the army.

Though the courts

of Henry VII of England and James IV of Scotland employed
Black entertainers, 2 the employment of Blacks as bandsmen in
British military units became fashionable later, probably
during the wars with France beginning in 1689. 3

Recruited

from slaves and free men from the West Indies, Africa, and
India, Black musicians usually held the positions of fifers,
drummers and trumpeters whose functions included the
transmission of orders and setting of marching paces.

They

served in all of the major battles of the British army from
1689 to 1815.

At Waterloo, a Black trumpeter served on the

staff of Major-General Sir Hussey Vivian, commander of a
brigade of light-cavalry. 4

Naval Institute Press, 1981), 109.
2

Paul Edwards, 15.

3

Shyllon, 159; Cecil C.P. Lawson, A History of the
Uniforms of the British Army, I, (London: Norman Military
Publications), 40, 117-8.
4

Matthew Coglan, "Reminiscence,"
ed., The Historical Memoirs of the 18th
Simpkin & Co., 1907), 143. Billy Blue,
Sydney, Australia, resident, claimed in

in Harold Malet,
Hussars (London:
a famous early
an 1823 petition to
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Regimental commanders desired to exploit the foreign
appearance of Black musicians and several regiments made a
long tradition of employing them.

For example, Farrington's

Regiment of Foot, included Black soldiers in the 1690s, but
it is unclear when the regiment abandoned the practice.

The

unit (redesignated as the 29th Foot) re-adopted Black
drummers in 1759, when Admiral Edward Boscawen "secured" ten
African youths after the British capture of Guadaloupe and
sent them to his brother, the commanding officer of the 29th
Foot, which was then stationed in Ireland.
Black drummers in 1774 and three in 1834.
with the regiment died in 1843. 5

The 29th had ten
The last to serve

As Turkish-inspired

military music became popular across Europe, regiments
clothed Black musicians, who now played bass drums,
kettledrums, cymbals and "jingling johnnies," in exotic
uniforms, including turbans.

In late Georgian and early

Victorian London, ornately uniformed Black bandsmen added to
have served in the British military for many years and
participated in several famous events: witnessing James
Wolfe's death at Quebec in 1759, serving as a marine in
Germany in the early 1760s, accompanying Major John Andre
when he was captured and executed by the Americans in 1780,
and spying for Lord Cornwallis during the Yorktown campaign
of 1781. See Meg Swords, Billy Blue, The Old Commodore
(Sydney: North Shore Historical Society, 1979), 41-4.
5

J. Paine, "The Negro Drummers of the British Army,"
The Leading Note: The Journal of the Military Musician 1
(August 1930): 26-7; H. Everard, History of Thos.
Farrington's Regiment (Worcester: Littlebury & Co., 1891),
74, 265.
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Victorian London, ornately uniformed Black bandsmen added to
the ceremony and pomp of the Household regiments that
guarded the sovereign. 6

Regiments preferred that their

Black musicians be as dark-skinned as possible.

In 1823,

the 1st (Grenadier) Regiment of Foot Guards discharged a
Black drummer because he did not possess "a sufficiently
Black complexion [sic]. " 7
Despite the popularity of Black bandsmen, there was
some publicly voiced opposition to their employment.

For

example, Cobbett's Annual Register deprecated the presence
of Blacks in the army, "where they never ought to show their
heads, in any capacity, or upon any condition." 8

However, a

general public acceptance of Black bandsmen is evidenced by
the fact that many volunteer and militia regiments,
including the most fashionable corps of London, imitated
their regular army colleagues. 9

Thus, Georgian racial

6

See, for examples, Edward Croft-Murray, "The Wind
Band in England," in The British Museum Yearbook 4: Music
and Civilisation (London: British Museum Publications,
1980), plates 113, 118, and 124.
7

Reported in the Fourteenth Report of the Mendicity
Society (1832), 41-2, quoted in Shyllon, Black People in
Britain, 159.
8

Cobbett's Annual Register, January/June, 1804, 936-

7.
9

Lawson, III, 149; V, 51, 80, 82; Croft-Murray, 154,
pl. 114. Edward Dayes' 1799 watercolor, "King George III
reviewing Eight Thousand Volunteers in Hyde Park," depicted
most of the assembled bands with at least one Black

165

stereotypes about the "musical nature" of Blacks combined
with military fashion to over-ride any racial anxiety that
might have been felt.
The primary reason why the British army used Black
bandsmen, their physical appearance, also contributed to
their being part of the lore of the British army. 10

The

Wexford militia contained a line-soldier named Myrtle, "a
half-bred Indian," commonly referred to as "the Devil"
because of "his satanic ugliness."

The Wexford's commander

wagered that Myrtle, possessing "extraordinary power of
fascination and agility," could retrieve another regiment's
monkey-mascot, Jocko, which was hiding in a grove of trees.
To win his colonel's wager, Myrtle dressed like a monkey,
climbed a tree and, according to a witness,

"commenced a

series of the most extraordinary ogling, grinning, grimaces,
and diabolical contortions of his ugly countenance that was
ever ... made by man, devil, or ape."

A pacified Jocko

eventually jumped into the "Devil's" arms. 11

In another

episode, a White drum-major of the 88th Foot (Connaught
Rangers) and the daughter of a Spanish notable attempted to

bandsman.
10

"A Ramble Round the Military Exhibition, " The
British Bandsman 3 (August 1890):
243.
11

70-71.

T. Ogle, The Irish Militia Officer (Dublin, 1873),
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elope.

When the father searched through the regiment for

his daughter, she hid among the Black bandsmen by disguising
herself as "a cymbal-boy, with her face blacked. " 12

In an

event immortalized on canvass by J.S. Copley, a Major
Peirson fell dead leading his troops against French invaders
of Jersey and a Black servant, named Pompey, reputedly
killed the French marksman.

Copley depicted Pompey

dramatically firing over the body of the martyred Peirson. 13
Besides being viewed as exotic objects, Black soldiers
participated in the normal pass-times of British soldiers,
including brawling, crime, and desertion.

In 1768, the 29th

Foot, with its Black drummers, arrived in Boston,
Massachusetts, in order to overawe the residents.

In the

months leading up to the Boston Massacre of 5 March 1770,
its soldiers frequently had violent confrontations with city
residents.
the 29th,

On 2 March, Thomas Walker, a Black drummer of
found a bleeding White comrade who had been beaten

by some local rope-makers.

He then led a group of

"redcoats" back to the "rope-walks" for revenge.

A local

justice saw the soldiers return and shouted at their Black

12

William Grattan, "Military Reminiscences," United
Service Magazine (August 1945):
526;
T.J. Edwards,
Military Customs (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1961), 21-22.
13

Richard Mayne, The Battle of Jersey (London:
Phillimore & Co., 1981), 68-9.
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leader, "You Black rascal, what have you to do with White
people's quarrels?"

Walker deceptively replied that he

would just "look on," but in the ensuing brawl, he received
a severe battering. 14

Nor was such violence absent from

internal military relations.

On 12 August 1780, two Black

bandsmen of the Somerset militia stationed in Plymouth,
England, quarreled with members of the Brecknock militia.
The confrontation erupted into a full-blown riot between
regiments which was quelled only after officers called the
guard out. 15

Individually, Black soldiers committed crimes

and deserted from their regiments just as White colleagues,
but their skin-color probably made them somewhat easier to
punish. 16
Many Black servicemen fought for the king

14

Hiller Zobel, The Boston Massacre (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1970), 182; John Shy, Toward Lexington:
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 317; See the
depositions of Thomas Walker and other soldiers' in P.R.O.
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15

W.J.W. Kerr, Records of the 1st Somerset Militia
(Aldershot:
Gale & Polden, 1930), 26.
16

In 1750, the 4th Dragoons executed a drummer
convicted for murdering a country-woman; in 1761, another
drummer in the same regiment suffered fines and one thousand
lashes for killing his horse.
In 1790, Othello and Carter,
trumpeters, attempted to desert but were captured, flogged
and transferred to the Royal Navy. R.O. Rickwood, "Black
Drummers in the Army," Journal of the Society of Army
Historical Research 4 (1925): 136-7.
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involuntarily, but it is also true that others chose to
enlist.

For example, an African named Ukawsaw Gronniosaw

served on a British naval vessel in the Seven Years War and
received his discharge in New York.

Because he wished to

visit England, he enlisted in the 28th Foot, which then
fought in the capture of Havana in 1762. 17

During the

Napoleonic Wars, an escaped slave served as a drummer of the
25th Foot for seven years and participated in the capture of
Guadaloupe and Martinique. 18

In 1813, John Baptist, of

Martinique, joined the Royal Waggon Train but transferred to
the Third (Scots) Regiment of Foot Guards in 1818 as a
cymbalist.

He served with the regiment until 1841. 19

The outbreaks of the American Revolution and War of
1812 presented numerous opportunities for Blacks to enlist
in the king's forces.

Prior to the Revolution, colonial

governments had been extremely reluctant to recruit Blacks
for their militias.

For example, the colony of Virginia

17

J. Albert, A Narrative of the most remarkable
particulars in the life of James Albert Ukawsaw Gronniosaw,
an African Prince, as related by himself (Bath:
1770), 223.
18

Fifth Report of the Mendicity Society(1823), 3940, quoted by Shyllon, Black People in Britain, 163-164.
19

C.H. Masse, The Predecessors of the Royal Army
Service Corps (Aldershot:
Gale and Polden, 1948), 16; Percy
Sumner, "Jean Baptiste, Cymbal Player of the Scots Fusilier
Guards, 1832," Journal of the Society for Army Historical
Research 22 (1943-44):
1.
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refused even the limited mobilization of Black manpower
during the Seven Years War because of a fear of teaching
Blacks how to efficiently kill Europeans, as well as a
hesitancy to interfere with the property rights of slaveowners. 20

In November 1775, Lord Dunmore, royal governor of

Virginia, proclaimed martial law in his colony and called
upon slaves to side with the king in exchange for freedom.
He formed the Ethiopian Regiment from runaways, many of whom
wore the slogan,

"Liberty to Slaves," stitched onto the

front of their uniforms.

Soon after its first battle and

defeat, the regiment withdrew to Royal Navy ships in the
Chesapeake, where fever and smallpox severely decimated its
ranks. 21

Except for Dunmore's short-lived scheme, British

policy regarding Black loyalists remained ambivalent until
1779, when the war shifted southward to the slave-holding
southern colonies.

Historian Benjamin Quarles concludes

that British schemes for raising masses of Black troops
never materialized because of the need for laborers and the
problem of controlling armed slaves. 22

Indeed, British

20

Larry G. Bowman, "Virginia's use of Blacks in the
French and Indian War," Western Pennsylvania Historical
Magazine 53 (1970):
57-63.
21

James St. G. Walker, "Blacks as American
Loyalists," Historical Reflections 2 (1975):
54.
22
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Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
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military authorities assigned thousands of escaped or
liberated Black men, women and children to the various
branches and units of the army to function as orderlies,
cooks, smiths, carpenters, seamstresses, and, most
crucially, as pioneers who constructed fortifications.

In a

nice bit of irony, Ralph Henry escaped from the bondage of
Virginia politician Patrick Henry and, in the spirit of
"GIVE ME LIBERTY OR GIVE ME DEATH," served with the Royal
Artillery. 23
During the first two years of the war, Loyalist units
welcomed Black recruits as line-soldiers as well as for the
customary role of drummers and trumpeters.

Richard and

Peter Martin had been owned by a Colonel Butler, a prominent
New York Loyalist whose property, including slaves, had been
seized and auctioned off.

The Martin brothers escaped,

rejoined their master, and enlisted in his provincial
regiment. 24

However, in 1777, Alexander Innes, Inspector

General of the Provincial Forces, moved to end the "abuse"
of enlisting "Negroes," "Mullattos" and "Indians" into
Loyalist regiments because he thought that the practice
brought "disgrace and ruin" to the provincial service.

23

Ellen Gibson Wilson, The Loyal Blacks (New York:
Capricorn, 1976), 28.
24

"The Petition of Peter Martin," Papers and
Records of the Ontario Historical Society 26:
244.
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Innes attempted to "discharge all improper persons" from
provincial corps and issued "strict orders" against the
future recruitment of Blacks. 25

Individual regiments did

not strictly enforce the color bar.

Years later, Butler's

Rangers still contained Black soldiers Jack Baker, Richard
Parepoint, James Robertson, and the Martin brothers. 26

The

Queen's Rangers, probably the most famous Loyalist unit,
still included drummers listed by the names of "Black
Prince" and "Black Barney. " 27
The expansion of the war to the southern colonies
prompted a rethinking of policy.

In 1779, Sir Henry

Clinton, British Commander-in-Chief in America, proclaimed
that Blacks captured in rebel service would be sold as
slaves, but those who sided with the king would receive
protection and freedom. 28

As a result, loyalists raised the

Carolina Corps from among Whites and Blacks; consisting of

25

"A Letter Regarding the Queen's Rangers," Virginia
Magazine of History and Biography 20 (1922):
369.
26

Ernest Cruickshank, The Story of Butler's Rangers
and the Settlement of Niagara (Niagara Falls, Ontario:
Renown Printing Company):
116-122; Green, 365-366.
27
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28
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both infantry and cavalry, it served throughout the southern
campaign. 29

Curiously, the German regiments hired by

Britain, popularly known as "Hessians," recruited two
hundred African-Africans as drummers and line-soldiers, many
of whom accompanied their teutonic colleagues to Germany
after the war. 30

Unfortunately for the king's cause,

British policy regarding Black manpower vacillated.

Because

of a combination of prejudice and fear of offending colonial
slaveowners, the British did not exploit this massive
resource of manpower to decisively change the course of the
war in favor of the king.
In the War of 1812, African-American slaves again
represented a potential source of military manpower for the
British forces but, as in the American Revolution, official
attitudes alternated between encouraging slave escapes and
fearing White American outrage.

The king's commanders did

not foment wide-scale insurrection but they normally
protected any escaped slaves who desired sanctuary.
African-Americans served the British as guides and, in the

29
30

Tylden, "The West India Regiments," 43.

Elliot W. Hoffmann, "Black Hessians: American
Blacks as German Soldiers," Negro History Bulletin 44
(1981):
81-2, 91; and George Fenwick Jones, "The Black
Hessians: Negroes Recruited by the Hessians in South
Carolina and other Colonies," South Carolina Historical
Magazine (1982): 287-302.
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mid-1814 raids against settlements in the Chesapeake Bay
area, Black British soldiers played key roles and also
helped to burn Washington D.C.

By September, three hundred

African-Americans had been organized into three companies of
Royal Marines and grouped with three White companies to form
a battalion. 31

Though they provided a welcome reinforcement

for the British forces, the Black marines were "wretchedly
equipped; some without blankets, others without great coats,
scarcely a haversack or canteen between [sic] them, & many
even shoeless. " 32
Throughout the Georgian period, the British government
and military proved to be ambivalent in their treatment of
Black soldiers and sailors.

Historian Sylvia Frey claims

that "racial prejudice" was "an important formative factor"
in British decision-making toward African-American soldiers
during the American Revolution and cites many instances of
their being treated differently from White personnel in pay,
punishment and functions. 33

Racial discrimination sometimes

31
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32
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reached across the Atlantic.

At an inspection of the

Wexford Militia during the 1790s, a British general, in "a
towering passion," demoted Black Dan, an African,

from

sergeant to private because he found it offensive to see a
Black man commanding Whites. 34
While Black personnel suffered from racism, other
evidence suggests that the political need to preserve "White
prestige" by maintaining distance and racial subordination
evoked far less anxiety during the eighteenth and mid
nineteenth centuries than it would later.

As proof of the

Georgian navy's "relatively liberal outlook on questions of
colour," historian N.A.M. Rodger cites a 1761 court-martial
in which a Black seaman acted as the principal prosecution
witness against two White sailors accused of sodomy.

The

defendants objected on the grounds that a Black should not
testify against "Christians," but the court found his
testimony trustworthy and hanged the two defendants.

35

One

of the earliest winners of the Victoria Cross, Britain's
highest award for gallantry, was a long-serving Black Nova
Scotian sailor named William Hall.

He received the

decoration while fighting as part of a naval shore party

34

35

0gle, 31.
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during the Indian Mutiny. 36
In the Georgian military, Black personnel often
functioned in disciplinary positions over Whites.

In the

Georgian army, drummers had the task of carrying out
corporal punishments, which included hundreds and even
thousands of lash strokes.

In his study of the Napoleonic-

era Irish militia, Henry McAnally raised the question of
whether Black drummers administered the lash, but found no
evidence one way or the other. 37

In the case of the 29th

Foot in colonial Boston, Black drummers such as Thomas
Walker did perform the duties required by their status, a
situation which caught the attention of Bostonians, who
generally did not approve of the military practice of
flogging anyway.

For them, the sight of White soldiers

being "scourg'd by Negro drummers" on the Common, was,
according to the Boston Evening Post, "a new and very
disagreeable spectacle." 38

In 1782, a unit of Black British

36
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16-17,
32. Under heavy fire, and with his colleagues dead and
wounded around him, Hall single-handedly loaded and fired
the heavy naval gun that breached the wall of a mutineer
stronghold.
37

Henry McAnally, The Irish Militia: A Social and
Military Study (Dublin: Conmore and Reynolds, 1949), 204.
38

0liver Morton Dickerson, ed., Boston under
Military Rule, 1768-1769, as revealed in a Journal of the
Times (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1968), 3, 6.
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cavalry served in another enforcement role in the Carolina
countryside by apprehending British deserters. 39

In the

same year, on the West African coast, Governor Joseph Wall
of Goree improperly ordered that a White sergeant, Benjamin
Armstrong, be flogged for mutiny.

Because he did not trust

his other White soldiers, Wall ordered several African
civilian employees at the fort to execute the punishment. 40
From the authorities' perspectives, the use of Blacks in
disciplinary roles as military police or floggers was merely
a matter of military function.

In contrast, by the late

Victorian era, the British generally did not allow Blacks to
exert such authority over Whites, a situation which would
not change until the Second World War.
II.

Black Soldiers and sailors, 1860-1914.
The Victorian era brought significant changes in the

officially sanctioned use of Black soldiers.

Most regiments

ceased employing Black musicians by the 1840s, but the
reason for the end of the practice remains unclear. 41

There

39

William Seymour, "A Journal of the Southern
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35.
40
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seems to have been confusion within the late-Victorian
military establishment as to whether any non-Europeans could
actually enlist in British regiments.

The Army Acts of

1881, 1884 and 1914 specifically allowed for the enlistment
of Blacks into the British army according to the following
provisions:
... (1.) Any person who is for the time being an
alien may, if His Majesty think fit to signify his
consent through a Secretary of State, be enlisted
in His Majesty's regular forces, so, however, that
the number of aliens serving together at any one
time in any corps of the regular forces shall not
exceed the proportion of one alien to every fifty
British subjects, and that an alien so enlisted
shall not be capable of holding any higher rank in
His Majesty's regular forces than that of a
warrant officer or non-commissioned officer .
... (2.) Provided that, notwithstanding the above
provisions of this section, any inhabitant of any
British protectorate and any negro or person of
colour, although an alien, may voluntarily enlist
in pursuance of this Part of the Act, and when so
enlisted, shall, while serving in His Majesty's
regular forces, be deemed to be entitled to all
the privileges of a natural-born British
subject. 42

The exception noted in paragraph (2) had originally
been made by the War Office to allow liberated African
slaves, who were genuine "aliens," to enlist in the
W.I.R.s. 43

Historian David Killingray interprets this

42

War Office, Manual of Military Law (London:
H.M.S.O.), 1881, 443-; and 1914, 471.
43

Manual of Military Law, 1884, 256, 444.
In 1947,
legal experts confirmed that, since 1881, British law had
technically allowed for both the recruitment and
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stipulation as an example of institutional racism because
the War Office considered Black people to be "aliens." 44
However, the Army Act never specifically addressed Britishborn Black subjects, "Black Britons," who were neither
inhabitants of British protectorates nor "aliens."

Anyone

who worked at the War Off ice in London probably had to have
been aware that Black people lived in Britain.
"Legal" did not mean "mandatory;" the same Army Acts
that regulated recruitment also granted the War Office,
acting in the sovereign's name, the authority to regulate
enlistment and commissioning.

The army's highest officials

expressed their views on Black enlistment into British
regiments in 1886.

The question had originally arisen

during the 1870s and '80s, when Europeans and Eurasians in
India called for the unrestricted enlistment of Eurasians
into British regiments and the formation of specifically
Eurasian regiments.

Ironically, the Indian government,

commissioning of "coloured" aliens.
"Opinion of the
Solicitor-General and Mr. Parker," 14 November 1947 and
"Case for the Opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown:
Whether Gurkhas serving in the British Regular Forces may be
Granted Commissions in those Forces." P.R.O. W.O. 32/12319.
See also the Ninth (1969) edition of the Manual of Military
Law (London: H.M.S.O., 1969), 304.
44

Killingray wrote that, "Army law classified Blacks
as aliens." See his "All the King's Men? Blacks in the
British Army in the First World War, 1914-1918," in Rainer
Lotz and Ian Pegg, eds., Under the Imperial Carpet (Crawley,
Sussex: Rabbitt Press, 1986), 166-169.
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always deeply concerned about matters of race, believed that
British regiments stationed in India could already recruit
Eurasians who possessed three-fourths European parentage, at
the discretion of commanding officers.

Eurasian soldiers

suffered only from the disability that, once enlisted, they
could not expect to be repatriated home to India at "public
expense" if, by the end of their service, their British
regiment had left India.

According to the highest Indian

officials, it was well known that Eurasians often "work(ed)
their passage ... to England, in order to enter the Army
there, as they cannot do so out here, owing to the
difficulty of obtaining the necessary certificate of
descent." 45

Ever conscious of Britain's tenuous hold on

India, the Indian government supported unrestricted
individual Eurasian enlistment in British regiments "in
order to remove a grievance to which some importance is
attached, by a class whose tendencies are loyal and
patriotic. " 46
In direct contrast, War Office officials in London
assumed that army regulations already prohibited Black
45

P.R.O. W.O. 32/6889. Military Department of India
to Secretary of State for India, 23 July 1886; and AdjudantGeneral, India, to Secretary of the Government of Madras, 2
December 1875.
46

P.R.O. W.O. 32/6889. Military Department, Simla,
India, to Lord Kimberly, 23 July 1886.

180

enlistment of any kind.

The Duke of Cambridge, Commander-

in-Chief, and Sir Garnet Wolseley, the Adjudant-General,
both strongly opposed Black enlistment.

In particular, the

latter described the proposal of opening British regiments
to "men of a cowardly race" as "insidious and very
dangerous."

Such a policy, Wolseley feared, would result

ultimately in the "enlistment of full-blown Black men" and
the ruin of the army. 47
Black men, whether "full-blown" or by degree, certainly
served as soldiers of the queen despite War Office rhetoric.
In 1882, a petitioner, using the pseudonym "A. Eurasian,"
claimed that,
There are more Eurasians in the British Army than
is commonly supposed. Being sufficiently White to
pass for Europeans, they have been enlisted as
such, and of course their identity as Eurasians
has been lost.
Several of the store-sergeants,
sub-conductors, &c., are to my personal knowledge
Eurasians, and they have the reputation of being
efficient men. 48
Many Black soldiers probably passed for White, but
others served despite obvious non-European descent.

For

example, the Edwardian-era Durham Light Infantry had a Black
Corporal of Buglers who had been found as a two-year-old

47

Minute by Wolseley, 29

48

Remarks by "A. Eurasian,"

P.R.O. W.O. 32/6889.
September 1886.
P.R.O. W.O. 32/6889.
Proceedings for April 1882, 7.
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child in the Sudan in 1885.

"Little Mustafa's" father had

been killed in a battle against the British.

N.C.O.s of the

regiment christened him "John Francis Durham," raised him,
and paid for his education.

When he came of legal age,

Durham enlisted in the regiment, married an English woman,
and died in Ireland in 1910. 49

Though unique, Durham's case

was, in all likelihood, not the only exception.

Regiments

at home required no proof of descent for enlistment and,
within the United Kingdom, British regiments increasingly
recruited from the urban areas in which significant numbers
of Black people dwelled.

Recruiting officers, perpetually

short of recruits, probably did not concern themselves much
with strictly enforcing racial purity. 50
III.

Black Officers to 1914
The possibility of Black line officers in British

regiments does not seem to have occurred to the War Off ice
until the 1880s.

Until 1871, most regular line officers

purchased their commissions, a policy that made the army the
creature of Britain's landed classes.

The regulations for

49

S.G.P. Ward, Faithful:
The Story of the Durham
Light Infantry (Durham: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1962), 274;
William More, The Durham Light Infantry (London: Leo Cooper,
1975): 10, 13.
5

°Killingray, "All the King's men?," 166. On
general recruiting patterns in Britain, see Alan Ramsey
Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home (Montreal: McGillQueen' s University Press, 1977), 289-298.

182

officer commissions made no mention of color, but, under the
purchase system, they really did not need it.

It seemed

obvious that, except in rare circumstances, potential
officers would come from the upper classes of the United
Kingdom.

The end of purchase in favor of application and

competition necessitated clarification of the regulations.
In 1884, authorities inserted a clause into the regulations
which stated that "only British born or naturalised British
subjects will be eligible to offer themselves for
examination" for the army's cadet colleges. 51
A decade later, after an unexplained 1893 case
involving a man name Ezechiel, a further qualification
stipulated that "candidates must, in the opinion of the
Commander-in-Chief, be in all respects suitable to hold
Commissions in the Army. " 52

The War Off ice defined

"suitability" in 1896 during an exchange of letters it had
with Dadabhoi Naoroji, a London-based Indian nationalist and
Liberal M.P., who had asked by what authority British
military officials barred non-European British subjects from
receiving commissions.

The War Office replied that no Act

of Parliament prohibited the practice, but military

51

History

P.R.O. W.O. 32/3759.
"A Statement Giving the
of the Case." May {?) 1910.

52

P.R.O. W.O. 32/3759.
"A Statement Giving the
History of the Case," May (?) 1910.
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regulations laid down by the Secretary of State for War
under the Queen's Royal Warrant on the pay, appointment, and
promotion of the army, did. 53

Naoriji argued that no

specific exclusions to Indian officers existed in the Royal
Warrant authorizing commissions.

Also, he cited an Act of

Parliament of 1833 governing the East India Company which
stated "that no Native of the said territory nor any
natural-born subject of His Majesty, resident therein shall,
by reason of his religion, place of birth, descent, or any
of these, be disabled from holding any place, off ice, or
employment."

Naoriji then cited the Queen's 1858

proclamation and its 1887 reaffirmation that there would be
no racial or religious discrimination in government
appointments. 54
Such arguments convinced Lord Lansdowne, the War
Secretary, that his ministry should be explicit on the
policy of excluding British subjects "not of pure European
descent."

He reasoned that a British private soldier would

never follow "a half-caste or native Officer."

Nor,

Lansdowne thought, would "junior Officers of pure British
blood serve efficiently under a senior Officer of mixed

53
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54

Naoriji to War Office, 7

P.R.O. W.O. 32/8651.
June to 23 July 1896.
P.R.O. W.O. 32/8651.
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origin."

In addition to recognizing these prejudices,

Lansdowne cited "physiological reasons for which,

in an Army

which may be called upon to serve in all parts of the globe,
Officers of Eastern extraction would not be suitable." 55

A

"frank" letter drafted for Naoriji's benefit stated that "it
is clearly laid down that only such candidates as those 'in
all respects suitable to hold a commission in the Army,' are
eligible;" and the War Office had decided that "pure
European descent" was "an essential qualification."

The War

Off ice further added that,
nothing whatever, either in the Queen's
Proclamation, or in the regulations for the
admission of University Candidates to which you
have referred ... could have the effect of
obliging the Military Authorities to grant
Commissions in the army to candidates who are not
considered suitable. 56
In 1900 and 1901, the War Office considered suggestions
that the army should adopt the navy's recent and open bar to
commissions for persons not of pure European descent.

On

both occasions, higher officials vetoed the idea because the
existing rule provided the Commander-in-Chief enough of a
tool to weed out objectionable candidates on the basis of

55
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56
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"suitability. "

57

In 1911, the War Office prepared to revise the
regulations for entrance to its military colleges at
Sandhurst (infantry and cavalry) and Woolwich (artillery and
engineers) to explicitly bar candidates "not of pure
European descent."

The India Office protested on the basis

that several serving Indian army officers possessed an
"admixture of Indian blood. " 58

In its reply to the India

Office, the War Office protested that the ambiguity of the
regulations allowed "a repetition of cases" in which
candidates prepared for the entrance examination but
eventually had to be rejected because of the unclear rule
that they must be "suitable" to hold an army commission.
One difficult case involved A.G.C. de Smidt, who, during a
medical examination for Sandhurst, was reported as "fit" but
having "the appearance of not being of pure European
descent."

The War Office invited him in for a visual exam

and decided that he did not have the necessary background.
Soon after, however, De Smidt successfully appealed on the
grounds that 1) he could prove his descent; 2) his brother
had been previously accepted to Woolwich; and 3) that the

57

"A Statement Giving the

58

Montagu, India Office to War

P.R.O. W.O. 32/3759.
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regulations contained no clause warning that "candidates
whose complexions happen to be unusually dark" would be
refused admittance. 59

Far from ending the controversy, the

War Secretary decided, for unspecified reasons, to retain
the unclear 1909 regulations. 60
In 1908, the "vexed question" of Black commissions
arose again, this time in connection with the Officers
Training Corps (O.T.C.s) at British universities.

The

presence of "coloured" students at British educational
institutions was increasing and they demanded equal access
to all university activities, including the "senior"
divisions of O.T.C.s.

O.T.C.s consisted of junior and

senior divisions, the former of which was open to any
students, often including non-Europeans, having an interest.
The latter was restricted to advanced students who intended
to gain commissions in the army's Territorial Force and
Special Reserve.

Up to this point, Glasgow had been the

only university to impose a formal color bar on membership
to its contingent.

The War Office decided to extend the ban

59

P.R.O. W.O. 32/3759. War Office to India Office, 1
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1911.
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to all universities on the grounds that it was "economically
unsound" for "coloured" students to be allowed to enroll in
O.T.C.s, which had been formed to supply officers for the
British reserve forces.

61

Despite War Office vehemence concerning race, the color
bar did not prevent the commissioning into Britain's regular
forces of several officers "not of pure European descent."
For example, R.F. Warburton had an Afghan grandmother but
earned a commission in the Somerset Light Infantry in 1892
and later joined the 5th Gurkhas in India.

F. Rennick,

whose mother was an Indian, initially received a commission
in the North Lancashire Regiment in 1885 and opted for the
Indian Army, subsequently rising to the command of the 40th
Pathans. 62

It may be argued that in examples such as these,

mixed-race officers passed for White, and therefore, did not
count as Black or "not of pure European descent."

However,

considering the relatively small circle of British and Irish
families that provided officers to the British army, someone
in the Colonial, India or War Offices had to have known such

61
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officers' genealogy.

Perhaps, out of a sense of fair play

or favoritism, officials simply looked the other way.

In

1939, Governor A. P. Richards of Jamaica claimed that his
colony had contributed many officers "of undoubted colour"
to the army.

They had evaded the color bar "presumably

through having been at the best schools in England and
having estates there as well as in Jamaica."

In particular,

Richards named H.S. Sewell, who served with distinction with
the 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards, and rose to command a
brigade of cavalry during the Great War. 63

Moreover, royal

pleasure could expand War Off ice rules regarding
"suitability," as in the case of Prince Victor Duleep Singh,
the British-born son of Sir Duleep Singh, a prominent Indian
exile and sometime favorite of the Queen.

Victor attended

Sandhurst and obtained a commission in an exclusive
Household Cavalry regiment, a unit which, ordinarily, would
not be sent out of Britain. 64
The matter did not rest there.

In 1897, the India

Office and War Office debated an Indian maharaja's proposal

63
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to commission the sons of aristocratic Indian families into
the British army.

The India Office failed to overcome the

War Office's opposition to implement this plan.

But just a

few years later, Indian princes became eligible for Imperial
Cadet Corps at "Princes Colleges," which would prepare them
for honorary commissions.

Their aspirations to serve the

King-Emperor would have to be satisfied by being attached to
the staffs of British generals as honorary aides. 65
Despite a lack of consistent enforcement, the political
need to maintain a formal color bar remained a key factor in
setting military policy.

In addition to injuring

individuals, the British army's desire to formally exclude
Blacks from positions of authority inhibited attempts to
rationalize the administration of the crown's military
forces.

In 1864 and again in 1881, for example, schemes to

amalgamate the Indian Medical Service with the Army Medical
Department foundered on the fact that the former accepted
Indians while the latter prohibited non-Europeans. 66

The Augustan and Georgian armed forces welcomed Blacks
to fulfil a variety of functions.

65

In the army, they usually
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served as regimental musicians, but they also often found
themselves fighting as line soldiers.

The navy proved

particularly accepting of Black recruits, especially when
its ships took station near colonies with Black populations.
Black soldiers and sailors participated in most of the
battles of the British army and Royal Navy between the
Restoration and the Crimean War.

Later, during the

Victorian period, British military policy formally barred
non-European individuals from enlisting or receiving
commissions in the regular forces.

However, numerous

individuals "not of pure European descent" did manage to
serve as officers and other ranks of the Queen.

Still,

officially sanctioned-racial integration would have conceded
racial equality in an empire increasingly justified by the
perceived inequality of the races.

CHAPTER VI
BLACKS IN THE BRITISH FORCES, 1914 TO 1939
The exigencies of the First World War challenged the
British government's policy regarding Black soldiers and
officers.

Initially, Britain's massive mobilization caused

many service recruiters to ignore the color bar when Black
Britons and colonial subjects volunteered but many other
Black volunteers were turned away.

Late in the war,

political pressures forced the War Office to amend its rules
governing Black involvement.

However, the military

establishment did not whole-heartedly welcome its Black
personnel and the alterations in policy demonstrated how
colonial political considerations could affect domestic
policy during times of crisis.
I.

An Imperial War

The outbreak of war in 1914 quickly brought forth
numerous British subjects "not of pure European descent,"
who attempted to enlist directly into the British armed
forces.

The army did not desire Black recruits but,

publicly, the War Office maintained an ambiguous position
regarding its policy.

The 1914 example of W. A. Moore, who

had held "a good position in the West Indies," typified the
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problems involved when a recruiter rejected a Black
volunteer who had actually traveled to Britain at his own
expense to enlist.

Moore complained to the West India

Committee, a London-based lobbying organization that color
was the reason. 1

In response, Lord Dundonald, the

Committee's secretary, deceptively disclaimed any knowledge
of War Office recruiting policies and suggested that concern
for Moore's health in the European climate was the probable
reason for the rejection. 2 In November 1915, the UnderSecretary of State for War, H.J. Tennant, claimed in
Parliament that no regulation barred enlistment on account
of "colour," but he warned that,

"the fact of a man being a

British subject and of military age and fit to serve does
not in itself entitle him to be enlisted." 3
The lack of candor on the part of the War Off ice meant
that Black enlistment often depended on the judgements of
individual recruiting officers, who may or may not have been

1

P.R.O. C.O. 318/333/46453. Dundonald to Secretary
of State for the Colonies, 23 November 1914.
2

C.O. 318/333/46453. Dundonald to W.A. Moore, Nov.
23, 1914. The correspondence had been forwarded to the
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Sometimes, such rejections by British recruiters resulted in
alternate arrangements.
See also, Killingray, "Blacks in
the British Army," 177-8.
3

Parliamentary Debates (Commons). 5th Ser., vol. 75
(1914-15), col. 653.
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aware of the War Office's real intentions.

Hundreds of

Black volunteers from Asia, Africa, the West Indies and
Britain actually served in the British forces despite
institutional prejudices. 4

For example, six hundred

"coloured" Ceylonese joined British regiments, including
elite units such as the Coldstream Guards and Royal
Fusiliers. 5

W.R. Clarke, a Black Jamaican, became a pilot

in the Royal Flying Corps, a forerunner of the Royal Air
Force (R.A. F.) . 6
Various pressures eventually compelled the War Off ice
to officially sanction Black enlistment into the army.

In

fact, an absurd situation developed after 1916 when Britain
introduced conscription.

Britain's Blacks, whether native

or temporarily resident, were technically liable for service
and, thus, the Ministry of National Service often called up
men whom the army did not want.

Consequently, the British
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government alternately prosecuted and ignored Blacks who
failed to answer call ups. 7

Further embarrassment arrived

from overseas because the War Office sought out British
subjects of pure European descent for military service
wherever they could be found, including the United States.
Because of fears about political ramifications in the West
Indian colonies, the War Office could not ask that only
White subjects overseas enlist in the British forces.
Meanwhile, for Black British subjects in the United States,
the War Office held out the prospect of a separate labor
battalion.

In February 1918, General White, head of

Britain's military mission in New York, informed his
superiors that an insufficient number of Black West Indian
subjects had come forward to form a complete battalion but,
he warned that rejection of "British subjects of colour"
would create "adverse comment."

At the bottom of a copy of

White's dispatch to the War Office, an unidentified person
spelled out the army's views on individual Black enlistment
with the following lines:
Wooly headed niggers. We now refuse to post
coloured men to 'White units.' These 'niggers'
must therefore go to native units, if
accepted. 8
7

8
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To better exploit their manpower, the British and
American governments had signed a recruiting convention
whereby British citizens living in the United States who had
not registered for enlistment in the British forces could be
conscripted into the American military.

The fear of being

drafted by the United States brought forward over two
thousand Black West Indian applicants for British service by
March 1918.

Although the numbers exceeded those required to

form a single battalion, the War Off ice no longer wished to
take them, claiming that the transportation of American
troops to Europe required every ton of available shipping.
From Washington, D.C., Britain's Military Attache cautioned
that the situation created ill-feeling and fed into antiBritish propaganda among West Indians. 9

Appeals from the

West India Contingent Committee persuaded the War Office to
formally accept a Black Trinidadian who had traveled to
Britain ignorant of the color bar.

The Committee had warned

the War Off ice that the color bar would have the "most far
reaching and regrettable results." 10
Mounting political pressure caused a change in policy.
In June 1918, the War Office formally, but quietly, agreed

9

P.R.O. W.O. 32/4765. Military Attache, Washington,
D.C., to War Office, (?) March 1918.
10

P.R.O. C.O. 318/347. Aspinall, West Indian
Contingent Committee to War Office, 24 May 1918.
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to enlist "British subjects of colour" into British units on
three conditions: 1) that they had to eat British rations,
2) that they be paid as British soldiers, and 3) that they
had to understand and speak English. 11

The Colonial Office

informed colonial governments that as long as these
conditions were strictly followed, the War Office would
allow the enlistment of any British subjects of "pure Negro
decent," "pure Oriental descent," and of mixed descent. 12
Alarmed, the War Office protested that its intention had
been only to recruit "British subjects of colour resident in
Great Britain and the United States" and those colonies not
already possessing combatant units. 13

In other words,

military authorities hoped to simultaneously allow, but
limit, the enlistment of Blacks at a time when the British
army desperately needed soldiers at the front.

The war

ended in November, before these more inclusive policies
could possibly affect its outcome.
It is difficult to gauge the everyday experiences of
individual Black soldiers in the British forces during the

11
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Great War.

Near the end of the war, several hundred White

patients, incited by soldiers with South African experience,
attacked fifty Black patients at a military hospital in
Liverpool. 14

These Black men appear to have been the

victims of a racial bigotry originally adopted in a colonial
setting and exacerbated by the frustration caused by the
sudden end of the war.

The Liverpool attackers possibly

felt their position threatened by those who obviously
appeared not only to be different and inferior, but also
present in significant numbers.
Most individual Black British soldiers probably served
in the forces without incurring such blatant hostility.

For

example, in the summer of 1918, two merchant sailors from
Sierra Leone, Ernest Marke and his friend Tommy, took
advantage of the army's new policy of toleration and
enlisted in Liverpool.

The war ended while they trained:

The two months I spent in the army were very happy
times.
I encountered no colour prejudice of any
kind and the feeling that we were all in the same
uniform was a strong one ... Tommy and I became
favourites in the camps. 15
In contrast to the besieged men of the B.W.I.R., White
soldiers did not perceive Black individuals such as Ernest

14
15

Shryer, Staying Power, 297.

Ernest Marke, In Troubled Waters: Memoirs of my
Seventy Years in England (London: Karia Press, 1986), 24-25.
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Marke and Tommy as any sort of threat.
treated as novelties.

Indeed, they were

A possible explanation for the

relatively good relations between Whites and individual
Black service personnel may be found in the nature of the
U.K.'s war-time forces.

The small pre-war regular forces of

several hundred thousand had served as imperial guardians
and upholders of White British rule.

In colonial settings,

British servicemen had become accustomed to treating nonEuropean subjects disrespectfully and brutally.

In

contrast, the expanded war-time army achieved a strength of
about five million men and the navy, about one million.

The

sheer expansion of the forces diluted the number of virulent
racists who had thrived in the small "peacetime"
professional forces.

If anything, skin color or cultural

difference ensured that individual Black soldiers frequently
became novelties in their respective units. 16
The notion of commissioning Black officers conflicted
with the empire-justifying idea of White superiority.

A few

years prior to the First World War, racial anxiety had
caused the War Off ice to refuse a request from an African
officer of the Gold Coast Volunteers to train with British
units in the United Kingdom.
16

It had been decided that the

This theme is discussed more fully in later
chapters. More evidence exists for the Second World War and
post-war period than for the First World War.
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visiting officer would probably not be treated with respect
by the N.C.O.s and men he would command. 17

In this

decision, the War Office implicitly denied its ability and
responsibility to influence the attitudes and behavior of
its ranks.

Also, the reply disguised the War Office's

prejudices against Black people with a contrived concern for
the well-being of the officer in question.
During the war, racism sometimes impeded promotion.
Norman and Roy Manley enlisted in the Royal Artillery after
the former had been refused entrance into Oxford
University's Officers Training Corps

(O.T.C.).

attained the rank of corporal and recalled that,

Norman
"the rank

and file disliked taking orders from a coloured N.C.O. and
their attitude was mild by comparison with that of my fellow
N.C.O.s."

The latter resented sharing equal status with

Manley and he found that he could turn only to his White
officers for "ordinary decency." 18

A Jewish African named

Lobagola actively recruited Jews for British military
service while a resident of New York City.

He eventually

17

P.R.O. C.O. 96/502. Ward, War Office, to Undersecretary of State, Colonial Office,
10 May 1910.
18

Manley, 7.
During the First World War, Cambridge
University's O.T.C. allowed Indian enrollment into an
ambulance unit, though not into the regular unit.
Hew
Strachan, History of the Cambridge University Officers
Training Corps (Tunbridge Wells, Kent: Midas Books, 1976),
143.
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enlisted and joined the predominately Jewish 38th battalion
of the Royal Fusiliers in Palestine.

Lobagola experienced

occasional resentment at the hands of White other ranks but,
because he found favor with his officers, he attained the
positions of quartermaster sergeant and orderly sergeant. 19
Political and military realities gradually wore down
the color bar in officers' commissions.

Indian officers of

the Imperial Cadet Corps and Imperial Service Troops became
a common sight in Britain and on the Western Front.

For

example, Sir Douglas Haig's headquarters staff included Lt.
Narain Singh of Takari, who alternated between delivering
messages by motorcycle at reckless speeds and sniping at
Germans with his tiger gun. 20

The legality of commissioning

Black officers was conceded in November 1917, when the War
Office's Judge Advocate General, Sir Felix Cassel,
interpreted Section 95 of the Army Act as allowing for the
commissioning of alien persons of colour. 21

It is unclear

what effect, if any, Cassel's decision had on the
commissioning of Blacks because several persons "not of pure

19

Lobagola, 357-62. The 38th was one of three
Jewish battalions of the Royal Fusiliers to serve in the
Middle East.
2

°Farwell, Armies of the Raj, 231-2.

21

P.R.O. W.O. 32/12319. Cassel to War Office RE:
Elie Avout, 22 November 1917.

201

European descent" had received commissions well before the
ruling.

Also, Cassell did not negate the army's authority

to restrict precisely who it commissioned.
Walter Daniel Tull, a professional footballer and
Folkestone native, became one of the first war-time officers
of obviously African descent.

Along with other footballers,

he had originally enlisted in the 23rd (1st Football)
battalion of the Middlesex Regiment.

In May 1917, Tull

received a commission and, according to a fellow officer, he
"bore a very high reputation for courage and devotion to
duty."

Superiors recommended Tull for the Military Cross

and his divisional commander sent him a note of appreciation
for "gallantry and coolness."
March 1918. 22

German fire killed him in

Other Black officers included G.A.R. Williams

of St. Lucia, who obtained a commission in the North
Staffordshire Regiment, 23 Rama Jodha Jang Bahadur of Nepal
who earned a Military Cross at Ypres in 1915, 24 and Mahaduv
Singhji, who received a British army commission, but

22

Major Poole to Tull's family, 12 April 1918;
Pickard to Tull family, 17 April 1918; and "Note of
Appreciation," Sydney Lampnel to Walter Tull, Finlayson
Collection.
23

P.R.O. C.O. 323/1673/6. Governor, Windward
Islands, to Malcolm MacDonald, 17 November 1939, and
enclosure.
24

Farwell, Armies of the Raj, 231-2.
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transferred to the Indian army in 1918. 25

At least four

Indians received commissions in the Royal Flying Corps, and
one of them, Indra Lal Roy, scored ten victories and earned
the designation of "ace." 26
Thus far, no evidence has surfaced to indicate that
Black officers experienced racism in uniform.

In all

likelihood, the resentment directed at Black N.C.O.s by
White N.C.O.s and privates did not affect Black officers to
the same extent because a wide legal and social gulf
formally separated officers on the one hand from N.C.O.s and
privates on the other.

Officers and N.C.O.s existed in

worlds with different rules, responsibilities, and
privileges.

A Black officer, who, by definition, was a

"gentleman," was too high ranking to be a threat to the
status of a White sergeant or corporal.
II.

Inter-War Color Bar
The services' acceptance of Black enlistment and

commissioning ended soon after the war.

The navy and the

newly formed Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) specifically barred
"coloured" recruits in their published recruiting
regulations.

In contrast, the War Office prohibited the

enlistment of Blacks, not through formal regulations, but,

25

Menezes, 310-11.

26

Lambo, 146; Menezes, 313.

203

by ordering medical officers to reject "undesirable"
recruits on the basis of medical reasons, which would not be
disclosed to the applicants themselves. 27
Explicit racial discrimination by the army appeared a
decade later, during a period of internal reform.

Because

of a recruiting shortfall in the 1930s, the army had, by
1937, instituted several measures including an improvement
of conditions, lower physical requirements, and an
acceptance of illiterate recruits. 28

At the same time,

however, the War Office decided to alter its regulations to
explicitly bar Blacks.

Army authorities adopted this

restriction because of "the difficulty experienced in
placing a coloured British subject" who had been
inexplicably allowed to enlist.

All of the regimental

depots "to which the man was offered were extremely
reluctant to accept him." 29

Thus ended the discrepancies

and confusions between army regulations and those of the

27

P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692.
"Report of the Committee on
the post-war regulations respecting the nationality and
descent of candidates for entry to the army." 16 March
1945. The Ministry of Defence has confirmed to the author
that the relevant files on the case do not exist.
28

Gerald F. Spillan, "Manpower Problems in the
British Army, 1918-1939," D. Phil. diss., (Oxford University,
1985)' 179, 185.
29

P.R.O. W.O. 32/10592.
"Report of the Committee on
the post-war regulations respecting the nationality and
descent of candidates for entry to the army," 16 March 1945.

204

other services.
The enforcement of the color bar in the armed forces
usually relied on a simple visual examination to ascertain
whether or not an individual met the requirement of "pure
European descent."

To prevent embarrassing questions, the

Air Ministry issued instructions that a candidate for
enlistment could be rejected if he voluntarily provided
written evidence that he was not of pure European descent
or, if he appeared to possess non-European blood.

Hoping to

avoid controversy, the R.A.F. required its recruiters to
conceal the reasons for a Black candidate's rejection unless
directly asked. 30
In 1936, the R.A.F. applied its racially exclusive
policy in several cases with varying degrees of success.
Patrick Thomas Blake was born in India in 1917 to a British
soldier and a woman of unidentified descent in India.

The

Manchester Recruiting Depot had passed Blake through his
medical and educational exams but, just a few minutes before
the oath, the attestation officer rejected him.

The officer

informed Blake that he did not possess sufficient knowledge
of electricity, but the recruit claimed to have informed the

30

P.R.O. AIR 2/2248. Air Council to the Inspector of
Recruiting, 5 December 1932.
I am uncertain as to the case
involved in the production of this document, which was
referred to in 1935-6.
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recruiters about his expertise earlier.

Afterwards, Blake

sarcastically claimed that he may have appeared as a spy
because of his "dark complexion and decidedly foreign
appearance."

To support his appeal, Blake provided evidence

only on his father's descent and military service.

An

investigation of army records revealed that his father had
married a Marcella Josephine Baptiste in India but the
inquiry yielded no evidence as to her descent.

The Air

Ministry decided to inform Blake only that he had no
possibility of being accepted.

In the event Blake appealed

through a Member of Parliament, the Air Ministry intended to
explain the real reason to him "sympathetically. " 31
In a second case, the father of J.F. Adam appealed his
son's rejection, whereupon the Air Ministry admitted to the
color bar.

Mr. Adam responded by castigating the

attestation officer for being a "super Solomon-cum-Daniel."
He provided a family genealogy to assure the Air Ministry
that his son had pure European descent. 32

At the Air

Ministry's request, the applicant reappeared so that an
official could have a "final look" at him.

The R.A.F.

31

P.R.O. AIR. 2/2248. Blake to Officer Commanding,
R.A.F., Altrincham, Cheshire, 10 November 1935; War Office
to Record Office, R.A.F., Ruislip, 29 November 1935.
32

P.R.O. AIR. 2/2248.
April 1936.

J.A. Adam to Air Ministry, 3
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interviewer judged that the younger Adam's "eyes and perhaps
his mouth and head" were oriental and his color dark, "but
no darker than many south Europeans."

Ultimately, the Air

Ministry decided to accept Adam although it considered his
to be a borderline case. 33

A third case went more smoothly

for the R.A.F., which informed the father of D.J.L.
Gabbatiss that his son had failed to fulfil a vaccination
requirement before a required deadline. 34

Mr. Gabbatiss

then asked the R.A.F. if any future possibility existed for
his son to enter the R.A. F. 35

Avoiding mention of "race,"

the true reason for rejection, the R.A.F. responded that it
had "given the matter careful and sympathetic consideration"
but the younger Gabbatiss could not be considered for any
openings. 36
Despite having secretive schemes in place to reject
unsuitable applicants, British military recruiters failed to
keep the British forces racially pure.

For example,

Londoner Cyril Charles Alcindor enlisted in the 1930s and

33

P.R.O. AIR. 2/2248.

Minutes of 24 and 27 April

1936.
34

P.R.O. AIR. 2/2248.
June 1936.

Pollock to E. Gabbatiss, 10

35

P.R.O. AIR. 2/2248. W. Gabbatiss to Officer-inCharge of Records, Air Ministry, n.d.
36

P.R.O. AIR. 2/2248.
28 August 1936.

J.M. Spaight to W. Gabbatiss,
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served with the Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment in
volatile Palestine and attained the rank of sergeant by
1939. 37

The Air Ministry made an outright exception to its

color bar in 1938 for Cyril Wellesley Bourke, a twenty five
year old Black Jamaican who had traveled to London to apply
for a commission.

An R.A.F.

selection board interviewed and

rejected him on account of color.

He then attempted to

enlist in the ranks but was again rejected because of race.
In order to prevent controversy, the Air Ministry decided to
make an exception for Bourke. 38
At the end of 1938, the color bar nearly became a
public issue because Sir Stafford Cripps, M.P., championed
the cases of "half-castes" who wished to enlist in the
R.A.F.

Cripps, a prominent critic of colonialism, had

received a letter from an indignant schoolmaster regarding a
mixed-race pupil who had been "made to feel that he is not
as other men are" by being rejected because of color. 39
After making inquiries, Cripps received what he considered
to be an unsatisfactory explanation from the Secretary of

37

Jeffrey Green to author, 17 February 1996.

38

P.R.O. AIR. 2/3936. Air Ministry Minutes, 28
September 1938; 6 October 1938; and 11 October 1938.
39

P.R.O. AIR. 2/3936.
Schoolmaster to Cripps, n.d.,
encl. in Cripps to Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for
Air, 20 December 1938.
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State for Air, Kingsley Wood, on the supposed need for a
color bar.

Cripps then asked for a full explanation of the

color bar from Wood and threatened to publish the
correspondence. 40
Before replying, the Air Ministry conferred with the
other two services on the necessity of maintaining the color
bar.

The War Office assured the Air Ministry that it faced

the same problem of rejecting men "not of pure European
descent" but "would most certainly exclude a man who had any
noticeable mixture of non-European blood, even though he had
been educated in England."

The army cited the "prejudice

among the men in the ranks against serving with men who show
any signs of color."

The navy replied in a similar vein:

men "not of pure European descent" would be miserable in the
service due to "ragging" by other sailors. 41

Rather than

sending a written explanation, Wood persuaded Cripps to meet
with him personally to discuss the matter.

The position of

the Air Ministry was that, while the R.A.F. opposed racial
discrimination, the good order and discipline of the
service, as well as the happiness of individuals "not of

40

P.R.O. AIR. 2/3936. Cripps to Wood, 30 December

1938.
41

P.R.O. AIR. 2/3936. Roseway, War Office, to
Sandford, Air Ministry, 13 January 1939, and Admiralty to
Sandford, 23 January 1939.
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pure European descent," necessitated a color bar.

In turn,

Cripps impressed upon Wood the importance of allowing Black
subjects opportunities to serve and suggested the formation
of segregated units. 42
The inter-war color bar reflected the British military
establishment's deep racial anxiety, an abhorrence of any
close association between the regular army and Black people.
For example, in 1937, the Jamaica Engineer Corps, a unit of
the mostly Black Jamaican local forces, applied to the War
Office to be officially "affiliated" with the Royal
Engineers. 43

Such relationships involved exchanges of

personnel for training, gifts, and greetings on the
anniversaries of glorious events in the regiments' pasts.
In effect, the units concerned shared in each other's
prestige.

White military units from the colonies and

dominions commonly obtained affiliations with British
regiments, especially those with which they had some
connection. 44

Ultimately, the War Office refused the

42

P.R.O. AIR. 2/3936. Minutes by Sandford to
Secretary of State for Air, 9 February 1939, and Draft (not
sent), Secretary of State for Air to Cripps, (?) February
1939.
For the question of segregated units, see Air
Ministry Minutes of 14 and 17 February 1939.
43

P.R.O. W.O. 32/4153. Denham to Ormsby-Gore,
Colonial Secretary, 15 March 1937.
44

For example, in 1929, the all-White Bermuda
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Jamaica Engineer Corps' request on racial grounds, but
offered the compromise of a "local alliance" between it and
a Royal Engineers company then stationed in Jamaica. 45

The

maintenance of "White prestige" via separation remained of
paramount importance and the army probably felt that a full
affiliation between a regular army unit and a Black colonial
unit would have been a step toward the inclusion of Black
soldiers in the armed forces.
After the end of the war, the forces re-adopted their
color bars to commissions and in 1920, the issue of nonEuropean candidates at Sandhurst emerged again.

The War

Office decided to bring Sandhurst's regulations into line
with those of the Navy.

The amended rule stated that a

candidate had to "be a British subject and the son of
British subjects, and ... he must be of pure European
descent." 46

Because of the recently introduced program of

"Indianization," the regulations did allow Indian candidates
destined for the Indian army to attend Sandhurst.
Almost two hundred Indians attended Sandhurst and some
claimed to have suffered from British prejudice.

its members served with the British regiment.

For

Kipling, 92.

45

P.R.O. W.O. 32/4153. War Office to Colonial
Office, 30 June 1937.
46
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example, some Indians were not allowed to command British
cadets. 47

Once commissioned, Indian officers normally

served with British regiments in India for one or two years
before joining an Indian regiment.

The purpose was to give

young officers experience and confidence before facing
"native" troops.

Presumably, White troops would be less

damaged by an inexperienced officer than Indians.

In

British regiments, Indian officers normally received the
proper respect and treatment due their rank.

Ayub Khan

served with a battalion of the Royal Fusiliers in the late
1920s, and "got along very well" with British colleagues. 48
"Timmy" Thimiyya was apprehensive about commanding a platoon
of the elite Highland Light Infantry, but he found that they
would follow him anywhere.

On his last day with the

regiment, his Glaswegian soldiers carried him on their
shoulders, an honor rarely bestowed on anyone. 49

P.K.

Sahgal claimed to have made many White friends in the
British units in which he served and won some over to what
he thought was the immorality of the British presence in
India. 50

As recently as 1995, the Cheshire Regiment
47

Khan, 10; Chaudhuri, 201.

48
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50

The I.N.A. Heroes (Lahore: Hero Productions,
1946)' 107-8.

212

maintained close contact with a former guest officer who
became a general in the army of the Republic of India. 51
Certainly, not all Indian officers experienced smooth
relations in their British regiments.

B.M. Kaul joined the

1/East Surrey Regiment in 1933 and participated in most of
the unit's customary activities, including sports, but he
refused to hunt and drink.

Instead of Anglicizing himself,

he engaged in "heated arguments with fellow British officers
who argued in favor of the inevitability and the benevolence
of the British raj.

1152

Government policy in relation to university O.T.C.s
laid bare the military's prejudices against Black people
more publicly than the regulations for commissioning into
the regular forces.

Membership in the racially exclusive

senior division of the O.T.C.s became a sore point for the
increasing number of African and Asian subjects who attended
universities in the United Kingdom.

In April 1920, the War

Off ice sanctioned the enrollment of Indians in the senior
divisions as part of Indianization but cancelled this policy
in 1921.

Rejected Indian applicants were to be informed

that O.T.C.s existed solely for the training of potential

51

Major John Ellis (Ret.), Cheshire Regimental
Museum, to author, 29 November 1995.
52
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officers for the British army.

53

the matter later in the decade.

The War Office revisited
The Colonial Office

pressured the War Office to open O.T.C.s on the grounds that
local colonial defense forces, especially those in Ceylon,
needed suitably trained officers.

On the political side,

the Colonial Off ice argued that the color bar was
"antagonistic to our general policy and is looked upon as a
slur by the colonies themselves."

The War Office repeated

its stance that O.T.C.s existed solely to provide officers
for Britain's reserve forces which had color bars.

In

1929, the War Office elicited opinions from officials at the
Universities at Glasgow, London, Cambridge, and Oxford. 54
D.J. Medley of Glasgow University wrote that its O.T.C.
would become "stigmatized" as the "Club of the Nigger" and
that White interest would decline. 55

L.N.G. Filan,

University of London, admitted "that one of the strongest
attractions of the O.T.C. for these lads is the fact that it
is the only University Institution which excludes women and

53

P.R.O. W.O. 32/18651. Creedy, War Office, to
Officers Commanding, all Senior Division Contingents,
Officers Training Corps, 2 August 1921.
54

P.R.O. C.O.
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55
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those whom they call 'niggers.'" 56

However, Charles Searle

of Cambridge answered that enrollment would probably not
suffer because the only members who would object would be
White "colonials." 57

Most respondents agreed in their

deprecation of the idea of accepting Indian students, who
were regarded as unreliable and solely intent on causing
trouble. 58
Eventually, university students became embroiled in the
O.T.C. issue.

In July 1935, R. Nunn May, the Secretary of

the National Union of Students of the Universities and
University Colleges of England and Wales protested to Lord
Halifax at the War Off ice about the color bar to the Senior
Divisions of the O.T.C.s.

Nunn May thought that the color

bar caused much resentment and constituted one of the Indian
students' major grievances. 59

Once again, the War Office's

objections to the admission of Indians included the stated
purpose of O.T.C.s, i.e., to provide officers for the

56

P.R.O. C.O. 323/1060/7.

Filan to Ling, 4 January

1929.
57
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British forces.

India had, by then, established similar

training facilities for the program of Indianization and did
not need O.T.C.s in Britain.

Again, the army cited the

potential resentment among White members.

Also, the

majority of Indian students in Britain were considered to be
from "non-martial" races, their desire to enroll in O.T.C.s
being "purely political."

The War Office predicted

"incidents" between civilians and Indians in uniform,
especially at Scottish universities because the O.T.C.
uniform included the kilt.

More significantly, if the War

Office dropped the color bar for Indians, then other nonEuropean and "mixed" British subjects would potentially
expect admittance, and all these together might clamor for
the opening of army commissions. 60
Before responding to the National Union of Students,
the War Off ice sought out the opinions of other ministries
on the issue.

Neither the India or Colonial Offices wished

to officially raise the matter. 61

Major S.J. Cole, a

military officer attached to the Colonial Office reasoned
that if O.T.C.s accepted Africans, then, logically, they

60
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would have to be admitted to Britain's Territorial Army and
Reserve.

Another official cited a sartorial concern: "a

Black man in kilts -I think the majority of W[est]
A[frican]s go to Scotland- would be even more ridiculous
than an Indian."

The Colonial Office surmised that only

Ceylonese students could benefit because Ceylon alone had a
local defense force in which graduates of O.T.C.s could be
commissioned. 62

Bolstered by these arguments, the War

Office responded negatively to the National Union of
Students, stating that "a change in the present policy would
have many far-reaching effects ... " but would produce very
few interested students. 63
In 1937, Cambridge's O.T.C. officials briefly discussed
the possibility of accepting Egyptians and Iraqis, but did
nothing constructive about it.

A second proposal, to allow

the enrollment of Indian members, received more thorough
consideration.

On this occasion, the officials expressed

the common concerns about Indian mischief, but they agreed
that such fears were outweighed by the good records of
Indian students who had previously attended Cambridge and
62
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Sandhurst and the potential value of Indians being involved
in their own country's defense.

However, the proposal

failed to win any further support. 64

In April 1939, Black

students at several British universities, including
Cambridge, complained that they had been prohibited from
enrolling in their local O.T.C.s.

The Colonial Office

referred the matter to the War Off ice which did not reply
before the outbreak of the Second World War. 65

To summarize, between 1914 and 1939, British policy
toward the racial purity of the United Kingdom forces
alternated between lip-service to political concerns and a
stubborn adherence to racial prejudice.

Once colonial

political considerations faded with the end of the Great
War, the services re-imposed their pre-war color bars.

When

Britain turned to face Germany in another world war, the
racialist ideas that had prevented a fuller mobilization of
the empire during the Great War, dominated the British
military mindset.

The services did not want Black people

serving as enlisted men or officers within their ranks and
only allowed it as acknowledged exceptions or under narrow
restrictions.

Nevertheless, even at their most virulently

64
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racist moments, the services accepted individual Blacks who
had evaded or had been allowed through the color bar.

The

forces' public image as racist institutions became
politically embarrassing during the Great War and
increasingly in the inter-war period because the empire was
changing.

Simple White supremacy justified on biology no

longer matched British scientific beliefs, imperial
politics, or recruiting realities.

Increasingly,

westernized colonial peoples demanded concessions toward the
recognition of racial and political equality.

These rising

expectations fell on deaf ears in the armed services where
the assumptions and prejudices of the Victorian empire
remained current.

CHAPTER VII
BLACKS IN THE BRITISH FORCES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

I.

Second Suspension of the Color Bar
Immediately preceding and following the outbreak of war

in 1939, several Blacks encountered rejection at the hands
of British recruiting authorities.

Almost immediately, the

government received warnings about the adverse consequences
of the color bar on imperial relations. 1

In September 1939,

military service in Britain was no longer strictly a matter
of voluntary enlistment, as the British had adopted
conscription several months before the war.

The National

Service (Armed Forces) Act contained no provisions for
racial exclusion and the War Off ice decided that "coloured
people" in Britain would, in fact, be called up. 2

This was

not an enthusiastic affirmation of racial equality.

The

army's Adjudant General, General Sir Robert GordonFinlayson, actually deplored the inclusion of Blacks and
1

P.R.O. C.O. 323/1673/5. A.P. Richards to Colonial
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Colonial Office, 29 September 1939.
2
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Aliens, by the British Army in the War, 28 September 1939.
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stated that, "for practical reasons the admission of
coloured British subjects into the Army here would involve
very serious difficulties." 3

On the other hand, any attempt

at rejecting Black conscripts at the depots would be
administratively difficult and politically controversial.
In mid-October, the Colonial Office announced the Cabinet's
decision that,
British subjects from the colonies and British
protected persons who are in this country,
including those who are not of pure European
descent, are to be on the same footing as British
subjects from the United Kingdom as regards
eligibility for voluntary enlistment in the armed
forces and for consideration for the grant of
emergency commissions in those forces ... 4
Since the decision had been made largely for political
reasons rather than service enthusiasm, misunderstandings
and individual cases of rejection continued well into 1941. 5
Colonial governments, private companies, and business
associations, particularly in the West Indies, encouraged
and arranged to pay for the passages of Black volunteers who
wished to enlist in Britain.

However, in July 1940, the

P.R.O. c.o. 323/1672/1. Colonial Office Note,
September 1939, enclosed in T.H. Lee to Sir John Shuckburgh,
27 September 1939. See also Sherwood, 4.
3

4

P.R.O. C.O. 323/1673/5.

5

See Sherwood, 6-7, and Killingray, "Race and Rank,"

Communique, 18 October

1939.
280-1.
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Colonial Office warned the Jamaican government that, while
"coloured" Black British subjects in Britain were eligible
for service in the British forces,

"it was never

contemplated that coloured persons should be specially sent
to England for enlistment." 6
Instead of displaying patriotic zeal, some Blacks in
Britain reacted to the services' pre-war color bars by
refusing to answer conscription summons.

For example,

George Price, who had unsuccessfully attempted to join the
navy before the war, applied as a conscientious objector to
protest British racial policies. 7

Also, Pan-Africanist

activists Ras Makonnen, Joma Kenyatta, and George Padmore
answered call-ups by hiding from authorities and expressing
anti-colonialist sentiments on their conscription notices. 8
II

Evasions by the Services
Dissatisfied with the Cabinet's ruling, the armed

forces attempted to hinder Black enlistment in several ways.
The professional naval officers at the Admiralty intended to
simply reject Black men who, once called up, chose to join

6

P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/4.
Governor, Jamaica, 4 July 1940.

Colonial Secretary to

7

P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/13. Rev. Charles A. Smith to
Arthur Woodburn, M.P., encl. in Harold Moody to Malcolm
MacDonald, 1 February, 1940.
8

Ras Makonnen, Pan-Africanism from Within (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1973), 132-3.
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the Royal Navy.

Otherwise, they reasoned, if the navy had

to accept a few Black recruits out of political expediency,
they would be enlisted for "hostilities only."

The admirals

also wanted to discourage Black colonial subjects from
traveling to Britain to enlist and provided local service
opportunities such as minesweeping in the West Indies and
West Africa. 9
In contrast, the newly appointed First Lord of the
Admiralty, Winston Churchill, opposed this racial
discrimination and minuted that,
There must be no discrimination on grounds of race
or colour ... I cannot see any objection to Indians
serving on H.M. Ships where they are qualified and
needed, or if their virtues so deserve rising to
be Admirals of the Fleet. But not too many of
them, please. 10
Despite the qualified tolerance expressed by the navy's
civilian head, it appears that the navy was the service most
evasive in recruiting Blacks.

In a clearly discriminatory

gesture, the Admiralty decided to accept British-born
"persons of pure European descent," whose fathers were
"British either by birth or by naturalisation," but in the

9

See the internal correspondence in P.R.O. ADM.
1/10818. Allan C. Wilmot, a Jamaican, served in the Royal
Navy on a minesweeper on the West Indian station until 1944,
when he transferred to the R.A.F. in Britain as a rescuer.
Wilmot to author, 29 June 1995.
10

P.R.O. ADM. 1/10818.
October 1939.

Minute by Churchill, 14
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cases of Black applicants, their fathers had to be "British
by birth." 11

Although concerned, the Colonial Office

hesitated at pressing the matter while the navy was busily
fighting the Germans: " ... great harm would be done if we
were now seriously charged with a breach of faith to the
colonial peoples.

If all publicity can be avoided, that

might be all right." 12

A few Blacks did serve in the navy

during the war, but as late as 1943, its recruiting
regulations stated that Blacks were ineligible for entry
unless granted specific sanction by the Admiralty. 13
By the summer of 1940, various colonial governments
received requests from White residents for funds to travel
to Britain and enlist in the forces. 14

What worried the

colonial authorities, in Britain and overseas, was that
Black subjects would make the same demands for the
opportunity to enlist. 15

11

P.R.O. C.O.
January 1940.

The War Office held that, "if the

323/1801/13.

P.R.O. c.o.
323/1801/13.
M(acDonald) ., 16 April 1940.
12

13

Poynton to Calder, 30
Minute by M(alcolm).

Sherwood, 42, nt. 24.

14

P.R.O. 323/1801/22. Governor, Trinidad, to
Colonial Secretary, 22 May 1940; Colonial Secretary to
Governor, Trinidad, 4 and 5 June 1940.
P.R.O. c.o.
323/1801/13. Calder, Colonial
Office, to Woods, War Office, 30 May 1940.
15
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enlistment of White personnel entails accepting coloured we
would prefer to do without the White ... ," but the army would
accept colonial Whites who managed to come to Britain
discretely. 16

In 1943, the contradiction between Britain's

need for manpower and the military's antipathy toward Blacks
prevented the British government from conscripting Britons
who resided in the West Indies lest Black West Indians
construe the action as a form of racial discrimination. 17
Eager for active service, hundreds of Black West
Indians arrived in Britain on their own and presented
themselves to recruiting offices.

Some initially

encountered an initial army hesitancy to accept Black
volunteers, but the Colonial Office and the West India
Committee usually persuaded the military authorities to
accept them.

In a significant shift, the War Office agreed,

in December 1940, to pay for the passages of Black West
Indian skilled tradesmen to Britain for enlistment in the
army. 18

In May 1941, the Colonial Office tested the War

Office's enthusiasm by requesting that the army pay

P.R.O. c.o.
323/1801/13. Woods, War Office, to
Calder, Colonial Office, 24 June 1940.
16

17

968/76/5.

Mayle to Williams, 19

18

968/37/13.

Minute by Calder, 2

P.R.O. C.O.
March 1943.
P.R.O. C.O.
January 1941.
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additional "incidental expenses" incurred by colonial
applicants en route to the recruiting offices in Britain.
The War Off ice refused because it did not wish "to make any
further concession which would encourage more direct
volunteers." 19

By the end of 1941, the War Office sought to

limit the enlistment of West Indian tradesmen on the grounds
that it was dissatisfied with their performance. 20
In June 1942, the War Office again agreed to accept
skilled West Indian tradesmen provided that, "enlistment
should be carried out in the West Indies in all cases and
the men [sent] to Middle East by the most direct route ... " 21
The Jamaican press widely advertised the scheme and five
hundred applied, but, within a few months, the War Office
suspended it because of shipping constraints. 22

The army's

underlying desire to prevent or limit a Black influx to
Britain was revealed to the Colonial Office in late 1942 and

19

P.R.O. C.O.
968/38/4.
Poynton, Colonial Office,
to Hobbs, War Office, 28 May 1941 and War Office to Colonial
Office, 11 September 1941.
20

P.R.O. C.O.
968/37/10. Minute by Calder, 24
November 1941 and Colonial Office to Caribbean Colonial
Governors, 26 November 1941.
21

P.R.O. C.O.
968/74/17. Williams, War Office, to
Thomas, Colonial Office, 19 June 1942.
22

P.R.O. C.O.
968/74/17. Extract from Report by
General Kerr, British Army Staff, Washington, D.C., on the
Local Forces in the Caribbean, October 1942.
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1943.

In August 1942, the War Office indicated that it

would help find transportation for Jamaican lorry drivers to
come to Britain before being sent on to the Middle East. The
Colonial Office suspected that the War Office was being
disingenuous, to which suggestion the War Office assured the
Colonial Office that it had no objections to "looking after"
the drivers. 23

In fact, the War Office did have a "policy"

against bringing Jamaican drivers to Britain, a secret
"carelessly referred to" during a phone call between lowlevel bureaucrats in September. 24

In March 1943, the War

Office agreed to resume recruiting skilled West Indian
tradesmen for the Middle East, but only for a few specific
categories. 25

The army imposed the condition that

recruitment was "subject to facilities being available for
direct shipment to that area."

In Colonial Office opinion,

this condition meant that there would be no actual
recruitment. 26
As a compromise designed to placate West Indian
23

P.R.O. C.O.
968/74/18. Henderson, War Office, to
MacMillan, Colonial Office, 17 September 1942.
24

P.R.O. C.O.
September 1942.

968/74/18.

P.R.O. c.o.
968/74/17.
Office, 10 March 1943.
25

26

1943.

P.R.O. C.O.

968/74/17.

Minute by Mayle, 26
Colonial Office to War
Minute by Mayle, 5 March

227

aspirations, the Colonial Office informally encouraged West
Indian enlistment into the Canadian military.

In May 1942,

about one hundred Black West Indians served with the
Canadian forces in Britain. 27

Always seeking a more direct

outlet for West Indian desires to serve in the British war
effort, the Colonial Off ice did not formalize the Canadian
scheme because it feared that the War Office might have
seized upon the idea as the logical and sole outlet for West
Indian military aspirations. 28
The color bar to the Auxiliary Territorial Army
(A.T.S.), the army's branch for women, outlived that for the
rest of the military by several years.

The War Office

wanted to recruit White West Indian women to serve as
clerks, drivers, and mechanics in Britain and at its offices
in America and the Caribbean, but it resisted the enlistment
of Black West Indian women for the A.T.S.

In 1943, after

mistakenly accepting a Black Bermudian, a compromised War
Off ice reluctantly agreed to accept Black West Indian women
along with Whites, with the notable exception of service in
Washington, D.C.

By the end of the war, over half of the

27

P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/14. West Indians serving with
the Forces in the United Kingdom, 27 May 1942.
28

P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/15.
in the Canadian Forces.
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six hundred West Indian A.T.S. recruits were Black. 29
Black servicemen made their most celebrated and
numerous contribution serving with the R.A.F.

However, for

the first year of the war, the Air Ministry resisted
accepting Blacks.

Until June 1940, the R.A.F. rejected

Black applicants as being unnecessary and possibly
disruptive for the service. 30

The Air Ministry had been

unwilling to integrate Blacks into aircrews because "the
team of an aircraft crew is so small and there has to be
such a high degree of mutual confidence between them that
they have never liked to take the risk of putting a coloured
man in among the crew. " 31

The fall of France in June 1940

and the Battle of Britain (August-October) convinced the Air
Ministry to extend the recruitment of aircrew to the
colonies but it quickly reversed itself.

In April 1941, the

Air Ministry informed the Colonial Off ice that, for existing
training vacancies to provide maximum output, the R.A.F. had
to reduce the number of Black entrants in favor of Whites:
"On the experience gained ...

[with Indians] it is clear that

29

P.R.O. C.O. 968/81/4.
Stanley, Colonial Secretary
to Grigg, War Secretary, 15 April and War Office to
Caribbean Commanders, 21 April, and Grigg to Stanley, 19 May
1943.
See also, Bousquet and Douglas.
30

31

Lambo, 150-1.

P.R.O. C.O. 323/1729/40.
by Poynton, 2 July 1940.

Colonial Office Minute
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non-Europeans require about half as long again to complete
their training as the normal British entrant." 32

Aghast,

the Colonial Office persuaded the Air Ministry to reconsider
this discrimination on political grounds. 33
R.A.F. authorities in the colonies had difficulty in
finding physically and educationally qualified candidates
for aircrew training.

Only four out of the fifty-eight Gold

Coast applications made during the first two and a half
months of the overseas recruitment program passed the
medical exam. 34

As of July 1942, Gambia had produced no

aircrewmen; Sierra Leone, five; the Gold Coast, two; and
Nigeria, six. 35

In Nigeria, rumors circulated that Africans

were being rejected by authorities on the grounds that they
all possessed malarial parasites. 36

Political pressures

caused some colonial governments to recruit personnel
specifically precluded by the Air Ministry.
32

P.R.O. C.O. 323/1828/19.
Office, 4 April 1941.

For example, in

Air Ministry to Colonial

33

P.R.O. C.O. 323/1828/19. Bigg, Colonial Office,
to Shone, Air Ministry, 31 May 1941.
P.R.O. c.o. 323/1828/38.
Secretary, 23 July 1941.
34

35

P.R.O. C.O. 968/55/8.

Gold Coast to Colonial

Minute by Bigg, 24 July

1942.
36

P.R.O. C.O. 323/1828/28. Minute by Bigg, 12
December 1941; See Also, West African Pilot, 18, 24
September, and 14 October 1941.
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1941, the Duke of Windsor, Governor of the Bahamas,
enthusiastically recruited ground crew although the Air
Ministry sought only aircrew.

The governor reported that it

would "be very desirable on political grounds if they could
be accepted ... " 37
By the end of the war, over four hundred of the "most
carefully selected" Black colonial aircrew flew with R.A.F.
squadrons based in Britain.
well" in the service. 38

In general, they "settled down

In May 1944, the Air Ministry ended

the overseas recruitment of aircrew on the grounds that it
no longer needed them.

Exceptions were made for Black West

Indians already accepted for training and for British
subjects in foreign countries. 39

In addition to aircrew,

from 1943, the R.A.F. also recruited and transported to
Britain about 5,500 Black West Indians for ground-crew
duties.

They served as armorers and maintenance technicians

for aircraft and base facilities.
The number of Black servicemen and women in the U.K.based forces is unknown, but assuming that the visibly Black

37

P.R.O. C.O. 323/1828/34.
State for Colonies, 13 June 1941.

Windsor to Secretary of

38

P.R.O. AIR. 20/1022. Manpower Contribution of the
Colonies to the Royal Air Force, 1939-1945.
39

P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269.
Office, 6 May 1944.

Air Ministry to Colonial
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population in Britain numbered between fifteen and twenty
thousand, perhaps fifteen hundred to two thousand -representing ten percent of Black people in Britain -- so
served during the war.

In May 1942, the British forces also

included over one thousand West Indians, of whom the R.A.F.
accounted for about half.

Meanwhile, West Indians served in

about forty different corps of the army, but only a few had
enlisted in the navy. 40

By the end of the war,

approximately eight to ten thousand Black colonial subjects
traveled to Britain at their own expense or under the
sponsorship of the services, especially the R.A.F., in order
to enlist. 41
III.

Black Over White:

Black Officers

Once again, British authorities confronted the question
of commissioning Blacks as officers.

The racial purity of

an O.T.C. kilt became an issue again in July 1940 when a
Jamaican student, R.A. Peat, attempted to enroll in the
O.T.C. of Aberdeen University.

The commander of the

contingent rejected Peat's application on the grounds of
40

P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/14. West Indians serving with
the Forces in the United Kingdom, 27 May 1942.
41

P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/14. West Indians on Service.
Totals registered with the West India Committee at the end
of September 1944 and 1945, enclosed in West India Committee
to Colonial Office, 22 October 1945.
In September 1944,
4,421 West Indians had registered with the Committee; in
September 1945, the total was 8,054.
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color.

The student angrily appealed and the matter was

referred to the Colonial Office.

He wrote that, "I can only

be a Private ... whereas White 'worms' who have neither my
education nor refinement, are readily accepted as Officers
merely because of a difference in pigmentation ... " 42

The

War Office attempted to evade the issue by arguing that
O.T.C.s technically did not form part of the armed forces of
the Crown, and, consequently, did not fall under the order
suspending the color bar in 1939.

Moreover, the War

Secretary, James Grigg, reminded the Colonial Office that
Aberdeen's contingent wore the kilt, and the officer who
refused Peat's application "no doubt had in mind the
probability that a Scotsman's susceptibilities might be hurt
by the sight of a gentleman of distinctly non-Scottish
appearance wearing the kilt." 43

Nevertheless, the War

Office relented on O.T.C.s and, subject to Colonial Office
assurances that they would receive commissions in their own
local forces, Black colonial students became eligible to
enroll. 44
42

Questions about this discriminatory policy at

P.R.O.
August 1940.
43

c.o.

820/45/22.

P.R.O. C.O. 820/45/11.
September 1940.
44

Peat to Colonial Office, 8
Grigg to Hall, 20

P.R.O. C.O. 820/45/11.
Peat to Strathdee, 6
August 1940; War Office to all Universities furnishing
Contingents of the Senior Training Corps, 14 December 1940;
and P.R.O. C.O. 820/49/12. Colonial Secretary to Gold
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universities continued into 1941. 45
After the 1939 Cabinet decision, Black Britons and
colonials became eligible for promotions and commissioning
on an equal footing with Whites.

According to Allan C.

Wilmot, a Black sailor on a naval minesweeper in 1942 and
1943 and later an R.A.F. sea rescuer, there was an
unwillingness among the services to promote Blacks to
positions of authority over Whites. 46

This may have been

the case in Wilmot's unit and others, but, overall, the
evidence indicates that, for the wartime emergency, the
services granted Blacks opportunities for considerable
advancement and responsibility.

Even the Royal Navy

commissioned at least one Black West Indian officer during
the conflict. 47
With the assistance of the Colonial Office, Arundel
"Joe" Moody received his commission by early 1940, 48 thus
setting a precedent for other "openly Black" officers.

Coast, 19 June 1941.
45

P.R.O. C.O. 829/49/12.
Students in the O.T.C., 1941.
46
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Allan C. Wilmot to author, 2 9 June 1995.

P.R.O.
December 1942.
48
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968/38/10.

Minute by Thomas, 15

Moody was the son of noted West Indian physician
and political activist, Harold Moody.
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Prior to the announcement of the color bar's suspension,
Moody, who possessed a public school education and O.T.C.
experience, applied for officer training with one of the
Guards regiments.

At first, the interview board attempted

to dissuade him by explaining the high expenses incurred in
the social life of the regiment.

After Moody assured the

board that his father would support him financially, the
officers presented an Attestation Form stipulating that only
British subjects "of pure European descent" were eligible
for commissions and advised him to enlist in the ranks and
hope for a commission.

Moody's father then appealed

directly to the Colonial Office.

Soon after, the government

announced the color bar's suspension, and Moody tried again.
The Colonial Off ice regarded Moody as a test case for the
government's new policy and sent an official, Colonel Cole,
to accompany Moody through his entire enlistment process,
including physical examinations. 49

In Moody's case, the War

Office waived the recently imposed requirement that all
aspirants for commissions serve in the ranks before applying
for a commission. 50

He joined an Officer Cadet Training

49

Moody. A Colonial Official had minuted that
Arundel Moody had answered an advertisement to the Royal
Tank Regiment.
P.R.O. C.O. 323/1673/6. Minute of 26
September 1939.
50

P.R.O. C.O. 323/1692/7212/4. Note on Dr. Moody's
Memorandum Calling for the Permanent Removal of the Colour
Bar, November 1939.

235

Unit (O.C.T.U.) in December and received a commission in the
Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment.
At the regimental depot, Moody's superiors warned him
that, while he was a first-class soldier, there would be
"dead silence" the first time he entered the regimental
officers' mess, but that he should not worry about it.
advice proved correct.

The

Moody fitted in well with his White

colleagues and did not experience any racism on the part of
British personnel.

The one possible exception occurred when

he attempted to transfer to the commandos, a request his
commanding officer refused on the grounds that the Black
officer would be required to infiltrate enemy lines, but
would stand out.

The government's interest in Moody

continued throughout the war.

A few years after

commissioning, a superior informed him that, according to
his file,

the War Off ice would not allow Moody to be demoted

except in the case of a very serious violation of military
regulations.

Presumably, this was a guard against potential

charges of institutional racism. 51
Another notable Black officer, Surrey-born Jimmy
Clarke, received his lieutenancy in March 1942, and
captaincy in October.

51

Moody.

In 1943, at the age of twenty three,
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he achieved the rank of major in a battalion of the Royal
Irish Fusiliers (R.I.F.).

Also, he earned a Military Cross

and Bar for gallantry in Tunisia and Italy, and became,
according to a regimental historian who does not mention
Clarke's "descent," a legend in the regiment. 52

According

to Joe Moody, who had heard rumors of a Black officer
serving with an Irish regiment in Italy, there was some
embarrassment about Clarke's attainment of such high rank
and responsibility in a White unit. 53

Another Black

officer, Sergeant Cyril C. Alcindor, had been a pre-war
regular soldier, and received a commission in 1944 and
attained a captaincy in 1946. 54

Though not a commissioned

officer, Sergeant Major Benjamin MacCrae commanded a platoon
in the Royal Norfolks and received the Military Medal for
skill and initiative at leading fighting patrols and killing
Japanese soldiers in Burma. 55
Britain's colonies in West Africa provided several
52

Amanda Moreno, Royal Irish Fusiliers Regimental
Museum, to author, 13 August 1996; Officeial Record of
Major Clarke's action of 1/2 December, quoted in Letter
(League of Coloured Peoples Newsletter ) 10, 56 (May 1944):
31.
See also, John Horsfall, Fling our Banner to the Wind
(Kineton:
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officers to the British army as part of the program of
"Africanization."

The first,

Seth K. Anthony had been a

teacher at Achimota College near Accra.

In 1939, he spotted

the announcement of the Local Forces Ordinance which
established, for the first time, officer cadetships for
Africans in the 5/Gold Coast Regiment, a territorial
battalion.

War came before Anthony had been in the program

for more than a few months, and he had to join the 5/G.C.R.
on a full-time basis, quickly earning promotion to sergeant.
In May or June 1941, General Sir George Giffard, British
commander in West Africa, summoned Anthony for a brief
interview and informed him that he was going to be sent to
Britain for officer training.

On 2 April 1942, Anthony

received a King's emergency commission, thus becoming the
first African officer commissioned for the R.W.A.F.F.
general, his White colleagues treated him well.

In

However, in

Burma, a British N.C.O. once refused to serve under Anthony,
but submitted after having been threatened with disciplinary
action by higher authority.

Ironically, after a time, this

N.C.O. did not wish to be transferred away from Anthony. 56
The second African R.W.A.F.F. officer, Tom Impraim,
recalled that White officers in Africa were polite, but
56

Anthony to author, 11 February 1997; and P.R.O.
C.O. 820/48/18. Commanding Officer, No. 17 Infantry
Training Centre, to Major J.C. Preston, 18 May 1942.
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there were few who would deal with him on equal and honest
terms. 57

Before the end of the wartime emergency in 1948,

several more West Africans received commissions.

Higher

military authority concluded that properly selected and
trained African officers "have held and are holding
commissions with full powers of command and punishment over
British troops with success." 58
Certainly, more Blacks received army commissions or
otherwise held positions of authority, but they possibly
passed for "White," or have simply gone unnoticed so far.
The R.A.F. probably commissioned more Blacks than the army
simply because it was the most glamorous of the services, no
doubt in part because of the publicity surrounding the
Battle of Britain.

No matter what their skin pigmentation,

many young men throughout the empire wanted to fly and the
R.A.F. wanted qualified individuals, no matter their color.
Of the four hundred Black colonial aircrew recruited during
the war, at least seventy gained officer commissions.

Most

Black aircrew, either officers or highly qualified N.C.O.s,
served successfully with White colleagues, but, in 1944, the

57

T.K. Impraim to David Killingray, Answers to
Questionnaire, 22 December 1980, Killingray Collection,
Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
58

P.R.O. W.O. 32/15483. Grant of Commissions to
Africans, by Nicholson, 26 August 1948.
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Colonial Off ice reported the case of a Black pilot who
complained that "some of his brother pilots said quite
openly that they refused to sleep alongside a -coloured
man." 59

With Flight Sergeant Sylvestre, a bomber pilot, the

R.A.F. faced the question as to whether Black pilots could
or should be placed in the command of large aircraft.

In

early 1944, dissension occurred among Sylvestre's White crew
on account of color and Sylvestre had previously earned a
reputation for being racially "super sensitive."
Unfortunately, Sylvestre's commanding officer took his
example as proof that Blacks could not make effective
Captains of Aircraft on the grounds that they could not
inspire the complete trust and confidence of their White
crew members. 60

Superiors removed Sylvestre from the

resistant crew and placed him in command of another.

It

appears that this case was an exception as most Black
aircrew flew,

lived, and sometimes died alongside Whites

free of racial antagonism.
IV.

Black Experiences in the British forces
As in the case of officers (and R.A.F. aircrew),

evidence suggests that most individual Black other ranks
59
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60
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Minute by Hutchinson, 16

P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269. Headquarters, No. 3 Group,
R.A.F., to A.J. Capel, Bomber Command, 17 May 1944.
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encountered relatively little racial animosity during this
period.

Alfie Lawes had superb relations with other Welsh

soldiers, officers, and even with his German prison guards.
Ramsay Bader, a gunner in the Essex Yeomanry, found a
friendly attitude among most people in uniform but, in one
instance, suffered at the hands of a regular soldier with
Indian experience.

Notably, Benjamin Macrae felt that the

harassment and bullying he initially experienced had been a
normal aspect of army life and reacted accordingly. 61
For most White soldiers, Black comrades were a
curiosity, a point emphasized in 1962 by a Ministry of
Defence official:
the ordinary British soldier (at least in the war)
was able to assimilate the odd one or two coloured
man [sic] very happily (indeed, they tended to
make "pets" of them, a fate which the people in
question accepted graciously, though goodness
knows what they really felt about it!) . 62
Perhaps being even more of a curiosity, Black service women
suffered little or no racism from other military personnel.
Black females,

if anything, were considered to be more of a

attractive novelty than a threat to White-dominated

61

This generalization is based on the accounts given
by the Black service personnel on file at the Imperial War
Museums as well as interviews conducted by the author.
62

P.R.O. DEFE. 7/1043.
January 1962.

Minute by W.B. Wilton, 2
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forces.

63

Overall, it appears that the diluted nature of

the services during war-time aided in making their White
members more hospitable to individual Blacks than they had
been in the small regular forces.
Nominally equal conditions of service did not extend to
the posting of Black service personnel who could not be sent
anywhere that their presence might prove embarrassing for
allied or colonial race relations.

For example, the R.A.F.

trained most of its aircrew overseas in the dominions but,
because of racial feeling in those places, Black colonial
personnel had to be brought directly to Britain for their
training.

However, in 1942, the Royal Canadian Air Force

agreed to accept Black R.A.F. candidates for training. 64
Blacks entered the British forces under the same
conditions as Whites and, therefore, their presence in
colonial settings raised questions about traditional racial
subordination.

In 1942, Black R.A.F. men in the Middle East

encountered "a distinct colour bar particularly amongst

63

Bousquet and Douglas mention no instances of
animosity against Black A.T.S. or Women's Auxilliary Air
Fore personnel. Norma Best, of British Honduras, and Lilian
Bader, of Yorkshire, told the author that Black servicewomen
were, in fact, quite popular.
64

P.R.O. C.O. 968/55/14. Colonial Office to
Caribbean Colonies, 7 November 1942, and Governor Sir A.
Gimble to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 November
1942.
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White colonial personnel."

They complained about the

discriminatory treatment they received in "cinemas,
restaurants, and other public places in towns in Egypt and
other countries ... "

In response, the Air Ministry decided to

withdraw Black R.A.F personnel to Britain, including V.A.
Bunting, a fighter pilot. 65

Inexplicably, in early 1943,

five West African airmen were posted to West Africa, which
resulted in the "most unhappy results" regarding
transportation and holding facilities.

Subsequently, the

Air Ministry withdrew them and undertook not to send any
more Black personnel to West Africa. 66

For similar reasons,

thirty four Black West Indian aircrew training in Canada had
to be informed that they could not be sent to their
squadrons in Southeast Asia because of color restrictions. 67
Curiously, Roland Alcindor, brother of Charles, an army
officer, flew with the R.A.F. as a Warrant Officer in
India. 68

Either Alcindor passed for White or he slipped
65

P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269. Air Ministry Minute, "Posting
of Coloured Personnel," 1 September 1942.
66

P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269. Resident Minister, West
Africa, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 March 1943
and reply, 12 March 1943.
67

P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269. United Kingdom Air Liaison
Mission, Ottawa, to Air Ministry, 9 June 1945.
68

Green. A Warrant Officer was an intermediate rank
between commissioned and non-commissioned officer and
denoted a special qualification.
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through the cracks in the racial barrier.
As was the case with the R.A.F., the army dealt with
the overseas assignment of its Black personnel
inconsistently.

Early in the war, Alfie Lawes volunteered

for service with a battalion of The Welch Regiment stationed
in India but was rejected because of racial considerations.
However, "race" did not prevent another Black Briton,
Benjamin Macrae, from serving as a senior N.C.O. and platoon
commander with the Royal Norfolk Regiment in Burma. 69

The

example of Joe Moody's voyage to the Middle East illustrates
the extent of racial hyper-sensitivity on the part of
dominion and colonial Whites.

In 1942, the army sent Moody

to East Africa to train African troops in anti-aircraft
tactics.

En route, his ship stopped over in Capetown but

the South African authorities forbade him to land.

Moody's

fellow passengers, mostly White British officers, "raised
hell."

The South Africans subsequently presented Moody with

a certificate asking that full courtesy be extended to this
British officer.

Once ashore, Moody's circle of friends

took the precaution of sending a White colleague ahead to
restaurants and bars to gauge the likely reaction to a
"coloured" officer.

69

Consequently, Moody's stay, which

Lawes, Interview by author, May 1996; Macrae,
Interview.
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lasted several weeks, passed without serious incident.
In East Africa, local authorities proved to be even
less receptive to Moody than those in South Africa.

The

White officers with whom Moody had arrived quickly received
postings but Moody remained at a depot, presumably isolated
as far as possible from Kenya's racially stratified society.
Nothing publicly happened to Moody, but he found himself
assigned to the French island of Madagascar.

There, he got

on well with the White British officers and African other
ranks.

The army then posted Moody to the Royal Artillery

Depot in Cairo, Egypt.

Before being assigned to a

particular battery, his superior officers discussed who
would take the Black officer.

Once accepted, Moody

experienced no outward signs of friction, but was told
afterwards that there had been problems because the unit
included a large proportion of bigoted Liverpudlians.

In a

demonstration of the "strange bedfellows" cliche, Moody
befriended several South African officers in the Middle
East, one of whom admitted that they could never be friends
in South Africa.

Incredibly, Moody accepted an invitation

to the South African officers' mess in Cairo. 70
After the United States entered the war, Britain and
its service personnel became involved in the "domestic"
70

Moody.
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racial conflicts of their American allies.

During Operation

Bolero, the American build up in Britain, violence
frequently occurred between European- and African-American
soldiers, especially in villages and towns where Black
soldiers competed openly for friends, women, pubs and
cinemas. 71
In order to foster good relations with its American
Allies as well as protect its own colonial service personnel
from precisely those same Allies, the British government
generally acquiesced to American segregation policies.

In

Britain, U.S. and British military officials often divided
the recreational facilities in a given town between their
respective personnel. 72

Also, certain postings became "off-

limits" to Black British servicemen in deference to White
American racism.

Thus, Black R.A.F. personnel could serve

in Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands based in Britain,
but R.A.F. Transport Command requested that it not be
assigned Black personnel because of its close contact with
U.S. personne 1 .

73

American sensibilities similarly affected

71

See Graham A. Smith, When Jim Crow met John Bull:
Black American Soldiers in World War II Britain (London:
I.B. Tauris & Co., 1987).
72

Baron Baker's account, in Forty Winters On:
Memories of Britain's Post-War Caribbean Immigrants
(Lambeth:
Lambeth Council, 1988), 17.
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P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269.
Ministry, 18 December 1943.
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British overseas assignments.

For example, in July 1943,

Flying Officer R.C.F. Foresythe, an R.A.F. code and cipher
expert, was transferred from North Africa to Britain because
of U.S. racial prejudice toward him. 74

The War Office

similarly refused to allow Black West Indian A.T.S. to serve
at its military mission in Washington, D.C. 75
Black and White members of the "integrated" British
forces often found themselves victims of American interracial conflict.

At a "Jim Crow" indoctrination lecture for

British military personnel, an American lecturer, according
to a British observer, "made no bones about the fact that
not to conform with the American view of race was to be the
victim of actual physical violence." 76

In a typical

occurrence White American soldiers threw "a coloured member
of the R.A.F." out of a pub.

On the following night, the

victim returned there with White comrades and "beat up the
Americans. " 77

Cy Grant, later a performer on the British

74

P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269. Headquarters, Northwest
African Air Forces to Air Ministry, 28 July 1943.
75

P.R.O. C.O. 968/81/4.
Stanley to Grigg, 15 April
and War Office to Caribbean Commanders, 21 April and Grigg
to Stanley, 19 May 1943.
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stage and screen, arrived in Britain from British Guiana in
1941 and became a navigator in R.A.F. 's Bomber Command.

In

Britain, he experienced no racism but, when a prisoner of
war in Germany, Britons and Nazis alike treated him with the
respect appropriate to his rank.
P.O.W. called him a "nigger."

However, an American

In Piccadilly Circus, an

American serviceman confronted Flying Officer Johnny Smythe
of Sierra Leone with the same racial slur as well as some
physical jostling.

The accosted R.A.F. officer, who had

been speaking with a White female,
cold.

laid the offender out

After a brief investigation, Smythe's commanding

officer unofficially congratulated his six foot six-inchtall subordinate. 78

In July 1944, an American court-martial

tried and convicted an American soldier of striking yet
another Black R.A.F. officer at a dance.

The victim

received an apology from a U.S. general while the offender
was sentenced to two years of hard labor and a dishonorable
discharge. 79

Beyond being onlookers or victims, Black

R.A.F. personnel at times acted as protectors of AfricanAmerican servicemen who sometimes felt reluctant to fight
back against White American military police. 80
78

Cy Grant, Interview by author, 16 June 1995;
Johnny Smythe, Interview by author, 4 June 1995.
79
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Allan C. Wilmot to author, 29 June 1995.
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Echoes of America's segregation policies existed in the
nominally desegregated British forces.

In November 1942, in

order to prevent Black colonial servicemen from being
demobilized in the United Kingdom after the war, the War
Cabinet had recommended that the forces concentrate these
men "in separate units," restrict their service to theatres
of war overseas, and repatriate them in complete units. 81
The tangible impact of this statement is difficult to
measure but, at least, it indicates the general frame of
mind of the British government.
In fact,
place.

informal types of segregation actually took

Many of Britain's Black army and R.A.F. personnel

served together in small groups of a few numbering from two
or three to several dozens within predominately White
support units where they endured the boredom and anxiousness
of rear area routine.

In units with significant numbers of

colonial Blacks, Black and White members commonly separated
themselves as much as possible.

The tendency for

individuals to cling together intensified as a result of low
morale, itself caused by the boring routine of military
life.

For example, at an army base at Clitheroe,

Lancashire, a number of West Indian soldiers complained

81

P.R.O. AIR. 20/9051. Extract from War Cabinet
Paper W.P. (42)498, 16 November 1942.
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about the slowness in assignment to army workshops, a lack
of promotion, the cold weather,

lower family allowances, the

slowness of the mail, and, ironically, of being unwillingly
inducted into the army. 82

Many expressed their resentment

at the cold climate and military discipline by disobedience
and assaults on N.C.O.s.

According A.J. Lane, a White

soldier, officers and N.C.O.s became reluctant "to have
anything to do with the wild men of the West Indies ... "
Lane forestalled deadly violence by secretly destroying a
cache of ammunition hidden by several disgruntled West
Indians. 83
In Egypt and Palestine, Black army personnel faced
problems similar to those in Britain.

In early 1944, a

group of Jamaican soldiers at No. 2 Electrical Base Workshop
in Egypt charged (a) that they were segregated from U.K.
soldiers;

(b) that the men received no opportunity to take

trade tests which would earn them promotion and pay
increases;

(c) that their letters were tampered with by

censors; and (d) that they had received no encouragement in
sports or congratulations when a West Indian team had won a

82

P.R.O. C.O. 968/37/10.
Moyne, 22 November 1941.
83

Harold Moody to Lord

A. J. Lane, "What more could a soldier ask of a
war," TMs., n.d., Imperial War Museum, London.
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cricket competition. 84

British commanders on the spot

discounted (b) and (c) and discovered that the segregation
of facilities had been introduced voluntarily when the West
Indians first joined the unit in November 1942, but had
since lapsed.

The authorities regretted non-recognition of

the cricket victory, but, overall, the investigators
concluded that, "there are no reasonable grounds for any of
the allegations of discrimination which have been made." 85
The R.A.F., although only about one-third the strength
of the army, included most of the services' total Black
colonial personnel.

Relatively good relations existed

between West Indian and British ground crew during most of
the war.

However, by the last year, the racial situation

within the R.A.F. worsened.

Following VE-Day, violent

clashes became frequent as all servicemen waited anxiously
for demobilization. 86

The Air Ministry blamed the

background of West Indians for these difficulties.

It cited

a correlation between poor upbringing, intelligence,
84

P.R.O. C.O. 820/58/9. Leonard Lyle, M.P., to
Oliver Stanley, 12 January 1944.
85

P.R.O. C.0. 830/58/9. Memorandum, "Treatment of
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86
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education and adaptability on the one hand with racial
friction on the other. 87

R.A.F. authorities reported that a

significant proportion of the later drafts of West Indians,
were not amenable to discipline and were inclined
to take the law into their own hands.
The
mentality of some of these was so low, their
unreliability so pronounced that they could only
be used for menial tasks and the effort of
administering them was not repaid by the output of
work.
They resented being given orders by N.C.O.s
and spoiled the reputation of the West Indian
Contingent as a whole by their outbreaks of
violence ... 88
Also, West Indian R.A.F. men complained directly to the
British government about racial discrimination instead of
seeking out their officers. 89

This would suggest that the

airmen did not feel confident of their officers' concern, a
most dangerous situation in and of itself.
It should be noted that the experiences of groups of
Black servicemen contrasted sharply with those of Black
individuals, whether officers or other ranks.

Once White

and Black personnel within a given rear area unit became
separated as visibly and culturally different groups,
friction and segregation in some form commonly developed.
87

P.R.O. AIR. 2/13437. "Recruitment of Personnel
from Colonies into post-war Air Force," 21 May 1945.
88

P.R.O. AIR. 20/1022. "Manpower Contribution of
the Colonies to the Royal Air Force, 1939-1945."
89
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Thus, with the exception of individual Black personnel, a
situation emerged that resembled that of the U.S. military.
Despite its traditional racial anxiety over Black
servicemen's contact with White settings, it does not seem
that the British government ever prohibited socializing
between its Black personnel and civilians.

Throughout the

war, the British people welcomed colonial personnel into
their villages and homes.

The behavior of a group of West

Indian R.A.F. ground crew training at a nearby base so
impressed the Yorkshire village of Hunmanby Moor that its
inhabitants signed a petition praising the behavior of Black
West Indian airmen. 90

E.M. Noble's description of an

English village he encountered as a member of the R.A.F.
reveals the ignorance of many British people:
On my walk almost everyone gave me a greeting, and
some, more bold than others, even stopped for a
chat. They wanted to know what part of the world
I was from, and marveled at the fact that I spoke
English perfectly, and without any trace of a
foreign accent.
The high spot of my afternoon's
walk for me was a darling old couple, who humbly
begged to be allowed to shake my hand for luck.
Until then I thought that sort of superstition was
confined to uneducated colonials. 91
When it came to wartime inter-racial romance, families
expressed surprise and White British personnel, occasional

90

Noble, 42.

91

Ibid., 41.
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jealousy, but, in general, Black servicemen associated
freely with, and, not infrequently, married, White British
women. 92

In a rare exception, British authorities

apparently attempted to assuage American sensibilities by
discouraging, though not prohibiting, White service women
from associating with African-American personnel. 93

This

attitude may have influenced race relations within the
British forces.

Baron Baker, a Jamaican R.A.F. policeman,

remembered an aloofness on the part of W.A.A.F. personnel at
service dances:

"When we tried to get dances all the

W.A.A.F.s would want to rest.

But when an English airman

approached, they would take the floor with them[sic] ."
Baker's commanding officer then instructed that W.A.A.F.s
not wishing to dance should avoid attending dances. 94

It

might have been that these particular W.A.A.F.s simply did
not wish to dance with Black servicemen.

In any case,

formal restrictions on inter-racial contact would have been
inoperable.

With regard to Black personnel, War Office

bureaucrats and generals had more pressing concerns than
enforcing sexual color bars.
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93
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The decolonization of Britain's Black empire had begun
in the inter-war period with constitutional concessions to
India, but the Second World War hastened the transition in
colonial relations.

In the process of transferring

political power, the British government hoped to maintain
close relations with current and former subjects.

One of

the consequences of this priority was the suspension of the
color bar in the British military.

The temporary end of the

color bar testified to Britain's anxiety to distance itself
from its no longer fashionable or tenable racial policies.
The ten thousand Black servicemen and -women made a
significant contribution to the British military effort
although many endured an unhappy existence within the
forces.

CHAPTER VIII
OLD PATTERNS AND NEW REALITIES IN THE BRITISH FORCES

For most of the Second World War, the leadership of all
three branches of H.M. forces assumed or hoped that they
would be allowed to re-impose the color bar once the war
ended.

In 1947, the British government decided that a

formally restored color bar would weaken Britain's
relationship with Black peoples of the empire and
Commonwealth.

Over the following five decades, the forces

as well as Black British subjects struggled with the
consequences of what would prove to be the government's
rather indifferent policy.
I.

The Future of the Color Bar
In April 1941, the League of Coloured Peoples informed

the Colonial Secretary, Lord Mayne, that one of their
members who was serving in the forces received a printed
notice regarding re-enlistment for regular service after the
end of hostilities.

It stipulated that applicants had to be

"of pure European parentage." 1
that,

The War Office explained

"these instructions embodied a pre-war practice which

1

P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/10. Extract from Letter, League
of Coloured Peoples to Lord Mayne, 24 April 1941.
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was due to the fact that a large part of the army served
abroad, and that it was undesirable to have coloured men in
the ranks of British units in Indian, Egypt, Singapore, and
so on." 2

The War Office acceded to a Colonial Office

request to revoke the restriction and adopt a non-committal
stance with regard to post-war enlistment and commissions. 3
However, in August 1943, when planning for the post-war
army, the War Office summarily decided to re-impose the
color bar to candidates for regular commissions. Oliver
Stanley, the latest Colonial Secretary, asked that the War
Office remove this stipulation because it flatly
contradicted colonial policy and that Black officers had
proven themselves worthy.

Stanley wanted to have the

question of the color bar re-examined, something with which
the War Office concurred, but with far different
intentions. 4
In December, the War Office informed the Colonial
Off ice that the good of the army required a color bar
because of the prejudices on the part of White soldiers and
2

P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/10.
Speed, War Office, to
Eastwood, Colonial Office, 12 July 1941.
P.R.O. c.o. 968/38/10.
Speed, War Office, to
Thornley, Colonial Office, 15 January 1942.
3

4

P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692. Memorandum, "Nationality and
Descent of Candidates for Permanent Commissions in H.M.
Forces," 28 November 1944.
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officers alike.

At the same time, the War Office

established a committee to study the issue in case it became
a matter of general government policy. 5

One of the factors

on which the War Office hoped to base its opposition was
physiology.

However, a scientific report prepared by an

army biologist for the War Office's "Nationality and Descent
Committee" repudiated any idea that physical limitations
impeded the efficiency of Black officers.

The report stated

that, "experience during the war has shown that every ethnic
group can provide successful candidates for commissions ... "
Apparently, the author of the report went beyond his
original brief by analyzing the origin of British racial
prejudice:
The color bar which looms so large in certain
human societies is mainly rooted in social and
economic considerations ...
It would seem that
males of our own group dislike the thought of
males displaying a constellation of
characteristics markedly different from our own,
mating with females of our own kind .... The
attitude of our own people toward individuals of
other ethnic groups and cultures is almost
entirely if not completely an acquisition from
their education. 6
The committee's chairman, Major General J.F. Hare, decided
5

P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692. Extract from the Minutes of
the 190th Meeting of the Excecutive Committee of the Army
Council held on 1 December 1944; and Draft Letter from War
Secretary to Colonial Secretary (marked 56A), n.d.
6

P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692.
Organization, 7 February 1945.

D.B.R. to Director of
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that these sentiments would not be circulated. 7
In its report, issued on 22 March 1945, the committee
formally objected to the inclusion of Blacks on several
grounds:
(a) [The Committee] consider that although nonEuropeans may possess many of the necessary
officer qualities, the crux of the matter is the
question of racial and traditional background.
It
cannot be expected that such officers will be able
to establish the relations with their men which
are essential if leadership is to be fully
exercised.
They feel that man-management would
never be satisfactory and in particular that the
officer could never be capable of dealing with the
family and domestic problems of his men. They
are, therefore, unanimously opposed to the
commissioning of men of non-European descent in
U.K. forces.
(b)
The Committee also feel that the enlistment
of non-Europeans in U.K. regiments and corps of
the Regular Army is undesirable. The case is
perhaps not quite so strong as it is against
commissioning, but there are two good reasons.
Firstly, there is evidence that in general the
non-European is not acceptable as a companion and
brother-in-arms to the British soldier. Secondly,
it is considered that in the post-war Army it will
be essential that no man entering the ranks should
be regarded as ineligible for a commission as
would be the case if our views at (a) are
accepted.
The committee's most startling conclusion was that,

"to get

the best results units must as far as possible be
homogeneous ... it must surely be undesirable for British
7

P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692. Minutes of the Third Meeting
of the Committee on the Post-War Regulations Respecting the
Nationality and Descent of Candidates for Entry to the Army
held 12 February 1945.
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soldiers to be commanded by men of another race." 8

At that

moment, thousands of British army officers served in the
various colonial forces throughout the empire.
In May 1945, the Air Ministry considered the "external"
difficulties involved in accepting Blacks for regular
enlistment.

First, Black R.A.F. personnel could not be

posted where they would encounter the color bars of the
United States, Rhodesia, and South Africa.

Secondly,

difficulties would be created by Black R.A.F. personnel
serving alongside Black colonial troops who were paid
considerably less than British servicemen. 9

In September

1945, George H. Hall, the new Labour government's Colonial
Secretary, adhered to his Conservative predecessor's policy
of ending the color bar and pressed the armed forces on the
issue.

In view of the successful service of Black aircrew

during the war, the Air Ministry over-rode its own racial
anxieties and broke with the other services, deciding that
the color bar should not be re-imposed for regular
commissions and enlistment. 10

In order to avoid

8

P.R.O. W.O. 32/10592. "Report of the Committee on
the Post-War Regulations Respecting the Nationality and
Descent of Candidates for Entry to the Army," 16 March 1945.
9

P.R.O. AIR. 2/13437. "Recruitment of Personnel
from Colonies into post-war Air Force," 21 May 1945.
10

P.R.O. W.O. 32/10592.
3 October 1945.

Air Ministry to War Office,
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embarrassing the other ministers, the Secretary of State for
Air, Lord Stansgate, undertook to enact the R.A.F.'s open
policy "as unobtrusively as possible." 11

Unilaterally, the

R.A.F. had decided to accept Blacks for regular enlistment
and commissioning provided that they met the standards of
Whites; that "they satisfy the Selection Board or recruiting
officers that they are likely to mix with other entrants and
hold their own in the corporate life of the Service;" and
that they travel to Britain at their own expense to attempt
their enlistment, in which success was not guaranteed. 12
Hoping to effect similar changes in policy elsewhere,
the Colonial Secretary circulated the R.A.F.'s new policy of
inclusion around to the other ministries.

The First Lord of

the Admiralty, A.V. Alexander, recognized that there were
"political and moral objections to the colour bar pure and
simple," but he still wished to maintain it.

Because of the

probable shrinkage of the service, Alexander argued that, it
was "essential that every man recruited to the Royal Navy is
of the highest possible calibre, capable of being used in
any ship or establishment ... in any part of the world,

nP.R.O. W.O. 32/10592.
Secretary of State for Air
to First Lord of the Admiralty, 19 November 1945.
12

P.R.O. AIR. 2/13437.
Recruiting, 21 February 1946.

Air Ministry to Inspector of
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whatever the climate and local racial prejudices may be."

13

In the spring of 1946, J.J. Lawson, the War Secretary
faced considerable pressure in Parliament regarding the
color bar.

Because the Colonial Secretary was determined to

raise the matter in Cabinet, Lawson proposed to his formal
body of advisors, the Army Council, that the color bar be
terminated in principle and allow practical difficulties to
impede Blacks from becoming officers.

The Army Council

unanimously balked at this compromise. 14

Lawson disagreed

with the professional officers but, nevertheless, presented
their views to the Cabinet as follows:
To describe the exclusion of coloured persons from
the British Army as an example of the colour bar
is an undue simplification of the problem.
Service in the British Army is not one of the
rights of man, nor indeed of British subjects ....
Moreover, it is the accepted policy of the Army
Council that men should be commanded by officers
having the same territorial connections as
themselves with some part of the British Isles,
e.g. that Scottish troops should be commanded by
Scottish officers ... Distrust of coloured men as
commanders may be a prejudice; but this prejudice
is nonetheless a fact which cannot be ignored in
assessing the fitness of the Army for its primary
duty, which is waging war. 15
13

P.R.O. W.O. 32/10592.
December 1945.

Alexander to Hall, 18
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P.R.O. W.O. 32/10592. Extract from the Minutes of
the Sixty-Fourth Meeting of the Army Council held on 12
April 1946.
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P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692. Draft Cabinet Paper,
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Yet again, the army refused to recognize and exercise its
control over the minds and bodies of its soldiers.
In June 1947, over War Office and Admiralty objections,
the Cabinet finally decided that,
British subjects and British protected persons of
non-European race should be admitted to the Royal
Navy and the British Army, provided that they
attained the requisite standards, were resident in
this country, and could satisfy the selection
authorities that they were likely mix with other
entrants and hold their own in the corporate life
of the services. 16
The Cabinet's decision followed the Air Ministry's
restrictive formula and embodied a minimum requirement to
formally end the color bars of the reluctant forces.
Shortly before the Cabinet's decision to end the color
bar to regular enlistment, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, the
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (the professional head
of the army), informed his staff that the regular army was
threatened by a dangerous lack of recruits. 17

Ironically,

but perhaps predictably, the army followed as restrictive a
recruiting policy as possible in order to perpetuate what it
considered to be necessary, if informal, racial

16

17

Quoted in Killingray, "Race and Rank," 282.

P.R.O. W.O. 163/282. "The Final Post-War Army:
Outline Statement of the Dangerous Situation that is likely
to develop unless we get more regular recruits," by Lord
Montgomery of Alamein, 30 May 1947.
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discrimination.

Adhering to the minimum requirements of the

Cabinet's decision, the War Office required that a Black
volunteer for the army must be a British subject or British
protected person and be resident in the United Kingdom.
Moreover, a Black applicant had to "satisfy the selection
authorities that he is likely to mix with other entrants and
hold his own in the corporate life of the army." 18

In

contrast, British subjects "of pure European descent" could
enlist at any British military base in the world. 19
The War Office's determination to retain an informal
color bar thwarted Black individuals throughout the empire
and commonwealth who wished for a career with the British
army as a method of escape from the lands of their birth.
For example, Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Indian (formerly
"Eurasian") children of British fathers and local mothers
looked to an uncertain future and they desired employment
and a secure life in Britain.

Similarly, many West Indians

hoped to be allowed to enlist as an escape from chronic
unemployment at home.

Generally, neither of these groups

could afford the luxury of a passage to Britain for a chance
to gain admission, but the War Office repeatedly rejected
18

P.R.O. W.O. 32/12913.
Commands, 13 October 1947.
19

P.R.O.
November 1952.

w.o.

32/12913.

Memorandum for All Home
War Office Minute, 25
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appeals for a change in policy.

20

A 1953 episode illustrates the army's determination to
remain as White as possible.

For administrative simplicity,

responsibility for army recruiting of White subjects in
Ceylon fell on the R.A.F.

Several Anglo-Indians

successfully enlisted in the army via the R.A.F. in Ceylon
by claiming European ancestry.

They were then sent on to

army authorities in Singapore, who subsequently discharged
them because "their retention in the army would establish a
dangerous precedent." 21

Obviously, these actions caused

hardship for the individuals involved and created potential
embarrassment for Britain.

The War Office resolved the

difficulty by transferring authority for army recruiting
from the R.A.F. in Ceylon to the army headquarters in
Singapore.

The British government continued to receive

large numbers of applications by Anglo-Indians for
enlistment, but the War Office steadfastly reaffirmed its
policy and told officials in India, Pakistan, and Ceylon to
tell prospective Black recruits to travel on their own to
Britain. 22
20

See the correspondence dated from 1948 through the
mid-1950s in P.R.O. W.O. 32/12913.
21

P.R.O. W.O. 32/12913. Minute of the Director of
Manpower Planning, 16 July 1953.
22

P.R.O. W.O. 32/12913. Director of Manpower
Planning to Commander-in-Chief, Far East Land Forces, 17
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II.

Gurkhas:

Britain's Beloved Black Soldiers

In contrast to its reluctance to accept individual
Blacks, the army enthusiastically employed Gurkha
mercenaries.

After India and Pakistan achieved independence

in 1947, both Britain and the new government of India
retained the services of several Gurkha regiments.
Britain's Brigade of Gurkhas served within the British
army as an administratively segregated element and the
Gurkhas' treatment has differed significantly from the rest
of the army.

While Gurkhas have been eligible for Queen's

commissions since 1947, the army did not appoint a Gurkha as
battalion commander until 1995.

Until February 1997, they

received less pay than other British soldiers and, under the
treaty governing Britain's employment of Gurkhas, they
received their army discharges and pensions in their
homeland.

Consequently, officers and N.C.O.s commonly

discouraged soldiers from marrying British or Chinese women.
Until 1997, the Gurkhas' primary mission had been to
patrol Hong Kong's borders against illegal immigrants from
mainland China, but the British army has used them in
various roles around the world.

For example, Britain

employed Gurkhas extensively to kill communist guerrillas in
Malaysia during the 1950s.

March 1954.

A battalion has occasionally
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served in Belize to protect that country against Guatemalan
imperialism and, for several decades, Britain has regularly
leased one battalion to the Sultan of Brunei.

Also, there

has usually been at least one battalion stationed in
Britain, where its members frequently perform ceremonial
duties.

A battalion recently served in Bosnia as part of

the British peacekeeping force, but Gurkhas have never been
deployed to Northern Ireland.

In 1989, George Younger,

Minister of Defence, reported to the Parliamentary Defence
Committee that, "We do not exactly bar it, but we think they
would not on the face of things be very suitable for
[Northern Ireland] duty, particularly owing to the language
difficulties." 23

In all likelihood, concerns about racial

antagonism have figured into this policy, beyond the problem
of language.

In the past, individual Black soldiers in

predominately White units have been "targets for special
abuse" by Irish mobs. 24

Propagandists on both sides of the

issue would probably protest the insertion of Gurkhas into
their own tribal conflict. 25
23

House of Commons, The Government's Announcement on
the Future of the Brigade of Gurkhas; Minutes of Evidence
(London: H.M.S.O., 1989), 10.
24

Angus MacPherson, "The colour clash that shook the
Army," Daily Mail, 21 November 1972.
25

It was Gurkha soldiers who fired on the unarmed
civilians in the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, an event still
officially mourned in India.
Ironically, the Republic of
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In successive budget reductions since 1947, the number
of Gurkha soldiers in British service has dwindled from
fourteen to three thousand, but a considerable lobby within
the government and army allowed them to continue, although
on a modest scale, in British service.

Historically, of all

the "martial races" which had comprised the Indian army in
the colonial period, the British military establishment and
public generally felt the greatest warmth and literary
interest for the Gurkhas recruited from Nepal. 26

In 1989,

however, parliamentary supporters of the Gurkhas disclaimed
sentimentality as their reason for maintaining the Brigade
of Gurkhas.

Instead, they cited a "dispassionate analysis

of the future role of the British army." 27

Although

practical arguments for maintaining the Brigade of Gurkhas
possess some merit, had the British not historically
romanticized the fighting abilities of the Gurkhas, they

India currently employs at least fifty thousand Gurkha
mercenaries, presumably because they are neutral and
effective instruments.
26

See, N.S. Lawrence, "The Gurkha as I know him,"
Chambers's Journal 104 (Aug. 6, 1927): 574.
For a typical
"scholarly" tribute, see Farwell, The Gurkhas (New York:
Norton, 1984).
For an analysis of how British military
historians treat the subject, see Lionel Caplan, "'Bravest
of the Brave': Representations of 'The Gurkha' in British
Military Writings," Modern Asian Studies 25, 3 (1991): 571597.
27

David Beneke, "Keep Gurkhas, say M.P.s," The
Guardian, 3 March 1989, p. 2.
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would have been disbanded decades ago.
The Gurkhas' reputation as loyal and enthusiastic
soldiers among Britons has been rivaled by accusations by
critics that Gurkhas were "savages" and tools of a
tyrannical New World Order.

Rumors of cannibalism preceded

a battalion that served in the 1982 Falklands-Malvinas war
between Britain and Argentina.

Argentines spread many

blood-curdling stories about the Nepalese "savages,"
accusations the British did little to dispel.

In New York

City, Argentine sympathizers protested the deployment of
Gurkha soldiers to the South Atlantic by greeting the
wartime troopship Queen Elizabeth II with a sign stating the
following:

"Beware!

In this ship are hiding 500 young

Argentinian head[sic] decapitated bye its fomers[sic]
passengers, the Gurkhas[sic] mercenaries." 28

More

incredibly, Gurkhas have been implicated in a supposed plot
to form a world dictatorship.

A number of American

conspiracy enthusiasts believe that a Windsor familycontrolled United Nations is conquering the United States by
means of Gurkha troops in Black helicopters. 29

28

Such fears

Farwell, The Gurkhas, photo and caption on page

172.
29

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "The British are coming,
says the apple pie home guard," Electronic Telegraph, 1 May
1995.
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have probably been fueled by mainstream suggestions that
Gurkhas be employed as professional peacekeepers in United
Nations operations. 30
III

A Final End to the Color Bar?
Gurkhas aside, by the end of the 1950's, the army

experienced acute difficulties in maintaining the regular
voluntary core of its mostly conscript army.

The War

Office's aversion to Black soldiers declined in proportion
to the rise in manpower requirements.

In 1947, the Cabinet

had compelled the army and navy to accept a few Black
applicants able to meet basic requirements, but nothing was
intended by the decision to prevent the forces from adopting
more open recruiting regulations in the future.

In 1957 and

1958, it considered the possibility of tapping Black
manpower from the colonies and newly independent
Commonwealth countries.

By the early 1960s, in a complete

reversal of policy, the army had begun actively recruiting
overseas in the West Indies, Seychelles and Fiji. 31

In

1968, 2,087 Blacks, excluding officers, were serving in the
army.

About 40 percent held non-commissioned rank, although

30

See, for example, Jennifer Griffin, "Homecoming
Blues:
Famed warriors lead difficult lives in Nepal after
being discharged," Far Eastern Economic Review 157 (7 July
1994) : 48-50.
31

P.R.O. W.O. 32/194521. War Office Paper,
"Recruitment of West Indians, 11 August 1961."
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largely at the lower end of the rank scale, i.e., corporals
and lance-corporals. 32

For the next twenty years, the

forces maintained no official published statistics
concerning Black service personnel.

However, in 1967, the

Times revealed that the army operated a 4 percent cap on
Black soldiers in most of its units and a complete ban in
"sensitive" assignments such as signals, intelligence and
advanced weapons. 33
Concerns about overseas posting continued into the era
of decolonization.

Throughout the 1950s, the army, "in

order to protect the dignity and status of coloured
personnel," prohibited Black soldiers from accompanying
their units to Kenya.

The army claimed that it did not wish

to send them "where they might suffer possible discourtesy
or embarrassment. " 34

The Admiralty came under public

criticism in 1961 because it withdrew seven Black sailors
from the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Victorious prior to an
official visit to South Africa.

Exceptions had been made

for Black sailors with family in that country because they

32

E.J.B. Rose, Colour and Citizenship: A report on
British Race Relations (London:
Oxford University Press,
1969), 306.
33

34

"Army Quota," Times (London)

P.R.O. DEFE. 7/1040.
17 May 1960.

8 May 1967, p. 4.

P.D. Martyn to Montgomery,
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already understood the racial climate. 35

Meanwhile, the

R.A.F avoided posting its Black personnel overseas,
including South Africa, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Kenya, Norway,
and "certain areas of the United States where colour
difficulties might be experienced."

The R.A.F. did not

officially compile statistics on race but, in order to
enforce its posting policy, maintained an informal list of
known (or, the author supposes, "suspected") Black
servicemen. 36

In September 1967, Britain's Middle East

Command banned Black airmen from the Persian Gulf, and, in
March 1967, from Aden for two reasons.
developed with the local populations.

First, difficulties
Secondly, and more

galling for the Black R.A.F. men, White R.A.F. police often
stopped and searched them as possible Arab terrorists.

In

contrast, both the R.A.F. and the army posted Black
personnel to Malaya served with no reported difficulty. 37
The Black experience in the scaled down regular forces
of the post-war era varied considerably, but generally seems

35

P.R.O. DEFE. 7/1040.
Lord Carrington, First Lord
of the Admiralty, to Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations, 5 June 1961.
36

P.R.O. DEFE 7/1040.
"Policy for Posting Coloured
Personnel to Overseas Stations," by A.W.B. McDonald, Air
Member for Personnel, 7 June 1960.
37

"Coloured R.A. F. men 'humiliated,'" and Minister
explains Aden ban," Times (London), 8 May 1967, p. 4.
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to have worsened over the decades.

Black servicemen

suffered from racism in the form of outright verbal or
physical violence, stereotyping, or in being made a "pet."
Barbadian John Ashton Brathwaite was an outstanding example
of a man thoroughly embittered by his army career in the
early 1960s.

He witnessed many cases of racism, especially

vicious name calling and intimidation.

At considerable

financial loss, he obtained an early discharge, citing the
fact that he gained no benefit from the army, could not
integrate socially, and "most important," he perceived the
British army to be "a brutal and racist organisation" in
which, he, "being a Black person, was wasting precious
time." 38

In addition to outright hostility, Black personnel

faced stereotyping by Whites.

For example, Allan C.

Wilmot's colleagues asked him whether he lived in a tree or
never needed a wash, or where he learned to speak English. 39
A former, and perhaps, typical, White officer informed the
author that "From my own experiences of [West Indian
soldiers] when we served in West Germany 1959-63 they
complained of the cold and when we were posted to Libya in
1963-66 all they wanted to do was lie in the shade of a palm

38

York:

J. Ashton Brathwaite, Black British Soldier (New
Kibo Books, 1986), 64.
39

Wilmot.
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tree." 40

More positively, but still patronizingly, many

individual Black servicemen became popular, 41 often being
remembered for their athletic abilities. 42
Black individuals have achieved high rank within the
forces.

In 1996, The King's Regiment had a Sikh captain who

had risen through the ranks 43 while the Royal Regiment of
Wales had a captain of Arab descent who had also been a
private soldier. 44

Trinidadian Larry Osborne joined the

R.A.F. in 1943 and remained with the service after the war,
served in a number of capacities and rose to the rank of
Group Captain before retiring in 1977. 45

Also, Jamaican

Vidal Dezonie enlisted in the R.A.F in 1944 and remained
until 1982, retiring at the rank of Flight Lieutenant.
Throughout his long service, he found the R.A.F. free of

40

N.D. Mcintosh to author, 27 November 1995.

41

R.A. Bonner wrote of two St. Lucians in the
Manchester Regiment: "They were very popular young men,
although rather fond of the German girls." Bonner
(Manchester Museum Committee of the King's Regiment) to
author, 24 January 1996.
42

J.S. Cowley (Light Infantry Office) to author, 28
November 1995; J.M. Grundy (Regimental Museum of the Royal
Regiment of Wales) to author, 6 December 1995.
43

Bonner.

44

Bryn Owen (Curator, The Welch Regiment Museum), to
author, 27 November 1995.
45

0bituary, Sunday Guardian (Port of Spain), 14
April 1996, p. 14.

274

racism.

46

In 1987, the highest ranking Black army officer

was a major general in the signals branch. 47

Although

Blacks can attain high rank, the author has not discovered
any Black officers in command of infantry or mounted units,
with the exception of a Gurkha battalion.
IV.

The Return of the Color Bar?
It appears that the 1970s witnessed the largest

presence of Blacks, proportionately as well as numerically,
in Her Majesty's forces,

especially the army.

It has been

estimated that, during the 1970s, Blacks made up 10 percent
of the army's Royal Green Jackets, an elite regiment,

48

and

about one hundred members of the Royal Anglian Regiment. 49
In 1987, however, only 1.6 percent of applications to the
forces came from minorities, although they comprised 5.7
percent of Britain's fifteen to twenty four year-old age
bracket.

The fear of racial abuse was believed to be a

factor for the low figures.

50

By 1990, the only infantry

regiments with a "noticeable number" of Blacks included the

46

Vidal Dezonie, in Forty Winters On, 11.

47

Killingray, "Race and Rank," 284.

48

Antony Beevor, Inside the British Army (London:
Chatto and Windus, 1990), 26.
49

50

Quoted in St. Jorre (de), 199.

"Forces Aim to breach colour barrier," Times
(London), 19 February 1988, p. A8.
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Green Jackets, the Parachute Regiment, and southeast English
regiments.

According to a recent account on the British

army, Scottish regiments have a well-known reputation for
loathing Blacks, "yet they have a great affinity for the
Gurkhas, presumably because they are fellow highlanders and
play bagpipes. " 51
From the mid-1980s, the forces have experienced
numerous publicized instances of racism.

Perhaps the most

embarrassing situation involved the Queen's personal
bodyguards, the Foot Guards and Household Cavalry regiments
of the Household Division.

These exclusive regiments, whose

ceremonial duties draw hundreds of thousands of tourists to
London annually, have stubbornly and notoriously resisted
accepting Black volunteers.

One of the tactics used by the

Guards to prevent Blacks from joining them had been to allow
applicants to go through the recruiting process, including
tests, medical exams, and interviews.

Black applicants

would then be told that, for undisclosed reasons, they
failed the physical or that no vacancies currently existed,
and that other regiments should be considered. 52

In 1986,

Prince Charles, in opposition to his father, the Duke of
Edinburgh, publicly criticized the Guards' color bar.

51

Beevor, 2 6.

~Quoted

in St. Jorre (de), 198.

In
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response, the Grenadier Guards admitted Richard Stokes who,
on 16 May 1988, became the first Black member of the
Household Division to stand guard at Buckingham Palace.
However, he left the regiment in 1990, ostensibly because of
racist threats and bullying. 53

In June 1995, the Commission

for Racial Equality charged that the elite Household Cavalry
regiments systematically excluded Blacks from enlisting or
transferring in from other units.

Soon after, the Royal

Life Guards accepted Mark Campbell. 54
Public pressures forced the Ministry of Defence to
encourage minority enlistment by adopting equal
opportunities directives and monitoring the number of Blacks
in the forces.

In 1988, the forces recorded the entrance of

28,652 Whites (35 percent of 81,098 applicants), 195 Blacks
(24 percent of 825 applicants), seventy three Asians

(18

percent of 398 applicants), thirty four Other Ethnic Groups
35 percent of ninety six applicants), 459 not specified (39
percent of 1,174 applicants) . 55

The Ministry of Defence

rejected an all-party committee's demand that it monitor the

53

"Black Guard at Palace," Photo., Times (London),
16 May 1988, p. 3.
54

"Army racism under fire," Sunday Times (London),
18 June 1995, sec. 1, p. 5; "First Black Life Guard asks to
leave the Army, Times (London), 9 December 1995, p. 9.
5

5Ministry of Defence, U.K. Defence Statistics
(London: H.M.S.O., 1994), 34.
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number of Blacks enlisted into each particular regiment of
the army. 56 The refusal allowed individual regiments to
continue barring Blacks.
Discriminatory recruiting policies coincided with
accusations of rampant racial abuse within the forces,
especially the army, to discourage prospective minority
applicants.

In the late 1980s and 1990s, a number of Black

servicemen and ex-servicemen filed suit against the Ministry
of Defence.

In early 1987, Stephen Anderson left the army

because, while a private in the Devon and Dorset Regiment,
he allegedly suffered verbal and physical abuse at the hands
of White soldiers. 57

In 1991, the Ministry of Defence

awarded him five hundred pounds. 58

In 1988, the army

discharged Winston Lindsay, the second Black Grenadier
Guard, for going absent without leave, just nine months
after enlistment.

Two years later, he sought damages from

the Ministry of Defence for racial harassment and
discrimination. 59

Similarly, Geoffrey McKay, formerly of

56

"Race check rejected," Times (London), 19 July
1988, p. 2.
57

"Forces aim to breach colour barrier," Times
(London), 19 February 1988, A8.
58

"Compensation," Times (London), 16 October 1991,

p. 8.
59

"Big guns fail to quell army racism claims, Times
(London), 28 January 1990, p. clO.

278

the Queen's Own Royal Irish Hussars, received eight thousand
pounds in 1992; and Anthony Evans of the Royal Regiment of
Wales, eighty-five hundred pounds in 1993. 60

Evans

testified that a kangaroo court of his colleagues had
charged him with "being Black." 61
The decisions in favor of the soldiers directly
challenged the services' long-held assumption that soldiers'
behaviors and attitudes could or should not be controlled by
higher authorities.

The army confirmed the change in

attitude in early 1996, when it issued all soldiers with a
code forbidding racist jokes, graffiti, nicknames, terms,
and the "exclusion of indi victuals from social occasions. " 62
Also, the commanding officer of the Household Cavalry, a
regiment which had been singled out by the Commission for
Racial Equality for "institutional discrimination," ordered
every member of the regiment to attend race relations
classes as part of his training. 63

Furthermore, in July

60

"Army racism under fire," Times (London), 18 June
1995, sec. 1, p. 5.
61

Hugh Muir, "Officers mostly to blame," Electronic
Telegraph, 5 March 1996.
62

Philip Johnston, "Army aims to curb racism in its
ranks," Electronic Telegraph, 28 March 1996.
63

"Household Cavalry to be taught a lesson on racial
discrimination, Times (London), 29 March 1996, p. 1.
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1997, the Ministry of Defence created a confidential
telephone help-line for Black service personnel "who feel
they are being bullied and do not know what to do about it
or how to make an official complaint. " 64 Thus, Black service
personnel received permission to circumvent the chain of
command to seek relief.
Despite the current trend of downsizing, the army has
been unable to recruit enough men to meet its shrinking
requirements, in part because of low minority enlistment.
Minority recruitment in 1993-4 stood at 1.8 percent in the
navy, 1 percent in the army, and .5 percent in the R.A.F.

65

To deflect criticism, the Ministry of Defence produced a
number of recruiting brochures in the 1990s specifically
targeted for racial minorities.

Often presented in several

languages, they invariably contained personal testimony by
serving Black service personnel disclaiming any experience
of discrimination. 66

Unfortunately for service recruiters

and public relations officers, in April 1996, the minority
presence in the forces stood at 1.4 percent with only 1.1 of
64

Joy Copley and Hugh Muir, "MOD acts to stamp out
racism in the ranks," Electronic Telegraph, 28 July 1997.
65

"Advisors to combat racism in Army, Times
(London), 28 March 1996, p. 6.
66

The Ministry of Defense provided the author with
recruiting literature developed with racial minorities in
mind.
In a navy brochure, an officer of Sikh descent is
featured in a naval version of the turban.
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all off ice rs being Black. 67
In 1996, the Office of Public Management (O.P.M.)
reviewed the ethnic recruiting initiatives and racial
atmosphere of the three branches.

The navy, according to

the O.P.M.'s report, was "not justified in describing itself
as an equal opportunities employer. " 68

Meanwhile, the

O.P.M. criticized the army because "racially offensive
language, behavior, and attitudes remain a significant
feature of life in the Army." 69

The O.P.M. urged the

services to reform themselves in order to better reflect the
diversity of the British population and tap an underrepresented source of manpower. 70
As part of the military's new policy of racial
inclusion, an updated version of the famous First World War
"Your Country Needs You" poster has been adopted by the
Ministry of Defence's public relations firm.

In it, the

face of a Black Royal Artillery officer replaced that of
Lord Kitchener, one of the most successful and influential
imperial generals of the Victorian and Edwardian eras. 71
67 0ffice for Public Management, Review of Ethnic
Minority Initiatives:
Final Report (London:
1996), 14.
68 0.P.M. Review:

Royal Navy/Royal Marines,

690. p .M. Review:

Army,

70 0.P.M. Review:

Final Report, 11-2.

4.

6.

71 Andrew Gilligan, "'We got it wrong on Blacks, '
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Army chief admits," Electronic Telegraph 12 October 1997.
Dr. Jo Hays pointed the new recruiting strategy out to the
author.

CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to trace how the racial
attitudes of the British military establishment affected
imperial defense policy from the Glorious Revolution through
the present, with an emphasis on the period from 1900 to
1950.

Historically, Black colonial troops formed a crucial

part of the imperial order of battle, but British racial
views limited the extent of colonial military participation.
By adhering to the "martial races" theory, British
authorities relied upon a relatively small proportion of
their subjects for military service.

Also, the degree of

White racial anxiety was expressed through policies
regarding locally raised militia and volunteer corps.
Further, the fear for White prestige, which would be
supposedly weakened by inter-racial sex and violence, made
the British reluctant to bring Black troops into contact
with Europeans outside of structured colonial settings.
Other, seemingly "practical," matters limited the
involvement of colonial troops in British war efforts.
First, a lack of "suitable" officers restricted the
expansion of colonial forces during the world wars.

Prior

to Indianization and Africanization, the empire-justifying
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idea of White prestige had necessitated Black subordination.
Non-European officers were introduced into the colonial
forces gradually and only as part of the process of decolonization.

Secondly, colonial troops never received the

confidence of British authorities in regard to military
effectiveness.

In the nineteenth century, the British

assumed that White troops were inherently better than Black
soldiers.

However, as Social Darwinism lost ground in

Britain and the complexity of warfare increased during the
twentieth century, British authorities generally cited
cultural and educational background for the superiority of
White soldiers.

The lack of education, in turn, owed much

to British policies informed by stereotypes and political
requirements.

Finally, the British had decided that Black

colonial troops could not be brought to Europe because they
would die in the cold climate, a belief that had mirrored
the British army's own medical experience in tropical
regions.
In the British armed forces proper, formal policies
concerning Black enlistment and commissioning changed
significantly over time, although the actions of the forces
usually reflected a desire to restrict Black enlistment as
much as possible.

The Georgian army and navy frequently

sought out Black recruits to serve in the roles of musicians
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or seamen.

To appear superior in a growing multi-racial

empire justified by Victorian constructions of "race," the
forces had to be or, at least, pose as racially pure.
British military policy and attitudes limited who could
serve and these policies ran counter to the chronic scarcity
of recruits experienced by the forces throughout their
histories.

The acceptance of the scarcity of recruits was

part of the trade off of colonial rule over Black subject
peoples.

In the First World War and again in the Second,

the imperial government over-ruled military sentiment and
temporarily suspended the color bar.

These actions

reflected a political anxiety about the racial situation
within the empire.
The period since the Second World War witnessed many
changes in the colonial relationship between Britain and its
Black subject peoples although one nostalgic throwback to
the "glory" days of empire has been the continued employment
of Gurkha mercenaries.

Reflecting new political realities,

the government permanently removed the color bar in 1947.
However, within the forces, it appears that race relations
have not been harmonious.

During the past decade, they

actually deteriorated and minorities have been discouraged
from enlisting.

The forces have now come under close public

scrutiny for widespread racism, but they have retained a
remarkable degree of internal autonomy in resolving their
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chronic race problems.

The army's sentimental attachment to

the "martial races" theory of a by-gone empire has coalesced
with its hostility to Blacks in a current Ministry of
Defence plan to integrate, into existing recruit-starved
British units, hundreds of redundant Gurkha soldiers whose
own units disbanded as a direct result of the return of Hong
Kong to China.
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